Taking a stance: experimenting with deliberation in dialogue by Concannon, Shauna
Taking a stance: experimenting with
deliberation in dialogue
Shauna Julia Concannon
Primary Supervisor: Professor Patrick G. T. Healey
Secondary Supervisor: Dr. Matthew Purver
Department of Electronic Engineering and Computer Science
Queen Mary University of London
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
September 2017
For Christopher Bohan, patron plumber extraordinaire.
Declaration
I, Shauna Julia Concannon, confirm that the research included within this thesis is
my own work or that where it has been carried out in collaboration with, or supported
by others, that this is duly acknowledged below and my contribution indicated.
Previously published material is also acknowledged below.
I attest that I have exercised reasonable care to ensure that the work is original,
and does not to the best of my knowledge break any UK law, infringe any third
party’s copyright or other Intellectual Property Right, or contain any confidential
material.
I accept that the College has the right to use plagiarism detection software to
check the electronic version of the thesis.
I confirm that this thesis has not been previously submitted for the award of a
degree by this or any other university.
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or






Shauna Concannon, Pat Healey and Matthew Purver. Opening Up and
Closing Down Discussion: Experimenting with Epistemic Status in
Conversation. In the 39th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science
Society (CogSci), London, July 2017.
Shauna Concannon, Patrick GT Healey, and Matthew Purver. Taking
a stance: a corpus study of reported speech. In Proceedings of the
19th SemDial Workshop on the Semantics and Pragmatics of Dialogue
(GoDial), Semdial Workshop, 2015a.
Shauna Concannon, Patrick GT Healey, and Matthew Purver. Shifting
opinions: An experiment on agreement and disagreement in dialogue.
In Proceedings of the 19th SemDial Workshop on the Semantics and
Pragmatics of Dialogue (GoDial), Semdial Workshop, 2015b.
Shauna Concannon, Patrick GT Healey, and Matthew Purver. How natu-
ral is argument in natural dialogue? In 16th Workshop on Computational
Models of Natural Argument, New York, July 2016.
Shauna Concannon, Patrick GT Healey, and Matthew Purver. Open-
ing up and closing down discussion: Experimenting with stance in
conversation. In preparation.
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervision team: Pat Healey for the many conver-
sations, head scratching sessions and the support that he has shown throughout this
process. Thank you for the endless frank, provocative and stimulating conversations,
fostering renewed excitement when I had ground to a halt. I would like to thank
Matthew Purver for his thoughtful advice, always delivered with clarity - from study
design to detailed explanations of how to make computers do things, I’ve valued
your contributions throughout. Graham White (together with Matt) interviewed me
for the PhD programme - thank you for taking a chance on an English Literature grad
and being a wonderful source of support when feeling out of place in a Computer
Science Department. I would also like to thank my examiners for their thoughtful
comments and incisive questions that helped me to think afresh about my work and
improve it.
Countless others have supported the development of my ideas along the way.
Irene, our discussions and disagreements were a source of inspiration and set in
motion a train of intrigue which is still running. Quin, for being my companion in the
process, proof reading, and nagging me continually to work more. And for the spare
room - a good chapter. And friends who showed continuing support, accepted when I
went M.I.A, and sent packages to cheer me on (Laura, Laura, Mairead, Lexie, Nikki
and Vicki in particular, but all the rest of you too). And my family, who stopped
asking, ‘when will you get a real job’, and allowed me to hermit myself away when
needed and housed and fed me when that was called on too. And of course the
QMUL family: Chris and Arash for showing me the ropes, teaching me how to
conduct experiments, and the dark arts of the DiET; the Media & Arts Technology
crew, Louis, Henrik, Dave, Nicole, Matt Jarvis, Sophie, Vincent, Louis and the rest,
for all the conversations and helping me find my way, back when I was wondering
what on earth a ‘for loop’ was.
And lastly I would like to thank Davy, who has been alongside me for much of this
journey, one of the great discoveries along the way. For the ongoing conversations
about research in general and particular, it’s been a real pleasure.
This work was funded by EPSRC through the Media and Arts Technology
Programme, an RCUK Doctoral Training Centre EP/G03723X/1.
Abstract
How do people manage disagreements in conversation? Previous studies of dialogue
have shown that the interactional consequences of disagreement are not straight-
forward. Although often interpreted as face-threatening when performed in an
unmitigated manner, disagreement can also encourage novel contributions. This
thesis explores how systematically altering the presentation of someone’s stance
influences the deliberative potential of a dialogue.
A corpus analysis of ordinary conversations shows that exposed disagreement
occurs rarely, but that speakers can signal a potentially adversarial position in a
variety of other ways. One of the most interesting among these is the way people
mark their rights to speak about something. Resources such as reported speech and
prefacing incongruent content with discourse markers (e.g. ‘well’) can be important
to the management of interpersonal factors.
The idea that disagreement is problematic but also useful for deliberation is
examined. Using a method that allows fine-grained manipulations of text based
dialogues in real-time, agreement and disagreement fragments are inserted into a
discussion dialogue. The findings show that inserting exposed disagreement violates
the conventions of polite dialogue leading participants to put more effort into the
production of their replies, and does not improve levels of deliberation.
This raises the question of whether manipulating apparent degrees of speaker
commitment might be more important for influencing the quality of deliberation. An
experiment was devised which presented oppositional content with differing degrees
of ‘knowingness’. The findings indicate that marking stance as knowing leads to
less guarded exchanges, but does not increase deliberation. Conversely, framing
statements as less knowing increases the likelihood that participants consider more
alternative viewpoints, thus increasing the deliberative quality of a dialogue.
Potential applications include training guidelines for professionals developing
tools to support considered debate. Implications for computational argumentation
studies include the importance of interpersonal dynamics and stance construction for
formulating polite arguments.
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How do people manage disagreements in conversation? Disagreement is generally
regarded as socially problematic and previous studies of dialogue have shown that
the interactional consequences of disagreement are not straightforward. Although
often interpreted as a face-threatening act when performed in an unmitigated man-
ner, disagreement can also encourage novel contributions. Political theorist and
philosophers have long acknowledged the importance of disagreement for reasoning
and public opinion. Deliberative theory posits that good decisions can be reached
only after multiple viewpoints have been consulted and considered (Bohman and
Rehg, 1997; Dewey, 2004; Habermas, 1984). While this procedure is established and
expected in formal discussion contexts, in interpersonal dialogues this process can
be subject to additional social factors which can make the process more complex. In
this thesis the idea that disagreement is problematic but also useful for deliberation
is examined. In particular, it explores how systematically altering the presentation of
someone’s position on an issue affects the deliberative potential of a dialogue.
In this thesis, an empirical approach to is taken to understand the interactional
effect of presenting contrasting viewpoints in dialogue. This involves interpreting
how individuals form, present, adjust and respond to the expression of a speaker’s
position. Furthermore, dialogue is conceived as a collaborative process, in which par-
ticipants actively work to establish a common ground fit for current purposes. Thus,
within this conceptualisation of interaction, ‘stance’ is a fundamentally interactional
matter, by which whatever is treated as the difference between those involved in an
interaction (i.e. by the participants themselves), emerges through what is said and
the display of disagreement.
In order to understand the social factors that affect this interactional phenomenon,
the ways in which agreement and disagreement are presented in dialogue is explored,
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with a consideration of how politeness impacts on this. In particular, it is considered
whether (dis)agreements are presented more freely in situations where the risk of
direct face-threat is removed, for example in reported speech, or problem solving
tasks in which (dis)agreements are anticipated and perhaps welcome. Furthermore,
how levels of speaker ‘knowingness’ affect participants’ willingness to consider
alternative viewpoints is also considered. Using a combination of corpus studies
together with experimental investigations, this thesis explores how different methods
of framing speaker position can alter the deliberative potential of a dialogue.
1.2 Motivation
This thesis sets out to deepen the understanding of the phenomena associated with
how people present their position or viewpoint on a given topic, particularly when
this is oppositional to prior contributions, together with the specific interactional
consequences of such acts. The topic of disagreement is framed within a wider
discourse on stance. Stance is a relatively new term in the field of linguistics and
pragmatics, that is variously used in the place of prior linguistic notions such as
evaluation, attitude and modality in language. However, it has been conceived and
applied differently by different researchers. However, it is essentially bound to the
ways in which speakers position their contribution in relation to alternatives.
A motivating factor behind this research is an interest in how individuals are
led to reconsider their position on a topic, and how and when this occurs through
interaction. Can the different ways of presenting a position to an interlocutor impact
on the potential for deliberation within a dialogue? Disagreement is the process
by which different positions on a given topic are negotiated in dialogue, however,
there are a number of different ways that speakers can convey disagreement. How
people present their position on a given topic, or the epistemic stance they take
in an interaction manifests in a number of ways linguistically. Furthermore, it is
essentially dialogic, i.e. relational to alternative stance positions. As such, the focus
of our enquiries is not only how epistemic stance is marked in conversation, but
also the articulation of agreement and disagreement, so that the trajectory of stance
shifts can be tracked, and understood in terms of the interaction. In computational
linguistics these challenges have been addressed to some degree in classification and
detection tasks within opinion, stance and argumentation mining. More qualitative,




To test these ideas we need to identify the contexts in which politeness constraints are
weakened or removed. We explore how agreement and disagreement are presented
in dialogue and how politeness impacts on this. In particular, we are interested
in whether (dis)agreements are presented more freely in situations where the risk
of direct face-threat is removed. Two examples are in reported speech, where the
absence of the original addressee removes the necessity for politeness, and problem
solving tasks in which (dis)agreements are anticipated and perhaps welcome. Using
a combination of corpus studies together with experimental investigations, methods
for detecting stance and disagreement are developed, with a view to understanding
the causal effects on the deliberative quality of a dialogue.
An important corollary of this approach is it explores the consequences of
disagreement, in particular, the hypothesis that it promotes shifts in stance. The
recent literature shows an increased interest in addressing the challenge of identifying
the stance a speaker holds on a given topic. There is a gap in the literature relating
to the negotiation of stance in interaction and detecting when a speaker shifts their
stance during the course of dialogue. While other studies have sought to extract
stance and opinions from blog posts or discussion forums, the static nature of these
modes of communication differ to the agenda outlined here in the following way:
we are interested in how to detect stance, and in particular shifts or re-orientation of
a speaker’s stance, in real-time interaction. Politeness impacts on such interactions
much more directly, and consequently this thesis will attempt to connect the research
on stance with the literature on politeness.
1.3.1 Research Questions
• How do people present their position or ‘point of view’ on a given topic?
• Can different ways of presenting an oppositional stance affect the interac-
tional consequences and deliberative quality of a dialogue (i.e. the number of
alternatives consider before a given stance is settled upon)?
• Are certain stance constructions preferred for delivering contentious content,
for example reported speech?
• How do facets of stance construction such as speaker commitment, degree
of certainty and reference to an information source affect the potential for
deliberation and the amount of collaboration and co-construction of stance?
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1.4 Outline of Thesis
1.4.1 Chapter 2
A detailed review of the relevant literature is presented in order to situate the work
conducted for this thesis. In particular, different theoretical conceptions and empirical
studies on disagreement and stance in interaction are reviewed, including Appraisal
Theory, Interactional Linguistics and Conversation Analysis. The conception of
stance as an interactive event, as opposed to denoting of a private attitudinal state,
is explored and the particular markers with which speakers can index agreement,
disagreement and stance are presented.
1.4.2 Chapter 3
In Chapter 3 an analysis of a corpus of ordinary conversations is conducted to assess
the distribution of markers indexing agreement, disagreement and ‘stance’ in different
types of speech in the British National Corpus. Samples were drawn for comparison
from reported and direct speech, as the former provides a potential context in which
to investigate opinions expressed without fear of face-threat. The distributions of the
markers in these different conversational contexts are explored and provide the base
motivation for the experiments presented in the next two chapters.
1.4.3 Chapter 4
Drawing on the observations of the corpus study in Chapter 3, an experiment is
presented in which the causal effects of exposed (dis)agreement is examined. Dyadic
dialogues are manipulated in real-time, so that speakers’ contributions appear to
contain instances of exposed agreement and disagreement. As exposed disagreement
rarely occurs in naturally occurring speech, this enables its effect on the dialogue
and quality of the deliberation to be examined under controlled conditions.
1.4.4 Chapter 5
In Chapter 5 a second experiment is presented in which the apparent degree of
speaker commitment to a given stance is manipulated, to present utterances as more
or less ‘knowing’. By investigating the impact of altering the epistemic framing of a
stance as ‘knowing’ or ‘unknowing’, the interactional effect of more subtle devices
for presenting oppositional content in dialogue is explored.
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1.4.5 Chapter 6
Chapter 6 concludes the thesis and provides a discussion on the findings resulting
from the work. Referring back to the relevant literature it outlines the developments
made within the work and potential applications, alongside the limitations of the
study and proposals for further development.
1.5 Associated Publications
Throughout the development of this thesis parts of the corpus analysis and experi-
mental work have been published at international academic conferences within the
fields of semantics and pragmatics and computational approaches to argumentation.
1.5.1 Chapter 3
The corpus study of disagreement in reported and direct speech was presented at
SemDial 2015 in Gothenburg, Sweden, in the paper Concannon et al. (2015a).
1.5.2 Chapter 4
The experimental work on the causal effects of exposed agreement and disagreement
was also presented at Semdial 2015 in Gothenburg, Sweden, in the paper Concannon
et al. (2015b).
1.5.3 Chapter 5
The experimental work on the causal effects of knowing and unknowing presentations
of speaker positions was submitted to CogSci 2017 in the paper Concannon et al. (In
preparation).
1.5.4 Additional Publications
The development of the thesis as a whole led to the publication Concannon et al.
(2016), which addresses how detecting informal argument requires an understanding
of interpersonal dynamics, politeness and more implicit stance markers, and the




This thesis explores how systematically altering the presentation of someone’s stance
on an issue alters the deliberative potential of a dialogue. The idea that disagreement
is problematic but also useful for deliberation is examined. Using a method that
allows fine-grained manipulations of text based dialogues in real-time, agreement
and disagreement fragments are inserted into a discussion dialogue. The causal
effects of exposed disagreement has not hitherto been examined; nor has how the
degree of knowingness can impact the level of constructive engagement and quality
of deliberation in a dialogue.
This research sets out to extend the work on disagreement by focusing on how
differing positions are negotiated in dialogue. In particular, it addresses the different
ways in which oppositional positions are presented in dialogue can serve to open
up or closed down a dialogue in ways that can effect the deliberative quality of
a discussion. Shifts in position should signal ‘constructive engagement’ within a
discussion, from a deliberative sense, and through this research we hope to investigate
whether such an approach can help us to understand if, how and when disagreement
is productive. There is currently limited research directly connecting the work from
sociolinguistics on politeness and disagreement with the work on stance-taking from
interactional linguistics and conversation analysis. Furthermore, there is little work
evaluating the causal effect of different stance constructions through experimental
methods, rather it is dominated by theoretical, corpus and fine-grained qualitative
approaches.
Studies of disagreement and politeness are dominated by corpus and observa-
tional approaches. This has yielded rich insights, however it is also problematic
because although it is possible to gather data on the avoidance of disagreement
and the preference of politeness, it can offer little insight into what happens when
disagreement does occur in dialogue. Similarly, although a number of descriptive
studies based on observations of discourse marker usage exist, experimental studies
in this area are still rather scarce.
Despite the limited experimental work on the interactional effects of stance mark-
ing, notable exceptions include Fox Tree (2002) which presents an experimental
approach to investigate the effect of pauses and ums at turn exchanges, Fox Tree and
Schrock (1999), which demonstrates how the discourse marker Oh can be used to
negotiate speaker positions and Põldvere et al. (2016) which examines the effect of
prosodic differences in how particular epistemic stance markers are interpreted and
processed. What such an approach affords is two fold: to assess the interactional
effect of certain linguistic markers in order to more fully understand their role in
stance-taking and deliberative dialogue; and import the significance of interactional
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dimensions of stance-taking in such a way that could be potentially utilised by
computational systems. Building on such approaches, in this thesis a combination of
observational and experimental methods are used to investigate the causal effects of




When we disagree with a conversational partner, we have a number of different ways
to convey that we are taking an oppositional stance. Does how we present a stance
have interactional consequences, such as opening up or closing down the dialogical
landscape?
Despite being relatively familiar and intuitive concepts, establishing a clear op-
erational understanding of what stance and disagreement are has proven difficult
to pin down. The literature on disagreement and stance in dialogue incorporates
qualitative and quantitative approaches and research from computational linguistics,
corpus linguistics, interactional and sociolinguistics and conversation analytic tra-
ditions. The question of how stance and disagreement are enacted and the social
and interpersonal consequences of such communicative acts also intersects with the
concepts of politeness and ‘face’.
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Rudy: If it’s two of you living in
the house right [pause] the
poll tax isn’t paid by one
person, it’s each person is,
is responsible for their own
poll tax
Joy: No they’re not
Rudy: No, if one’s not working
and the other one’s working,
the one that isn’t working’s
supposed to get relief on it
Joy: No, you’re wrong, you’re
wrong, you’re totally wrong
Table 2.1 Exposed disagreement
from the British National Corpus
A: im sure plenty of doctors
think that they’re on the
brink
B: he is very smart, so he
probably isn’t over exag-
gerating
[pause]
B: he might be but i think its
unlikely that he is exagger-
ating
Table 2.2 Subtle disagreement
taken from an experiment tran-
script
The examples in Table 2.1 and Table 2.2 both feature disagreements, however,
the way in which participants present their contributions and position them as
oppositional is handled quite differently. In table 2.1 both speakers are markedly
pitting themselves in opposition to one another; they are taking oppositional stances
in relation to each other on the topic of council tax reduction eligibility. This
is made clear through the use of turn-initial ‘no’ and negation, which serve to
reject the prior offering, and with Joy’s unequivocal assessment that Rudy is wrong,
which is repeated and finally upgraded from ‘you’re wrong’ to ‘your totally wrong’.
Conversely, in Table 2.2, the participants are discussing a doctor who claims to
have a cure for cancer. A is refuting the validity of the doctor’s claim, a judgement
which B does not accept. However, rather than directly challenging or rejecting A’s
assessment of the situation, B offers a counter-claim, namely that doctor is smart and
therefore unlikely to lie. B uses the stance marker ‘I think’ to frame their position
and mark their assessment with evaluative language, such as ‘unlikely’, to convey
that they are offering a considered opinion.
Individuals can also change perspective and align with their co-conversant’s
position. In Table 2.3, A and B are discussing who should be saved in a hypothetical
scenario. Speaker A begins the extract by defending Tom, while B provides a
reasoned argument for sacrificing him (that as the pilot Tom is responsible for the
consequences), before re-stating their position in turn 4. A then alters their position,
introducing their shift with the discourse marker ‘you know what’, before explicitly
aligning with B’s position, and upgrading from B’s assertion that ‘tom has to go’, to
‘kill tom’.
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A: leave tom alone
A: what
B: cos hes a balloon pilot and therefore he would
of known the consequences of the balloon in the
first place
B: no tom has to go
A: you know what kill tom
A: they say ignorance is bliss
Table 2.3 Shifting positions, from an experiment transcript
The conversational excerpts in Table 2.1, Table 2.2 and table 2.3 begin to illustrate
how speakers can present a viewpoint and position themselves in relation to one
another, can denote disagreement in more or less obvious ways, or signal that they
are altering their alignment.
‘Stance’ is whatever is treated as the difference between those party to an in-
teraction, by the participants themselves, i.e. something that only emerges from
the display of disagreement. It is a fundamentally interactional matter constituted
by what people actually say in a particular sequential context (disagreement) and
regardless of what we might say about what people ‘think’ or ‘believe’. Thus, stance
for the purposes of this thesis, is whatever is cited as being at stake in a disagreement.
To understand the ways in which differing viewpoints are negotiated in interac-
tion and how this has been explored in the literature, this chapter will review the
various theoretical characterisations of disagreement and stance from perspectives
including Speech Act Theory, the Appraisal Model and more dialogical conceptions
of interaction from Interactional Linguistics. The Conversation Analytic understand-
ing of stance as an interactional achievement will then be explored, with particular
reference to the Epistemic Engine outlined by Heritage (2012a). Following this,
the empirical research on particular markers of disagreement and stance will be
presented, ranging from the more obvious and direct markers to more subtle means
of communicating disagreement in interaction.
2.1.1 Operationalising Disagreement and Stance
Detecting the stance a speaker holds towards a given subject can prove highly chal-
lenging, particularly in a conversational context. Research on stance detection has
tended to focus on other forms of communication such as blog posts (Somasundaran
and Wiebe, 2009, 2010; Walker et al., 2012a) or customer reviews, and be related
to opinion mining and sentiment analysis. As Hunston (2007) observes “the phe-
nomenon of stance represents an area of difficulty for corpus linguistics, because
stance is a meaning, a type of meaning or several types of meaning, rather than a
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form.” While forms associated with stance have been identified, operationalising
stance is not so simple a task that these forms alone can lead us to the instances
in which the articulation of stance occurs. Rather, interpreting the role of stance,
how, when, and in which variation it appears in dialogue, necessitates a deeper
understanding of sequential aspects, context and pragmatic and semantic elements.
Disagreement poses similar challenges, in that the forms it can take are varied.
While disagreement markers (like stance markers) can help us identify instances,
interpreting disagreement often requires deeper understanding of the interactional
context and sequential elements; inference and politeness interplay with the articula-
tion of disagreement, adding to the difficulty of identifying and interpreting the role
of disagreement in a dialogue.
There have been limited studies which directly connect research on stance in
interaction with disagreement, although a number of scholars have displayed interest
in both, e.g. Walker et al. (2012b,c), which deal separately with both topics from a
corpus linguistics perspective. Scott (2002) investigates linguistic feature variation
within disagreements using a corpus of television debate programmes. In compiling
her linguistic feature set Scott (2002) incorporated research on stance (namely Biber
and Finegan (1988, 1989)).
In this thesis, disagreement is conceived as interactional event in which speakers
position themselves in opposition to one another, in such a way that surfaces and is
addressed in the dialogue. Thus disagreement is the perceivable incongruence or
misalignment in the stance positions being taken by two or more interlocutors, and it
is something therefore which the speakers can identify as inconsistent between the
position each respective participant takes.
‘Stance’ is whatever is treated as the difference between those party to an in-
teraction, by the participants themselves, i.e. something that only emerges from
the display of disagreement. It is a fundamentally interactional matter constituted
by what people actually say in a particular sequential context (disagreement) and
regardless of what we might say about what people ‘think’ or ‘believe’. Thus, stance
for the purposes of this thesis, is whatever is cited as being at stake in a disagreement.
This chapter begins with a contextualisation of the social consequences associated
with disagreement and an overview of Politeness Theory in section 2.2.
2.2 Face and the social consequences of interaction
Every person lives in a world of social encounters, involving him in
face-to-face or mediated contact with other participants. In each of
these contacts he tends to act out what is sometimes called a line-that
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is, a pattern of verbal and non-verbal acts by which he expresses his
view of the situation and through this his evaluation of the participants,
especially himself [...] The term face may be defined as the positive
social value a person effectively claims for himself by the line others
assume he has take during a particular contact (Goffman 1967a, p.1)
Qualitative studies show that exposed disagreement is generally avoided in
conversation (Goffman, 1967a,b; Pomerantz, 1984a). One argument for the scarcity
of disagreement in dialogue is anchored to the concept of politeness and the desire
not be perceived as rude, nor to encroach on other’s self presentation. Politeness
theory has developed in response to sociological writings of Ervin Goffman on
the concept of face. Goffman (1967a) defines face as ‘the positive social value a
person effectively claims for himself’ through interaction and offers a model of
co-operation that is enacted when an individual’s face or social value is threatened
during interaction. Brown and Levinson (1987), in their seminal work on politeness,
explain the predisposition for the avoidance of disagreement in terms of face. Direct
challenges to a speaker or disagreeing with their assertion in dialogue can constitute
what is known as a Face Threatening Act, that is to say it can threaten the hearer’s
public self-image.
When a face has been threatened, face-work must be done [...] lack of
effort on the part of one person induces compensative effort from others
[...] Resolution of the situation to everyone’s apparent satisfaction is
the first requirement [...] For example, in polite society, a handshake
that perhaps should not have been extended becomes one that cannot be
declined. (Goffman 1967a, pp 27-28)
This concept of face-work is an extremely important aspect of the rituals and
behaviour that people adopt in interaction, which otherwise would be taken as indirect
and arguably inefficient. Clearly, directly disagreeing with an interlocutor can pose a
significant face threat. Politeness theory suggests that interlocutors would minimise
disagreement to save face, employing strategic conflict avoidance techniques to
mitigate the effect of any disagreement that did surface (Leech, 1980). Goffman
describes a range of scenarios in which disagreements are prevented, glossed over,
ignored or mitigated using avoidance tactics and corrective processes that enable a
face-threat to be overcome as quickly and painlessly as possible. Thus politeness
can be understood as ‘strategic conflict avoidance’ which ‘can be measured in terms
of the degree of effort put into the avoidance of a conflict situation’ (Leech, 1980, p.
19). However, while Brown and Levinson continue Goffman’s line of argument that
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people generally cooperate in maintaining one another’s face needs, at times this
tendency is intentionally or unintentionally breached, result in a ‘face-threating act’.
Brown and Levinson (1987) also outline three politeness super-strategies: pos-
itive politeness, negative politeness and off-record politeness, the first of which
Holtgraves (1997) cites as important in disagreement. Positive politeness appeals to
the positive face, and enables the disagreeing party to claim common ground and
position themselves as a co-operator, thus minimising the potential threat enacted
through the disagreement. Negative politeness seeks to avoid any imposition on
a hearer, and maintain their freedom of action and choice. A common example
is the expression of requests, which can put pressure on a hearer, and so can be
formulated in such a way to minimise the negative face-threat, such as, “if you’re not
too busy, could you look over these papers for me?” By constructing the request in an
unimposing manner, providing a possible get-out clause (I’m too busy) and through
the use of the modal ‘could’, the speaker creates a context in which a rejection would
be acceptable. Off-record politeness strategies rely entirely on inference, such as
expressing it’s cold, when the actual agenda is to have the window closed.
Politeness Theory supports a co-operative view of communication, in which
conversation participants actively work to maintain social order by redressing and
minimising any potential face-threats, an endeavour taken by all parties, through
their interactions. Other perspectives on communication interpret the communicative
endeavour differently. For example, Accommodation Theory posits that rather than
seeking to re-align any imbalance in an interaction, interlocutors will synchronize
and assume matching approaches (Giles et al., 1991). For example, if someone is
agreeable their conversational partner would match them in this convivial approach,
whereas if they are adopting a discursive or even combative linguistic style, then
their conversational partner would be likely to adopt a similar tack and synchronicity
would become more exaggerated (Giles and Smith, 1979). Accommodation Theory
argues that interlocutors adopt strategies of convergence to integrate and identify
socially with another (Giles et al., 1991); according to this theory, adopting a similar
linguistic style leads to perceived communicative effectiveness (Giles and Smith,
1979) and co-operativeness (Feldman, 1968). Conversely, speech divergence reflects
distancing from the co-conversant and can surface when confronted with perceived
differences to the co-conversant. For ‘constructive engagement’ in discussion con-
texts, however, it is not really possible to converge on everything since, in the limit,
this would make it impossible to actually talk about anything substantive (this will
be addressed in more detail in section 2.2.2).
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2.2.1 Minimising Disagreement
This raises the empirical question of how a ‘face threat’ is actually managed in
conversation. Conversation Analysts have shown that when people produce as-
sessments of situations or events, positive responses are made more quickly and
clearly than negative or unaligned responses (Pomerantz, 1984a; Sacks, 1987). In
natural dialogue, because of the preference to minimise disagreement and emphasise
agreement, speakers often delay the delivery of dispreferred responses. Conversation
Analysis (CA) is an approach that without introducing additional theory, looks at
language used by the speakers to interpret the sequential meaning of the language.
CA has shown that when people produce a response to a previous assessment, if
the content is positive it is made more quickly and directly than if it is an unaligned
response that might challenge the prior speaker’s face. Negative or dispreferred
responses are typically prefaced with a delay or an agreement token (Pomerantz,
1984a). Consequently, argumentative content can span quite a number of turns in a
dialogue, and failing to consider this fully could lead to misinterpretation and false
classification of stance. Disagreements can be socially problematic and so speakers
often delay issuing contrasting or challenging propositions. This can be signalled
through turn-initial hesitations, disfluencies and discourse markers, or by prefacing
any disagreement content with an agreement.
Consider Example 2.4; in this transcription, Evaluation of an artwork, taken from
(JS:I. -1) Pomerantz (1984a), participant A is inviting the others to provide their
opinions on the artwork at which they are currently looking. Critical assessments are
indicated in the transcript by Pomerantz with a ‘-’ sign, while a ‘+’ sign indicates
a positive assessment. The way in which A structures their questions, ‘D’yuh li:ke
it?’, constrains the range of appropriate responses to a polar yes/no response. D,
although issuing a slight hesitation (as indicated in the transcript as ‘hhh’), provides
a positive appreciation in the turn directly following the initial question. Notably, this
is followed by the contrastive conjunctive ‘although’, which initiates D’s next turn,
and provides some indication that they have more to add on this subject. However, it
is not until some 18 turns later that D manages to contribute that they are ‘not a great
fan of this type of art’. In the final turn of the example D explains that that they find
it reminiscent of a magazine advertisement, and state that their taste in art is more
realistic. Without ever directly saying that they do not like it, it becomes clear that
they don’t despite having explicitly said that they do.
Subtle markers and sequential context all contribute in positioning a speaker’s
stance. The polar interrogative that A initially offers, leaves D with the choice
of being polite, and providing the preferred response, or offering a more accurate
but dispreferred response (i.e. that she doesn’t like the art work), which directly
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A: D’yuh li:ke it?
(+) D: .hhh Yes I do like it= (-)
D: =although I rreally::=
C: =Dju make it?
A: No We bought it, It?s a .hh a Mary
Kerrida print.
D: 0:h (I k-)=
A: =Dz that make any sense to you?
C: Mn mh. I don’ even know who she
is.
A: She’s that’s, the Sister Kerrida,
who,







A: It’s worth something,
(1.0)
A: There’s only a hundred of’m
(0.5)
D: Hmm
E: which picture is that.
A: The one that saysLife.
(1.5)
A: ( ).
(-) D: ‘hhh Well I don’t- I’m not a great
fan of this type of a:rt. There are
certain ones I see thet I like, But I
like the w- +
E: =Is there ano thu way of spelling
Life?.
(-) D: -more realistic-.
A: hhmh!
E: That’s all I wd loo(hh)k fo(h),
D: hh!
(-) D: Yih d-know why don’t got fer this
type of uh: art, Becuz it- it
strikes me ez being the magazine ad-
verti:sement yt:pe. Which some
uh-uh some a’ them are really great.
But tuhm I-my, taste in art is
for the more uhit-t-treh- it tends tuh
be realistic.
Table 2.4 Evaluation of a new artwork from (JS:I. -1) Pomerantz (1984a)
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positions her in opposition to her interlocutor. As this example highlights, offering
an opinion can be significantly affected by the social factors of the interaction. If we
had considered only the first two lines a different summary of the discussion would
have been concluded (example 2.5):
A: D’yuh li:ke it?
D: .hhh Yes I do like it=
Table 2.5 Detail of Evaluation of a new artwork from
From example 2.5 it is possible to assume that A and D both like the painting.
D’s response taken in isolation could lead to erroneous analysis; if the full context of
the dialogue is included, then a different interpretation is possible. ‘Yes I do like it’,
is direct and seemingly unequivocal, however, when considering the full transcript
and the delay preface, the dialogue reads quite differently, and the likelihood that
D simply says they like it out of politeness, before providing an account for why
they don’t, seems much more plausible. This example highlights the ways in which
individuals carefully formulate their responses to minimise potential disagreements.
It also highlights the importance of paralinguistic features, such as hesitation. Before
D asserts that they do like the art work they issue a breathy hesitant delay. While
this may seem like noise in the data, it is actually an important indicator that D is
struggling to formulate and appropriate response. Such paralinguistic content can
prove vital to an accurate interpretation of the interaction.
Making and responding to assessments and assertions occurs frequently in natural
dialogue. When responding to an initial assessment, an agreement may be signalled
by repeating back the original assessment, but subtle details such as whether it is
an exact repeat or a modified repeat can signal whether it is a strong agreement
or weaker variation, modifying or downgrading the original assessment or even
acting as a disagreement. Example 2.6, taken from Pomerantz (1984a), illustrates a
disagreement. A pause and delay, ‘(hhhhh) well’, is inserted, followed by a partial
agreement, before the contrastive conjunctive ‘but’ is uttered, signalling that this is
not in fact an agreement. Such mechanisms enable the speaker to take some time to
formulate their disagreement, to search for a tactful way to deliver it, and to prevent
the response coming across as blunt or aggressive.
Pomerantz highlights that people have a tendency to minimize disagreements.
Respondents to initial assessments employ back-downs to hint at disagreement while
still leaving room to avert it, that is, the conversant can resume with a modified
assessment that may lead onto agreement. As such, there are times when honest
appraisals are simply not a part of interaction: “It is not only that what would be
a disagreement might not get said, but that what comes to be said may be said
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A: cause those things take working at,
(2.0)
B: (hhhhh) well, they do, but
A: They aren’t accidents,
B: No, they take working at, But on the
other hand, some people are born
with uhm (1.0) well a sense of hu-
mor, I think it’s something you are
born with Bea.
A: Yes. Or it’s c- I have the- eh yes, I
think a lotta people are, but then I
think it can be developed too.
Table 2.6 Example of a disagreement from Pomerantz (1984a)
as an agreement” (Pomerantz, 1984a). In addition to hesitation, speaker B also
uses the discourse marker ‘well’ in line 3. A turn-initial ‘well’ typically (but not
exclusively) indicates that a disagreement is forthcoming or what follows will be in
some way contrary to a prior statement (Pomerantz, 1984a). Speaker B performs
an initial agreement, signalled through a turn-initial ‘no’ (typically regarded as a
marker of disagreement) and a repeat back ‘they take working at’, before delivering
a contrasting point of view, namely that certain traits are innate. In response, speaker
A begins with a token agreement, chiming in with accord, before reverting back to
their previous, contrary stance: ‘I think it can be developed too’. By adding ‘too’
at the end of the utterance, it enables A to maintain their line of argument while
conceding to the possibility that they both could be right, thus mitigating any face
threat and enabling the difference of opinions to be left unresolved.
Negative or dispreferred responses are normally produced more slowly and are
often prefaced with some form of agreement (e.g. ‘Oh yes... but’); the negative
assessment itself is often delayed by several turns and produced with some sort of
mitigating account (Pomerantz, 1984a). Brown and Levinson (1987) also identify
this preference for agreement and the occurrence of ‘yes, but’ constructions to
mitigate the face threat associated with directly disagreeing with and interlocutor
in their corpus of British data. Holtgraves (1997) confirms these observations. He
coordinated discussions between pairs of participants with opposing views and
analysed the resulting transcripts for positive politeness strategies outlined by Brown
and Levinson (1987), as well as others that emerged through the analyses. These
included: token agreement (‘yes, but’ constructions), hedge words, seeking common
ground through the use of ‘you know’, developing and pursuing safe topics in which
agreement could be reached, and prefacing disagreements with ‘well’. This provides
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some useful insights in to how disagreement is actually performed in conversation,
bolstering the theoretical understandings of politeness with empirical findings.
Performing assessments and positioning one’s views in relation to that of another
is identified as a key component of the collaborative model of communication
and central to the study of shared understanding (Goodwin, 1981; Goodwin and
Goodwin, 1992). “The activity of performing an assessment is intrinsically social in
that it can provide for the collaborative, but differentiated, participation of multiple
actors” (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1992, p. 181). It is through assessments that
participants negotiate and coordinate their perspectives with one another, providing
opportunity for collaborative participation in an emerging utterance. Thus, it is
through performing assessments, and agreeing, disagreeing or renegotiating the
terms, that participants establish their own and others’ positions and develop shared
understanding. As stated by Goodwin and Goodwin (1992), “the assessment is thus
not treated simply as a description, but rather as something that can be responded
to, and participated in, in a special way”. How participants make manifest the
degree and terms of their disagreement can be conveyed through a range of subtle
interactional resources. The way in which assessments are presented and the choice
of response can have a significant impact on the resulting collaboration and degree
of constructive engagement.
2.2.2 Constructive Engagement
A motivating factor behind this research is an interest in constructive engagement
in discussion contexts. As highlighted in section 2.2, it is through the presentation
of assessments that speakers negotiate their disparate and congruent perspectives
on the world. Furthermore, all things being equal, there is a tendency to minimise
disagreement. However, for any type of substantive discussion it is essential that
differing viewpoints are consulted, and this will inevitably involve the negotiation of
oppositional stances. The ways in which these procedures are managed and speaker
positions presented can contribute to whether an individual may adjust the line they
are taking and shift their position.
Disagreement can take a variety of forms and perform a number of different
acts, which can significantly alter the illocutionary force and interactional effect
of the utterance. However, in essence, disagreement is the process by which some
inconsistency is treated as a difference between the parties: “Verbal disagreement is a
situated activity whose function is to express an opinion (or belief) the propositional
content or illocutionary force of which is – or is intended to be – partly or fully
inconsistent with that of a prior (non-verbal) utterance” (Koczogh, 2013). The
terminology employed to reference disagreement is wide ranging and has been
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addressed in relation to argument, conflict, debate, oppositional talk and conflict talk,
among others. Furthermore, aside from the appropriate terminology for discussing
the presentation of oppositional stance, the way in which a turn is constructed can
vary.
Recent literature on disagreement and politeness theory in Sociolinguistics and
Conversation Analysis suggests that in certain contexts disagreement is appropriate
(Kotthoff, 1993), can signal sociability and intimacy (Angouri and Tseliga, 2010;
Schiffrin, 1984; Tannen, 1984), and rather than lead to conflict, help strengthen
relationships (Georgakopoulou, 2001; Sifianou, 2012). Furthermore, in problem
solving dialogues Chiu (2008) found that disagreement, when done politely, was
more productive in provoking novel contributions from participants than agreement.
Although face-threatening and impolite disagreement constructions are rare, in a
dataset of workplace interactions deviating opinions are acceptable and unmarked
disagreement is an important aspect of problem solving talk (Angouri, 2012). So, al-
though disagreement, particularly when executed impolitely, tends to be problematic,
for certain contexts, such as problem solving and discussion tasks, it can be essential
in advancing the deliberative quality of a dialogue.
Thus, although there is good reason to think that disagreement ought to be
socially problematic, benefits, such as encouraging novel contributions have been
acknowledged (Chiu, 2008). Furthermore, Chiu (2008) also suggests that agreement
can be potentially detrimental to a dialogue. One such context in which the surfacing
of differences has been shown to be beneficial is in relation to repair, when speakers or
hearers attend to some difficulty in hearing, speaking or understanding. Differences
in interpretation are a basic form of disagreement and research on the phenomenon
of repair shows that disruption in interaction can also be potentially beneficial to the
progression of a dialogue (Colman et al., 2011; Healey, 2008), particularly if focused
on the clarification of a content issue. Although instances of repair seemingly
interrupt the flow of a dialogue, this attempt to address problematic talk is not
necessarily negative, rather it seems to drive the conversation forward. Issuing only
agreements can often lead to a lack of mutual intelligibility in fact, which is why
instances of repair are so common in task-oriented dialogues (Colman et al., 2011), a
context where effective co-ordination is critical to the interactional outcome. Healey
(2008) demonstrates that repair processes deal directly with misalignments and have
a positive effect on measures of interactional outcome. Consequently, disagreement
ought to be a catalyst or precursor to a potential shift in stance, as it signals a direct
challenge to a held idea, which in turn may be retained, re-negotiated or or more
fundamentally re-conceived.
This, together with the findings by Chiu (2008) and Angouri (2012), suggests
that disagreement can play an important role in the deliberation and problem solving
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process, but how it is achieved can be an important factor. Whether a disagreement
is interpreted as constructive engagement can depend on how it is delivered. In
section 2.6.1, the specific ways that speakers convey disagreement will be addressed.
2.3 Forms of Disagreement
Muntigl and Turnbull (1998) analysed argument in naturally occurring dialogue
between family and friends. Oppositional content was either produced quickly or in
overlap, or was prefaced by agreement and pushed to the end of the turn. Examples
analysed utilised negation and other negative contradiction markers or oppositional
markers such as ‘yes’ and ‘so’, to accomplish the oppositional effect. Furthermore,
disagreement was typically produced in four different ways in the next relevant turn
after the contested stance was presented - either as irrelevancy claims, challenges,
contradictions, or counter-claims Counter-claims are typically delivered with more
mitigating devices, while contradiction is often achieved through negation, and is also
a less direct form of disagreement. Irrelevancy claims are typically issued in a less
guarded manner, in quick succession or overlap with the prior speakers contribution
which is being assessed. Challenges are “often preceded by reluctance markers” and
typically take interrogative question form (Muntigl and Turnbull, 1998).
68% of the disagreements analysed were issued in the next relevant turn, and
were most frequently counter-claims (87 of 155; 56%), followed by contradictions
(29; 18%), challenges (18; 12%), and finally irrelevancy claims (12; 8%); with
contradiction and counter-claim combinations accounting for the remainder (9;
6%). As well as observing the relative frequency of the different disagreement acts,
Muntigl and Turnbull (1998) observe that there are differing degrees of face-threat
associated with each:
A disagreement’s degree of aggravation is likely to depend on the spe-
cific way in which an act of disagreement is done. Based on the previous
research and consideration of the structural characteristics and pragmatic
functions of each type of disagreement act, we propose that the ranking
of disagreements from most to least face aggravating is [Irrelavancy
Claim, Challenges, Contradictions, Contradictions + Counter-claims,
Counter-claims].(Muntigl and Turnbull, 1998, p. 243)
Counter-claims are particularly important in substantive discussion, as it is
through the presentation of new or alternative perspectives that the dialogue can
progress and the deliberative quality of a dialogue develop. A number of the examples
of counter-claims in Muntigl and Turnbull (1998) are framed by the propositional
2.3 Forms of Disagreement 34
marker ‘I think’. It appears, that through such devices individuals introduce oppo-
sitional claims that challenge prior speakers assertions without direct negation and
explicitly marking the disagreement as oppositional.
As Muntigl and Turnbull (1998) explains, a contradiction is “face-aggravating
because it contains opposition markers that directly and unambiguously repudiate
the other’s claim. However, it is less face-aggravating than either Irrelevancy Claim
or a Challenge since it does not directly attack the competency and rationality of
the other speaker”. However, a counter-claim “mitigates the threat to other’s face
by offering more information with which to negotiate the disagreement [...] It
provides an alternative claim and/or reasons for why speaker disagrees, which invites
negotiation of the T1 claim by opening up the topic of discussion rather than closing
it down”. The way in which a disagreement is constructed and the act that it performs
(e.g. contraction or counter-claim, etc.) will affect the extent to which it will foster
negotiation of both the self and the other’s claims, and this is inextricably linked to
whether it is presented in such a way that emphasises the opposition or creates space
for alternative claims that are worthy of discussion.
Furthermore, disagreements are not only framed as assertions but can take
the form of questions. Keisanen (2007) takes a CA approach to disagreement
in conversation, and the ways in which speakers disalign themselves from prior
stance positions. In particular, the process by which speakers challenge prior turns
by demonstrating doubt is explored. Keisanen (2007) notes that negative yes/no
interrogatives and tag questions are often used to pose challenges to the co-conversant.
However, they highlight that “the negotiation of alignment does not surface in the
interaction explicitly”, but is available for analysis by examining the sequence
organisation of relevant turns. Keisanen (2007) focuses on everyday interactions in
which the challenges discussed are warranted “by a discrepancy in information or
knowledge between the participants, and thereby relate to the social co-ordination
of knowledge, rather than being presented as unanswerable or hostile assertions”.
These constructions, as with other interrogative forms, make a response relevant
when used in conversation, i.e. they warrant some sort of response and to not respond
would appear irregular. Also, because they are polar interrogatives, their grammatical
form constrains the response to a yes or no response. This backs the co-conversant
into a corner where they are called upon to either agree with or disagree with their
partner. Heritage (2002) talks about argumentative challenges in news interviews
and observes that negative interrogatives in turn-initial position are more assertive
and less questioning than tag questions; Constructing an assessment in such a way
that it invites for agreement, even though to agree would involve a concession on the
part of the respondent.
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To summarise, agreement and disagreement are sequentially specific forms of
stance presentation, which are positioned in juxtaposition to an initial publicly stated
stance. Although it is worth noting that dialogical conceptions of stance, such as
Du Bois (2007); Linell and Marková (1993) suggest that stance is not only presented
in reaction to what has been publicly stated in the current context, but can intersect
with unspoken, imagined, or priorly issued alternate stances. Disagreement is the
presentation of an oppositional stance, whereas agreement is the presentation of a
stance that aligns with or supports what came before. Importantly, there are a number
of different ways that oppositional stance can be presented and the interactional effect
and associated face-threat vary dependent upon the way in which the opposition is
constructed and presented, whether as explicit and direct, or more implicit, in the
form of an unmarked counter-claim. In the next section we will address some of
the different ways in which stance can be presented, which deviate from the purely
exposed disagreement but can still achieve the interactional effect of signalling that
the position taken is not necessarily aligned with some prior (e.g. the previous
speaker’s contribution).
2.4 Stance
The ways in which people can mark their stance is numerous; furthermore, different
analytical traditions have conceived stance differently, covering a broad range of
proposals. Two of the most salient aspects of stance are evaluations and assessments;
the presentation of evaluations and assessments are subject to modality, which can
affect the levels of certainty and speaker commitment with which they are produced.
Evidentiality, providing a source for ‘how I know’, can also affect commitment
or force of an utterance, serving to distance a speaker from a given viewpoint by
presenting it as belonging to someone else, or alter the perceived certainty with
which an assertion is made. For example, whether a person is detailing something
they witnessed first-hand or reporting some knowledge acquired through hearsay,
will result in differing levels of perceived speaker commitment.
Terms such as attitudinal stance (relating to attitudes and judgements) and
alignment (the interpersonal positioning of a stance in relation to another), epis-
temic stance (relating to knowledge) (Glynn; Heritage, 2012a,b; Kärkkäinen, 2003;
Krawczak, 2014), deonetic (relating to rights to know) affective or expressive stance
(expressing feeling towards an object or event) (Lyons, 1977), writer stance (the
expression of opinions in text) (Hyland, 1999), evaluative language (Hunston and
Thompson, 2000) and mood and modality (Palmer, 2001), have all been used to
denote related concepts.
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In linguistics, the concept of stance was traditionally considered to represent
subjective opinion and internalised perspectives on objects and events e.g. (Biber
and Finegan, 1988, 1989; Biber et al., 1999; Conrad and Biber, 2000). Early studies
in linguistics on stance related concepts such as Lyons (1977), began to create a
diverse lexicon for describing the expression of stance. Palmer (2001) presents a
grammatical topology of mood and modality, while Biber and Finegan (1988) address
the lexical and grammatical marking of stance, with a focus on evidentiality and
affect, and the role of adverbials (Biber and Finegan, 1988). Building on Halliday’s
conception of grammar – or ‘lexicogrammar’, Systemic Functional Linguists have
also used the language of appraisal to explore stance, most comprehensively covered
by Martin and White (2007) (c.f. Chindamo et al. (2012) for a detailed review of the
different incarnations and definitions of stance in the literature).
Stance has been investigated from a formal semantics perspective in terms of
‘point of view’ (Mitchell, 1986); in corpus linguistics in relation to subjectivity,
intersubjectivity and evaluation (Glynn; Hunston, 2007; Hunston and Thompson,
2000; Hunston et al., 2011; Krawczak, 2014); Verhagen (2005) provides an in depth
study from a cognitive linguistics standpoint, concerning the intersubjectivity of
language and interactional nature of stance-taking and Fitzmaurice (2004) presents
a historical perspective on the development of stance markers in English. Another
facet of stance expression which has been examined is the importance of certainty
expression and speaker commitment or the epistemic strength of an assertion (Rubin,
2006). Non-verbal indicators of stance marking have also been explored (Prepin
et al., 2013).
Langlotz and Locher (2012) explored conflictual disagreement in the comments
section of MailOnline, and were interested in how people communicate emotional
stance in online disagreements, relating their discussion to the work on impoliteness
work by Culpeper (2011). They address how the public practice of dismissing a
person’s contribution is what can cause it to be an impolite and face threatening act.
Such work highlights the politeness frameworks that surround different conversa-
tional actions, noting that those with the greatest social impact are “not such speech
acts as requests and assertions, but rather challenges, and retreats, which have to do
with the status of the participants, their rights and obligations, and their changing
relationships in terms of social organization” (Muntigl and Turnbull, 1998, p.242).
Corpus linguists have identified linguistic features associated with epistemic
stance in order to guide corpus-driven studies of subjectivity (Krawczak, 2014),
or focused on evaluative language (Hunston, 2005, 2007; Hunston and Thompson,
2000). Others have focused on particular linguistic features associated with stance,
such as adverbials in general (Conrad and Biber, 2000), or particular use cases such
as ‘surely’ (Downing, 2001a). The dialogic practices of stance-taking in conversation
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have been examined from an interactional linguistics perspective (Du Bois, 2007;
Kärkkäinen, 2006); Field (1997) details the role of factive constructions to index epis-
temic stance, while Kärkkäinen (2003) analyses the function of particular epistemic
stance markers, or complement taking predicates, such as ‘I guess’ (Karkkainen,
2007) and ‘I think’ (Kärkkäinen, 2003) within the frame of epistemic scale (Clift,
2006a; Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Kärkkäinen, 2003), for example, exploring the
knowledgeable, versus ignorant, use of ‘I guess’ to soften claims.
A number of studies have attempted to focus on particular grammatical construc-
tions used for stance-taking. Kärkkäinen (2003) analyses subject-verb combinations
that serve as epistemic fragments to index subjectivity and stance in conversation.
Scheibman (2002) studies intersubjectivity, providing an overview of frequent com-
binations of subjects, verb types and tenses, arguing that grammatical and lexical
patterns are shaped by subjectivity and the speaker’s need to personalize their contri-
butions to discourse. Precht (2000, 2003a,b) provides a statistical analysis of stance
related lexemes and grammatical constructions using a corpus of British and Ameri-
can English, noting cross cultural variations in the expression of stance. Myers and
Lampropoulou (2012) highlight the role of impersonal pronouns in the construction
of stance.
The expression of stance has also been studied across a number of mediums,
for example, stance in spoken and written academic registers (Biber, 2006; Hyland,
1999, 2005), stance-taking in public discussion blogs (Myers, 2010); stance-taking
in interviews (Haddington, 2004; Lampropoulou and Myers, 2012; Myers and Lam-
propoulou, 2012), online debate (Anand et al., 2011; Hasan and Ng, 2014; Langlotz
and Locher, 2012; Somasundaran and Wiebe, 2010; Sridhar et al., 2015; Walker
et al., 2012a), online diaries (Krawczak, 2014) and conversational data (Downing,
2001a; Heritage, 2008; Kärkkäinen, 2003, 2010, 2012; Kockelman, 2004; Landgrebe,
2012; Sidnell, 2012), and with a particular focus on reported speech (Clift, 2006a;
Siromaa, 2012).
Sociolinguistic perspectives on stance have taken the theoretical account of stance
as a dialogical act (Du Bois, 2007) and applied it to sociocultural topics such as
race (Walton and Jaffe, 2011) and examined the interpersonal function of particular
particles, such as ‘just’ (Kiesling, 2011). Work in conversation analysis takes social
actions in their sequential contexts as a starting point to study how positions are
adopted and negotiated in interaction. While not always labelled explicitly as relating
to stance, studies focusing on agreements, disagreements and assessments (Heritage
and Raymond, 2005; Pomerantz, 1984a), challenges (Keisanen, 2007), questions
(Koshik, 2002), and responses (Gardner, 2001) are also relevant.
In the next section three different approaches to understanding stance will be
considered in more detail, namely the Appraisal model (Martin and White, 2007), the
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interactional linguistics perspective as outlined by Du Bois (2007), and the work in
Conversation Analysis on stance and epistemics, as outlined by Heritage (2012a,b).
2.5 Different Approaches to Stance
The work on stance incorporates a number of conceptions and methodological ap-
proaches. It is possible to group the research into two broad categories: interactional
or intersubjective stance and internal or subjective stance. The role of particular
markers associated with stance marking in dialogue can be understood differently
within these two frameworks, either as an interactionally motivated phenomenon
or as the expression of personal attitude. In this thesis, the collaborative model of
interaction which views interaction as co-constructed by present parties is pertained
to. Consequently, in section 2.5.2 the idea of ‘stance’ as an interactional achievement
will be considered in more detail. In the context of this thesis, it is argued that stance
should only be understood in terms of the ways in which participants themselves
orient to questions of similarity or difference of their positions, as manifests in the
dialogue.
While the various devices and resources through which a speaker can take a
stance have been explored, the causal effect and interactional consequences have
received less attention. The specific markers associated with disagreement and
marking stances as oppositional will be addressed in more detail in section 2.6,
but first, the idea that stance is an interactional achievement will be considered.
Accounts of modality have often interpreted hedges, downgraders, boosters and
emphasisers as indicating the level of authorial confidence in “the truth of the
proposition expressed” (Lyons, 1977, p. 797) (also, Palmer (2001) and Coates
(1983)). Martin and White (2007) however, move the discussion of epistemic status
and stance from the individualised knowledge status account, to one more explicitly
attuned to interactional factors.
2.5.1 The Appraisal Framework
Coming from a systemic functional linguistics (SFL) perspective, Martin and White
(2007) present a detailed framework for analysing the evaluative properties of a
text, and the stance of a speaker or writer towards the content of an utterance and
actual or potential respondents. The Appraisal framework posits that evaluative
language used for the formation of a stance is the direct expression of the author’s
own attitude, with an additional facet oriented towards “aligning the addressee into a
community of shared values and belief (Martin and White, 2007, p. 95)”. There are
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three components to the framework: Engagement, Attitude and Graduation. It is the
first of these, Engagement, that is most central to this thesis.
Engagement involves the way in which a position is presented and the degree
to which it acknowledges the availability of alternatives. A distinction is drawn
between the Monoglossic, in which no dialogistic alternatives are acknowledged, and
the Heteroglossic formulations that inherently acknowledge other possible alterna-
tives. Engagement is closely related to, and often enacted through evidentiality; for
example, ‘John said that Jane was late’, is hetroglossic, as it presents John’s account
of events, but permits that their could be alternatives, whereas ‘Jane was late’ offers
a monoglossic, unequivocal account. In a sense, hetroglossic relates to a perspectival
account as opposed to a factual presentation, but the degree of explicitness and the
force or strength of the assertion can vary. Thus, including evidential information,
for Martin and White (2007), inherently positions an assertion as one position, of
multiple possible positions. However, this becomes more complicated with differ-
ent evidential constructions, such as ‘I know Jane was late’, or ‘I saw Jane arrive
late’, which clearly modulate the degree of alignment of the speaker with the stance
presented.
Martin and White (2007), highlight that hetroglossic resources fall into two
categories of intersubjective functionality: dialogically expansive or dialogically
contractive. A dialogically expansive functionality better supports the deliberative
endeavour, in that it fosters a communicative context in which the consideration
of multiple viewpoints is supported, and in which speakers are encouraged to put
forth such alternatives. They argue that writers and speakers make assessments of
likelihood via modal auxiliaries, adjuncts and adverbials as well as certain mental
verb/attribute projections, such as ‘I think’. Conversely, ‘proclaim’ and ‘disclaim’
are listed as two resources for dialogical contraction. Disclaim includes denials,
counters, which can include overt disagreement, while proclaim includes: concur,
pronounce and endorse, which can encapsulate agreement as well as presenting an
unequivocal factual account (e.g. the sky is blue).
The grounding of this approach in SFL means that interpersonal dimensions of
an interaction are considered central to the way in which language choice and use is
governed. Language in SFL is a resource that is utilised, and speakers have a choice
over how to express their communicative goals, and due to the context, speaker
status and environment, the probability that they will draw on particular resources
is determined. Thus this is a form of macro linguistics, that attempts to inform a
theory of micro linguistics, and the particular lexical, syntactical and grammatical
constructions achieved through socially motivated agendas. However, analysis using
the Appraisal framework, does not account for sequential aspects of interactions, nor
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does it align with a collaborative model of communication, as it maintains a focus
on individualised contributions, albeit with an awareness of a hearer or reader.
2.5.2 Interactional Stance
While Martin and White (2007) proposes an interactionally aware conception of
stance, i.e. constructed with a reader in mind, it is in the conversation analytic work
of Heritage that epistemic stance and status are positioned in terms of interactional
effect. In essence, this means that it is through the interactive process of dialogue
that stance is made manifest (Heritage, 2012b,b), a position that is similarly explored
in Interactional Linguistics. Du Bois (2007) refocuses the topic of stance, on stance-
taking which is a “dialogical and intersubjective activity” (Haddington, 2004), and
which again permits for continual updates. As opposed to an internalised knowledge
status, a purely objective knowledge state or even an interactionally aware commu-
nicative act, Heritage frames stance in terms of an epistemic engine, which is driven
by the communicative actions and reactions of participants. For Glynn “the notions
of subjectivity and epistemicity, or more specifically, how speakers (or authors)
position themselves with regards to their understanding of the world and how they
express this ‘stance’, is a central question”. Glynn employs term ‘epistemic stance’,
with ‘epistemic’ referring to “the individual’s conception of reality” and ‘stance’ to
“the subject’s expression towards an external subject, another individual.” While
treatment of epistemic stance has recently come under fire as for being ‘cognitivist’
(Heritage), others have argued that whether or not the term is fitting, it has been
used to proffer an interactionally grounded notion of stance. Consequently, a given
expression in a given context will represent a degree of commitment to a proposition,
not necessarily equate to it.
Work in the emergent field of interactional linguistics has begun to investigate
stance-taking as a dialogical and fundamentally intersubjective process (Du Bois,
2007; Englebretson, 2007; Haddington, 2004). Such research posits that stance is
co-constructed through interaction. This co-construction process of stance relies
upon the concept of oppositions and alternatives. A stance is taken in response to an
(uttered of imagined) alternative. Disagreement is one perspicuous social activity
which denotes the negotiation of differing stances and a potential process by which a
shift in stance can occur.
Du Bois (2007) provides a detailed theoretical approach to interactional stance,
explaining that “[s]tance is a public act by a social actor, achieved dialogically
through overt communicative means, of simultaneously evaluating objects, posi-
tioning subjects (self and others), and aligning with other subjects”. Within this
definition, stance is conceived as fundamentally interactional and dynamic, and con-
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trary to the conception of an opinion which can be mined - which is presumed to be
fixed, stance is something reflexive, that can shift throughout an interaction. Rather
than separating out evaluative, affective, epistemic and other stance types, Du Bois
seeks to reconcile these as part of a single unified stance act. Du Bois (2007) cites
evaluation, positioning and alignment as three aspects of a unified stance act. These
three aspects become important when starting to think about the linguistic features
associated with stance. Evaluation refers to “the process whereby stancetaker orients
to an object of stance and characterizes it as having some specific quality or value”
(Du Bois, 2007, p.143), e.g. ‘that’s horrible’.
For Du Bois affective stance (in which speakers position themselves along an
affective scale, e.g. ‘I’m so glad’) and epistemic stance (in which speakers present
themselves as knowledgeable or ignorant, e.g. I’m not sure), both fall under what
he terms positioning. Positioning, in line with Davies and Harré (1990), is defined
as “the act of situating social actor with respect to responsibility for stance and for
invoking sociocultural value”(Du Bois, 2007, p.144). Alignment, then, is the way
in which the relationship between two stances is made manifest, signalled through
such utterances as ‘I agree’, in the most explicit formulation, or a head nod, or ‘yes’.
Du Bois (2007) insists “a real utterance is always framed by its context of use”, and
that part of that context is the speaker who is responsible for it. Therefore, attempts
to analyse and interpret stance acts using theoretical sentences, as has been favoured
by grammarians, is limited as it cannot account for interactional motivations and
social factors. As Du Bois (2007) asserts, “[s]tance is property of utterances, not of
sentences, and utterances are inherently embedded in their dialogic contexts”.
Linell and Marková (1993) posits that “discourse is made up of dialogical inter-
acts, i.e. acts which are intrinsically dependent on their contextual relations, rather
than of monological ‘speech acts’.” The essentially relational facets of dialogical
interaction highlight the collaborative nature of dialogue, in which communicative
acts are necessarily collective, and co-produced; dialogue is dynamic and responses
are not simply responses, but also “opportunities to introduce new initiatives and
new content into the interaction”. Linell and Marková (1993, p. 177) continues:
[E]ven if an utterance, such as an assertion or a request, is met with
silence, that reaction, or absence of a reaction, will take on commu-
nicative significance and retroactively influence the interactional and
illocutionary value of the utterance in question.
Thus, for the interactional context of substantive discussion and stance-taking,
to borrow an analogy from Linell and Marková (1993) this Janus-like structure in
which an utterance attends to what has come before and what may come ahead,
2.5 Different Approaches to Stance 42
captures the emergent and incremental facets of stance-taking in dialogue, as well as
the social sensitivity to epistemic territories.
As Linell and Marková (1993) assert: “although the discoursive acts associated
with the assignments of rights and obligations are usually not symmetrical [...] the
assignments have bilateral consequences, binding the interactants under an implicit
‘contract’.” A dialogic understanding of interaction is particularly pertinent for
certain dialogue contexts. In relation to stance-taking, unplanned discursive dialogue
is a context of heightened dialogicalism, compared to, for example a structured public
debate. While public debates are prepared for, natural dialogue happens moment-
by-moment; a context in which opinion formation and negotiation is manifest in
the contents of the interaction. In their critique of Speech Act Theory (SAT), Linell
and Marková (1993) suggest that SAT is an ill-fit for interpreting authentic situated
discourse, due in part to its development using imagined sentences and its essentially
individualistic and Cartesian conception of cognition and human agency.
2.5.3 Empirical evidence of stance-taking in conversation
Work in Conversation Analysis attends to this dialogical conception of interaction,
but from a perspective that abstains from theoretical projections. By looking at
the sequential organisation of authentic dialogue the structures and orders of social
action are understood. Furthermore, it provides means for analysing such phenomena
by examining the product of interaction, talk itself. So, for example, Sacks and
Jefferson (1995), in discussing the significance of silences, in line with section 2.5.2,
demonstrate how a silence is attributable to a speaker due to the very organisation of
turn-taking and the fundamental ways in which speakers organise their contributions
and select whose turn it is to speak. Stance in Conversation Analysis is viewed as
an interactional achievement and something that should only be understood in the
participants own terms - i.e. an oppositional stance is only recognised as such if the
participants can orient to a contribution as being oppositional. The specific devices
participants use and orient towards, then, are inextricably linked to the interactional
consequences, and how the ensuing interaction is affected by the speakers’ choices.
Heritage’s Epistemic Engine: Knowing & unknowing
The exchange of information is clearly a key component of interaction, particularly
in the domain of substantive discussion. One way that information can be exchanged
is through the asking of questions and the issuing of relevant answers; however,
as argued by Heritage (2012a) epistemics, and in particular epistemic imbalance
between speaker is what drives contributions and sequences in a dialogue. However,
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interaction is more complex than the information exchange process depicted in
the Shannon and Weaver model of communication, it is not a simple transactional
process, but an incremental and continually evolving play of epistemics - namely,
who knows what, how they now it, their degree of certainty about and, importantly,
how much of this is communicated between one conversational partner to another.
Furthermore it is essentially interactive and constantly shifting as a result of joint
action in this endeavour. As Paul Drew neatly summarises:
Heritage’s epistemic engine relies on participants monitoring and be-
ing continuously apprised of their epistemic status relative to their co-
participants; it requires us to keep a check on what we know relative to
the other, to know how we know what we know, to assess whether how
we know what we know is different from how the other knows – in other
words, to track quite precisely our state of knowledge with respect to
some domain, relative to the other’s state of knowledge. (Drew, 2012, p.
65)
Epistemic status, then, is the relative positioning in which “persons recognize one
another to be more or less knowledgeable concerning some domain of knowledge as
a more or less settled matter of fact”. Epistemic status can be altered from moment
to moment, and can be “disassembled by persons who deploy epistemic stance to
appear more, or less knowledgeable than they really are” (Heritage, 2012a).
This almost performative function of epistemic stance is of particular interest.
There can be social consequences of, or costs associated with seeming either knowing
or unknowing (Levinson, 2012). In a general sense, Goffman (1967a) explains that
“when a person volunteers a statement or message, however trivial or commonplace
he commits himself and those he addresses, and in a sense places everyone present in
jeopardy.” More specifically, “[a] request for information positions the requester as
occupying an unknowing (K-) epistemic status and the recipient in a knowing (K+)
one” (Heritage, 2012a). Questions not only position the requester in an unknowing
position, but bestow the obligation to respond upon the hearer (Levinson, 2012).
Levinson (2012) details a question to assertion function space and observes patterns
across multiple languages that suggest people prefer polar to other forms of question
that require more knowledge rich responses and often disguise them as assertions.
This systematic approach to questioning demonstrates an unwillingness to locate
oneself in an unknowing position, nor to impose too greatly upon an interlocutor by
demanding a response.
The management of rights and responsibilities is connected to participants’
concerns with face (Heritage and Raymond, 2005). People can withhold questions
for a range of reasons, be it fear of looking foolish or causing offence, etc., and these
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‘frustrated interrogative ambitions’ are attributed to social or economic inhibitions
according to Levinson (2012). Methods other than direct interrogation can be used
to solicit an epistemic position from an interlocutor, such as hearsay: for example,
compare ‘are you going out tonight’ and ‘Tom said you’d be out tonight’, one of
which takes the form of a statement and the other a question, both of which create
a space in the conversation for the respondent to confirm or reject the proposition
that they are going out tonight. Furthermore, the use of evidentials for the epistemic
framing of a statement is not only relevant when attempting to illicit information
but can also be used when presenting a position. Consider the example in Table 2.7
taken from Pomerantz (1984b), in which a son tells his mother about a friend, John,
who has cut his long hair into a shorter style. The son also has long hair and his
mother is potentially cautious in her response, at first withholding a response and
then providing as source when she does offer a stance.
So: That’s John. He cut his hair by the way.
Mo: Oh he did?
So: Yeh
Mo: Do you like it?
So: Uh, Yeah, (He looks)-
Mo:
I heard- uh, I read two or three columns and
I hear it over the TV that it’s become old- it’s
becoming passé
Table 2.7 Extract about Hair taken from Pomerantz (1984b)
The mother offers an assessment, a stance position that she does not claim
personally - namely that long hair has fallen out of fashion. In a sense, by framing
it as a report, she distances herself from the stance and assumes a less knowing
position, while still contributing that position to the dialogue. Pomerantz (1984b)
suggests that this strategic choice to offer a position while not openly affiliating to it
may be bound to the status of the son’s long hair being an ‘issue’, that she would not
wish to directly criticize.
From this example, it is evident that making assessments, positioning a contri-
bution as ‘knowing’ or ‘unknowing’ and providing a source or giving evidence are
all key features of epistemic stance and socially complex. Furthermore, it is not
inconsequential; taking an epistemic stance of ‘unknowing’ invites for an elabora-
tion and projects a possible sequence expansion, whereas an interactant taking a
more ‘knowing’ epistemic stance, creates a preference for inviting for confirmation
and sequence closing; indeed ‘expressions of epistemic imbalance drive sequences’
(Heritage, 2012a).
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2.5.4 Understanding stance-taking in dialogue
A key difference in the approaches outlined in this section is that Heritage, coming
from the conversation analytic tradition, and Du Bois from interactional linguistics,
work predominantly with spoken dialogue, whereas the Appraisal framework is
developed largely in response to an imagined audience of a text: “Our framework
has a prospective or anticipatory orientation in that we are concerned with the way in
which the text builds for itself an audience and presents itself as engaging in various
ways with this audience” (Martin and White, 2003, p. 135). Therefore, work remains
to reconcile such a model when co-participants are interacting in a situated context.
Although Appraisal is concerned with the communicative effect of an utterance
and challenges the monologic status of texts, due to the focus on textual resources
in developing the framework, how applicable Appraisal is to dialogue is unclear.
The registers used as examples in Martin and White (2007), such as newspaper
articles, are written and constructed with time and thought put into augmenting the
presentation of dialogic space. The full ramifications of the distinction between
registers is not fully considered; the construction of ‘authorial voice’ in the sources
which inform the framework involve premeditated construction, thus while the notion
of authorial linguistic choice pertains for these contexts, to what extent this persists
in real-time dialogue, in which content is produced on the fly and in response to an
immediately present co-participant, is unclear.
Haddington (2004, 2005) builds upon Du Bois’s theoretical framework, and
integrates a conversational analytic approach that pays particular attention to the
sequential context of stance in interaction. Haddington uses this integrated approach
to analyse news interview data Haddington (2004, 2005). The data that Haddington
is using is a rich source for exploring exposed conflicting stances and documenting
the stance-taking process in dialogue. However, the deliberative aspect is somewhat
missing, as news interviews are more likely to resemble polished debate format than
actual discursive deliberation. The stakes in such interactions are often too high
to concede a point, and lose face; consequently, the processes by which stance is
renegotiated and shifts in stance occur are less likely to be exposed in this context.
In their writing on assessments, Goodwin and Goodwin (1992) stress that in
conversation assessments provide for the possibility of collaborative participation
in an emerging utterance. In support of this proposal they observe that feedback on
assessments is often issued as the talk emerges, mid turn, offering co-participants
access to influence the assessment as it is produced. Furthermore, although attending
to the dialogical functions of language, the Appraisal framework doesn’t address
many of the specific factors associated with dialogue, such as ‘face’ and other aspects
of a co-constructed and collaborative model of dialogue outlined in section 2.2.
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Another criticism levied at the Appraisal model is its rigid conception of meaning
in language as fixed, in attributing particular ‘engagement’ expressions as either
expansive or contractive, without permitting the poly-functionality or meaning shifts
(Põldvere et al., 2016). In particular Põldvere et al. (2016, p.11) demonstrates the
multiple functions that complement-taking predicates can perform, with a particular
focus on ‘I think’, by manipulating prosody and speaker status. They argue that
“the discursive meanings and functions of lexical items have to be described and
explained with reference to principles of meaning-making and variation” (Põldvere
et al., 2016, p.11).
Consequently, the empirical research on specific markers which have been high-
lighted as important to how individuals present and negotiate their respective posi-
tions will be addressed in Section 2.6.
2.6 Linguistic Features Associated with Stance and
Disagreement
In this section the specific markers relating to disagreement, stance and speaker
commitment will be addressed in more detail.
2.6.1 Disagreement markers
The ways in which disagreement can be enacted are various. Resources such as
well-prefacing (Pomerantz, 1984a), stance markers such as ‘I think’ (Kärkkäinen,
2003) and reported speech (Clift, 2006a; Holt and Clift, 2007) are some of the less
explicit or direct ways of marking what follows as incongruous or in opposition to
what went before.
Previous studies on disagreement take a distributional or corpus based approach
at evidencing and analysing instances of disagreement in interaction (Abbott et al.,
2011; Holtgraves, 1997; Misra and Walker, 2013; Muntigl and Turnbull, 1998;
Walker et al., 2012c). These studies have provided valuable insights into the ways
in which these complex social interactions are handled in different contexts, and
given rise to various theories on how we process, respond to and mitigate the impact
of disagreement. However, the literature also highlights that exposed disagreement
rarely surfaces in naturally occurring conversation.
Agreement and Disagreement Cue Words
A set of more indirect indicators of agreement and disagreement are provided by
cue words that are associated with agreement and disagreement but don’t explicitly
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formulate a turn as such. Walker et al. (2012c) analysed large datasets of forum posts
to identify cue words marking features such as agreement, disagreement and sarcasm.
Samples were manually annotated for levels of disagreement and agreement. In
order of decreasing consensus amongst annotators the markers of disagreement were:
‘really’ (67% read a response beginning with this marker as prefacing a disagreement
with a prior post), ‘no’ (66%), ‘actually’ (60%), ‘but’ (58%), ‘so’ (58%), and ‘you
mean’ (57%).
These markers do not, of course, encompass all ways of doing disagreement.
About 50% of respondents interpreted unmarked posts as disagreeing, highlighting
the way disagreement is often enacted by more indirect means. Walker et al. (2012c)
also identified markers of agreement: ‘yes’ (73% read a response beginning with
this marker as prefacing an agreement), ‘I know’ (64%), ‘I believe’ (62%), ‘I think’
(61%), and ‘just’ (57%). Although these markers do not encompass all ways of doing
disagreement. About 50% of respondents interpreted unmarked posts as disagreeing,
highlighting the way disagreement is often enacted by more indirect means. Walker
et al. (2012c) also identified markers of agreement: ‘yes’ (73% read a response
beginning with this marker as prefacing an agreement), ‘I know’ (64%), ‘I believe’
(62%), ‘I think’ (61%), and ‘just’ (57%).
2.6.2 Explicit stance markers
There are a number of markers which explicitly index stance and communicate that
what follows is intended to be interpreted as a position being taken by the speaker.
The most intuitive examples would be the prefaces ‘In my opinion’ and ‘I think’. ‘I
think’ is the most frequently used stance marker in conversational English, despite
being relatively infrequent in written data Kärkkäinen (2003). However, although it
has been acknowledged as a marker which introduces personal opinions and attitudes,
a number of different functions of the marker have been established. Two distinct
modifying capacities have been identified, with ‘I think’ performing as an upgrade or
downgrade modifier - a hedge or a booster. The interactional consequence of these
different functions have been framed in terms of ‘subjective’ versus intersubjective.
Intuitively, ‘I think’ is the most explicit epistemic marker, in that a purely seman-
tic interpretation would suggest that it is used to introduce an individual’s thoughts on
a matter, or their personal attitude towards someone or something. The interactional
functionality of ‘I think’ has been highlighted by (Kärkkäinen, 2006), who stresses
that it is not a framing device for the sharing of purely private mental states. For
Martin and White (2007), the choice to include the marker (without which the ensu-
ing content would typically still make grammatical sense) performs a dialogically
expansive function. By introducing a proposition with ‘I think’, Martin and White
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(2007) argues that it positions the utterance as one of many possible perspectives,
and thus opens up the dialogic space for possible contestation. This position aligns
with the interpretation of ‘I think’ as hedging device or downtoner.
Aijmer (2002) takes a corpus approach for the interpretation discourse markers.
She acknowledges that the function of ‘I think’ can vary, and in particular, notes that
when prefaced with ‘well’ it tends to serve a certain face-saving purpose, functioning
as a downtoner to soften the impact of a controversial assertion. Conversely, she
finds that ‘now, I think’ is used to introduce a subjective opinion or evaluation, and
is often associated with conflict and disagreement. However, it is argued here that
in both examples provided, the expression of a stance is being communicated and
the face-saving efforts or explicitness of the delivery is what changes. Consequently,
the interactional effect of the marker in the two examples may differ, because one is
more explicitly polite, but both are delivering a potentially disagreeable stance to the
hearer, with varying degrees of mitigation. Thus, while the status of ‘I think’ as a
stance marker, or stance-taking device, is not contested, the degree of conviction with
which it is issued can vary dependent on the co-location with other discourse markers
or hedges, and it’s sequential positioning. For example, parenthetical inclusion in a
tag position is more closely associated with a hedging function (consider for example
‘I think it’s unfair’, compared to ‘it’s unfair, I think’). Aijmer (1997), in her corpus,
classifies all mid-turn and final position instances of ‘I think’, as tentative.
However, while interpretations of the function of ‘I think’ have tended to focus
on the hedging function, Holmes (1990) contests the reductive interpretation of ‘I
think’ as a hedging marker, stressing its dual function as both hedge and booster,
dependent on syntactical positioning, prosody and contextual information relating to
the participant relation, formality of the interaction and the topic under discussion.
Kärkkäinen (2003) conceptualises the function of ‘I think’ as existing upon a scale
from doubt to certainty. In light of the dual functions, Põldvere et al. (2016) chal-
lenges Martin and White (2007)’s interpretation of the engagement function of ‘I
think’, observing that it can perform a contractive or expansive function in dialogue;
such factors as speaker status, prosody and other contextual factors were found to be
important in determining the perceived function (Põldvere et al., 2016).
Kärkkäinen (2003) conducted an analysis of instances of ‘I think’ in the Santa
Barbara Corpus of spoken American English. In their data, ‘I think’ was found to
occur in a turn-initial position in 34% of instances, turn-medial in 61%, turn-final
in only 2.4% and as a separate turn in a further 2.4% of instances. By looking at
the sequential positioning, Kärkkäinen (2003) found that ‘I think’ was often used at
certain trouble spots in an interaction, specifically, when the current speaker wants
“to bring in a slightly different perspective or slant to the matter expressed in the
prior turn, to disagree with it, or to display uncertainty about its interactional import
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or relevance” (Kärkkäinen, 2003, p. 143). Furthermore, it generally does not express
a high degree of doubt or uncertainty, but falls more toward the other end of the
scale.
As well as markers which directly frame an utterance as a stance, there are mark-
ers which explicitly position utterances in relation to a prior contribution. Haddington
(2004) cites various linguistic resources such as intersubjective alignment markers,
‘either’ and ‘too’, that highlight how stance-taking is done in response to not only the
object of conversation, but also in response to the co-conversant. Another, intuitive
category is connectives, which explicitly mark relational coherence, such as ‘but’,
‘although’ or ‘and’. In particular, contrastive markers, a sub-strand of discourse mark-
ers (Fraser, 1996), highlight the relational connective between speaker positions, and
often signal a discordance between two oppositional stances, as demonstrated in this
example, taken from Fraser (1996):
A: We can go now, children.
B: But we haven’t finished our game yet.
The contrastive marker ‘but’ is used to introduce an oppositional stance and mark
B’s resistance to ‘go now’. While B does not explicitly state ‘I don’t want to go’,
the utterance clearly implicates opposition, and the combination of the contrastive
marker and the negation serve to convey that.
Other discourse markers have been shown to function in ways important to the
presentation of speaker positions (Smith, 1998). Discourse markers are a feature
of spontaneous discourse that can help speakers manage, attend to and overcome
problems in speaking and understanding that can often occur when language is
prepared on the fly. Although often treated as extraneous or superfluous, the addition
of non-semantically critical particles, such as ‘like’, ‘you know’ and ‘I mean’, can
have significant pragmatic effect. Fraser (1996) argues that such markers can help
structure the discourse and constrain the relevance of an utterance, while Fox Tree and
Schrock (1999) has demonstrated that discourse markers aid in the comprehension
of dialogue. Smith (1998) highlights that discourse markers can be instrumental in
how speakers negotiate their respective positions in dialogue. For example, when
discussing the specific case of ‘you know’, Smith (1998) identifies that it is a strategic
device that enables the speaker “to involve the adressee in the joint construction of
a representation” and marks “statements whose implications are critical to a point
being made [...] thus invit[ing] the addressee to complete the argument by drawing
the appropriate inferences” (Smith, 1998, p. 196).
Experimental studies have been able to test the precise causal effects of discourse
markers. For example, Fox Tree (1999) found over-hearers were able to understand
and follow the content of dialogues with greater clarity than monologues (despite
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thinking contrary in self-reports on performance); the significant difference between
the two monologue and dialogue source content was the frequency of discourse
markers and participant performance improved in correlation with the frequency
of discourse markers. In trying to make sense of how discourse markers alter the
interaction, Fox Tree (1999) suggests that they can contribute to a ‘more friendly
or creative atmosphere that fosters multiple perspectives’, and that they may be
more frequent in dialogues which involve the negotiation of different perspectives.
For example, ‘Oh’ can serve to identify the interlocutors contribution as ‘relevant,
unanticipated and newsworthy’ (Fox Tree and Schrock, 1999) – making it more
polite than a mere acknowledgement, and signalling that a contribution is valued.
Furthermore, it can also be used deceptively - to indicate new information has been
received and a change-of-state undergone, when in fact it has not; similarly it can be
withheld to signify that the information is not informative (Fox Tree and Schrock,
1999; Heritage, 1984). As Fox Tree and Schrock (1999) stress, “Oh does not have
to indicate a genuine change of state or precede new or unanticipated information.
It just has to be used to imply a change of state by the oh producer”. Fox Tree
and Schrock (1999) found that ‘oh’ helps listeners to integrate discourse in two
ways: it primes them that what is forthcoming may involve a change of state, and it
also signals that what follows should be processed separately to what came before,
indicating a disjuncture between what came before and what will follow.
Detailed studies of particular markers such as ‘oh’ (Fox Tree and Schrock, 1999;
Heritage, 1984), and ‘you know’ and ‘I mean’ (Tree and Schrock, 2002), have
revealed that a more systematic effect can be determined. For example, ‘you know’
and ‘I mean’, often grouped together as similar markers that are randomly sprinkled
across discourse, have been shown to have quite specific separate ‘basic meanings’
that relate to their interactional functions, highly relevant to negotiation dialogues.
In light of a detailed review of the various use cases of the two markers, Tree and
Schrock (2002, p. 744) explain:
You know may be increased in dialogue because its basic meaning
focusses on addressees, by inviting addressee inferences, whereas I
mean’s basic meaning focusses on speakers, by forewarning speaker
adjustments. Another way of viewing this is that you know encourages
listeners to focus more on their own thoughts, and [...] I mean encourages
listeners to focus more on speakers’ thoughts.
This aligns with the proposed interpersonal functions of these markers, which identify
their face-saving functions, either signalling shared understanding or demonstrating
speaker imprecision in such a way that invites the addressee to contribute their own
perspective (Holmes, 1986, 1990; Stubbe and Holmes, 1995).
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Thus, a central focus of this thesis is the interactional effect of such markers, and
the degree to which they foster constructive engagement and either open up or close
down the dialogical landscape. For example, as described in section 2.5.3, framing
an assertion as ‘unknowing’, invites elaboration and sequence expansion, whereas
the opposite can lead to sequence closing. This process of ‘dialogic expansion’
and ‘contraction’ (Martin and White, 2003; Põldvere et al., 2016; White, 2004,
2002, 2003) can be an important factor in the deliberative quality of a dialogue.
Põldvere et al. (2016) cites speaker status, prosody and co-occurrence with other
stance markers as an important factor in determining the perceived function of
stance markers such as ‘I think’, i.e. as expansive and inviting further comment,
or contractive, i.e. limiting further exploration of alternate views (Põldvere et al.,
2016).
In terms of interactional consequence, Kärkkäinen (2003) argues that the marker
“at least weakly projects more talk”, contrary to others who have argued for its
contractive function (cf. Martin and White (2007)), in that it orients toward some
problematic content or possible introduces a contrasting perspective. Furthermore,
she contests the role of ‘I think’ as predominantly functioning as a politeness device
or hedging marker, as in most use cases she examined it prefaced content issued
with relatively high degrees of certainty. Rather, she explains, “I think generally
appears in contexts that do not inherently involve a high face threat to the recipient
(or speaker, for that matter)” (Kärkkäinen, 2003, p. 145). Thus, she concludes that ‘I
think’ introduces an “explicitly personalised assessment”, and is a starting point for
perspective, and a boundary in the talk to orient toward some “routine interactional
trouble” (Kärkkäinen, 2003, p. 146).
2.7 Speaker commitment: marking evidentiality and
epistemicity
In this section studies which have analysed the specific mechanisms used in the
presentation of a stance will be addressed. How do people do being knowing or
unknowing? As outlined in section 2.5.3, one way in which a knowing or unknowing
stance is conveyed can be through the use of interrogative format; however, a related
aspect is the level of certainty a speaker demonstrates towards an assertion and this
can be conveyed through epistemic markers (such as adverbials, axillary modals and
hedges) and evidential markers (resources which index the source of the knowledge -
such as ‘I heard he moved away’).
Epistemic and evidential markers are two categories of pragmatic marker that
can modulate the level of perceived knowingness or commitment associated with an
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assertion. Epistemic stance, can be conveyed in a number of different ways. Unlike
in other languages which systematically encode epistemic stance grammatically or
syntactically, in English it is marked in a variety of less formalised ways, which can
be realised lexically or even prosodically (Lyons, 1977). Furthermore, many of these
lexical items are pragmatic discourse markers, that invariably function in a multitude
of ways. Indeed, Heritage argues that “[e]pistemic positioning is conducted through
the entire resources of language and sequence organization,” (Heritage, 2008, p.
309).
There are a number of linguistic devices that can index the degree of speaker
commitment, or epistemicity, a person communicates about a given topic and the
level of authority with which they deliver their message. For example, epistemic
adverbials refer to those adverbs that address the state of the speaker or writer’s
knowledge and are used to express probability, possibility and certainty (Biber and
Finegan, 1988). Wierzbicka (2006) identifies various types of epistemic adverbials,
such as ‘maybe’ adverbials which perform the function of marking questionable
assertions or hedging and ‘surely’ adverbials which express certainty.
Literature on stance and evaluative language provide a number of different
linguistic features relevant to our inquiries. Willett (1988) identifies a general list
of cue words that index evidentiality, while Biber and Finegan (1988), Biber et al.
(1999) and Wierzbicka (2006) locate the role of particular adverbials in conveying
speaker commitment. Work on hedging often incorporates some of the linguistic
features outlined above, as well as additional markers, such as approximators (Prince
et al., 1982; Sauerland and Stateva, 2007).
Taking a stance in response to your own prior views or those of others, is
achieved through a range of linguistic features, both grammatical and lexical; often,
the interpretation of these features is not monolithic but subject to the placement,
prosody and other contextual factors. It has been studied from a number of different
academic perspectives and the terminology employed to discuss such aspects of
language are multivariate and complex. Mood, modality, evaluation, epistemic
markers, evidential markers, attitudinal, propositional, positioning, footing, taking a
line, stance-taking, appraisal, parentheticals, discourse particles, stance adverbials,
discourse markers, modals, modifiers, boosters, hedgers, downtoners, upgraders,
emphasisers are just some of the terms used to describe the range of resources
through which a speaker can take a stance.1
1There is not consensus on what constitutes a stance marker and notably some terms have
been used interchangeably, or even had their meaning inverted. The definitions of ‘epistemic’ and
‘evidential’ in particular have been attributed contrary definitions (e.g. Fraser (1996) uses epistemic
for the source and evidential for the strength of an assertion, which is counter to most other working
definitions).
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In this section we will review the research which highlights the use of epistemic
and evidential markers to affect the credibility or commitment to a given assertion.
2.7.1 Evidentiality
Expressions of evidentiality can provide reference to or encode the source of knowl-
edge or information (e.g., the speaker/writer or someone else who may or may not
be named) and the means by which the knowledge was acquired. Evidential markers,
convey the source of information and reveal the basis for a proposition. In a sense
they explain ‘how I know’. This includes resources such as reported speech, e.g.,
Tracy said ‘John is coming’, and other attribution methods such as, ‘I read that Nigel
Farage is an idiot’, and perception verb constructions, such as ‘I saw him leave’.
Evidentiality is identified as key resource used in the presentation of stance and
has been the subject of focused studies (Bergler, 2006; Biber and Finegan, 1989;
Chafe, 1986; Downing, 2001b). Evidentiality also relates to the perceived epistemic
strength of an assertion and has been acknowledged to contribute to the construction
of authority and responsibility (Fox, 2001; Heritage and Raymond, 2005). Evi-
dentiality is one important way that speaker commitment and accountability for an
assertion can be modulated. Presenting evidence, or citing an external source for
a claim can be a way to mitigate the impact of disagreement and minimizing the
perceived difference between oneself and others (Pomerantz, 1984b).
Evidential markings are strategically used to accomplish social goals. For exam-
ple they may function to create “distance from one’s own misdeeds” (Fox, 2001).
Fox (2001) suggests that evidential marking can index the social meanings of respon-
sibility and the construction of authority, but is sensitive to context. Hunston (2007)
observes that context is crucial as evaluative meaning does not occur in discrete units,
but across phrases, and is cumulative, making it challenging for quantitative corpus
studies.
Chafe (1986) found that although the frequencies of evidentials was not markedly
different in conversation compared to academic writing, there was a difference in
the types of evidentials used across context. Chafe attributes this difference to an
inherent difference between speaking and writing: “A writer has much more time
than a speaker to deliberate on what is being said. Speaking takes place on the fly,
but a writer can mull over how best to say what is desired, and has ample time to edit
what is produced [...] Speaking is an involved, social activity” Chafe (1986, p. 262).
For example, belief and hearsay were more common in the conversational corpus
than the academic corpus (Chafe, 1986).
Heritage and Raymond (2005) describe practices for indexing relative primacy
and subordination of assessments in dialogue, asserting that when an individual
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wishes to convey a lack of certainty about a claim, and thus reduce their own respon-
sibility for accuracy of what they are saying, individuals can index this epistemic
downgrade by evidential weakening. Evidential weakening is typically signally
through a variety of cue words (e.g. seems, sounds). Tag questions also enable
individuals to formulate their utterances as a question rather than an assertion, to
defer to another speaker’s epistemic rights in regards to the topic under discussion.
Biber et al. (1999), Precht (2003b) and Aikhenvald (2006) have provided cate-
gories of evidentials; however, as Chindamo et al. (2012) reflect, there is not total
consensus on the name nor composition of these categories. Willet (1988) proposes
a narrower sense of evidentiality, which can be picked up from the a set of cue words:
hear, heard, see, saw, look, looked, sounded, sound, say, said, says, overheard, must,
look/ed/s like, sound/s/ed like, seem/s/ed like, apparently, evidently, according to.
In this thesis the following categories will be adhered to: reporting verbs (e.g.,
said, told, reported, read); internal/inferential verbs (e.g., think, believe, feel); per-
ceptual verbs (e.g. saw, heard, read) and relationship verbs (e.g. appears, seemed).
Some markers, such as ‘probably’ have been classified both as hedges and epis-
temic adverbials in the literature. While acknowledging this duality, in this work
hedges are classified as approximators and pragmatic particles which serve to make
things ‘more or less fuzzy’ (Lakoff 1977), and separate epistemic adverbials into two
categories: those which express certainty (e.g. surely, obviously) and those which
express anything less than certainty, such as possibility or probability (e.g. maybe,
probably). We categorise in this way, as when even expressing that something is
probable, there remains room for manoeuvre, which demonstrates less authorial
commitment. Furthermore, by breaking down the epistemic adverbials into those
expressing certainty and those expressing uncertainty, we can learn more about the
epistemic status and weakening in our corpus.
Evidentiality: Reported Speech
Reported speech is one resource which is used for evidencing claims. Reported
speech provides a novel resource for investigating the expression of stance, agreement
and disagreement in dialogue. In spoken dialogue people sometimes talk about
things that were said in other conversations. These instances of reported speech are
typically marked by a pronoun (e.g., ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘I’) and an embedding verb (e.g.,
‘said’, ‘went’, ‘goes’) followed by a rendition of the previous utterance.
I said, I’m not assassinating your character now but you’re being very
intimidating in the way that your talking to people.2
2Theatre public meeting, September 1991, BNC-D91
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So she said, well you can’t do that. 3
Detailed studies of the form and function of reported speech show that they are
not simple verbatim reproductions of something said previously (Clark and Gerrig,
1990; Clift, 2007, 2006a; Holt, 2007, 2000). Rather, they involve the selective
representation of people’s own and others’ conversational conduct. This allows
conversational participants to use them, amongst other things, as evidence or justifi-
cation for particular accounts of events, to relay complaints and disputes and to claim
epistemic priority or privileged rights, knowledge or expertise about a topic under
discussion (Clift, 2006a; Haakana, 2007; Holt, 2000; Vincent and Perrin, 1999). The
non-narrative functions of reported speech have been closely associated with the
expression of a point of view, with dialogically expansive properties (Martin and
White, 2007), and argumentation, providing justification, support or authority for
a particular stance (Couper-Kuhlen, 2007; Vincent and Perrin, 1999). It has been
noted that direct reports are often more forthright in character, ‘delivered bluntly
with no mitigation’ (Clift, 2007). Tannen (1984) argues that reported speech is rarely
representative of what was actually said, and is rather used as a device in its own
right.
Although not traditionally conceived of as evidentials, in that they do not refer-
ence an external source in support of a claim, Clift (2006a) highlights that self-reports
are used for evidential effect. Furthermore, and rather than limited to story telling
contexts, her analysis demonstrates that reported speech is often utilised in assess-
ment environments.
Clift (2006a) observes the evidential capacity of reported speech to function
interactionally across turns, and defines it as an interactional evidential compared
to the stand alone evidentials. Stand alone evidentials, according to Clift (2006a)
are those that only operate within the turn, such as lexical or modal means of stance
marking, e.g. ‘apparently’, which only affect the modifies the perceived epistemic
status. Interactional evidentials are positioned in response to prior assessments and
“work to index the relative authority (or indeed subordination) of the speaker over a
co-participant with respect to what is said” (Clift, 2006a, p. 583).
Martin and White (2007) describes reported speech as overtly dialogistic, in that
it explicitly references and represents external viewpoints and utterances. Siromaa
(2012) also addresses some of the ways in which direct reported speech is used in
storytelling, to perform a stance-taking function; in particular a number of extracts
are analysed in which reported speech is employed to convey the substance of a
story which is issued in response to an initial story by their co-conversant and which,
importantly, serves to reinforce the stance taken in the prior story.
3At home, March 1992, BNC-KCN1
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2.7.2 Modifiers, adverbs and approximators
There are a number of linguistic devices which can make assertions more or less
precise, alter the perceived speaker commitment associated with an utterance, or
moderate the semantic meaning of the main clause by providing additional informa-
tion which alters the degree or strength of the verb on which it operates. Emphasisers,
boosters or intensifiers typically serve to upgrade the semantic meaning of an utter-
ance, whereas downtoners or minimisers do the opposite and downgrade the strength
of an assertion. Compare for example, ‘I really liked it, compared to ‘I quite liked
it’. Pomerantz (1984a) observed that replying to an initial assessment with a partial
repeat that features a downgrade, could signal disagreement. Consequently, such
linguistic features can index instances where oppositional stances are presented or at
odds.
The adverb ‘really’ in ‘I really liked it’, can add emphasis and boost the speaker’s
stance. The choice of adjective can also reveal incongruent stance positions. Consider
the following example taken from Pomerantz (1984a):
A: She’s a fox
B: Yeh, she’s a pretty girl.
B’s response uses a less emphatic adjective in response to A’s fox metaphor, thus
signalling a misalignment of speaker stances. As well as adjectives and adverbs such
as ‘quite’ and ‘really’, certainty adverbials, such as ‘surely’, ‘clearly’, ‘possibly’ and
‘probably’, can also serve position speakers along a scale from certain to uncertain.
Modal verbs (‘can’, ‘could’, ‘may’, ‘might’, ‘shall’, ‘should’, ‘will’, ‘would’ and
‘must’) and expressions affect the perceived commitment or certainty a speaker
attaches to an utterance. Palmer (2001) describes epistemic modality as being
“concerned with the speaker’s assumptions, or assessment of possibilities, and, in
most cases, it indicates the speaker’s confidence or lack of confidence in the truth of
the proposition expressed”.
Others have advanced a more socially motivated interpretation of modals, serving
to alleviate face threatening acts. Alonso-Almeida and Cruz-García (2011) highlights
that modals such as ‘may’ and ‘must’ have both an epistemic and evidential function.
The communicative purpose of the epistemic modal ‘may’ is to express probability,
to avoid face threatening statements which may not be possible to justify, and can
serve to protect the speaker’s face and fend off external criticism (Alonso-Almeida
and Cruz-García, 2011). In the context of medical texts, Vihla (1999) argues that
modals and other hedges can be considered a strategy for appearing unknowing and
diminish inequality between writer and reader (Vihla, 1999).
Rubin (2006) derives an empirical framework for analysing certainty about writ-
ten propositions. She defines “certainty, or epistemic modality” as “a linguistic
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expression of the likelihood that a particular state of affairs is, has been, or will be
true”. A data set of New York Times Service news reports and editorials were anal-
ysed for explicit certainty markers, factoring in the following dimensions: certainty
level, perspective (the writer’s point of view, a report of a direct participant, or the
reported of an expert’s view), focus (opinions, emotions, or judgements and facts or
events), and time (past, future, etc.). She found that “central modal auxiliary verbs,
gradable adjectives in their superlative degree, and adverbial intensifiers frequently
express explicit certainty, while adjectival downtoners and adverbial value disjuncts
rarely do so” (Rubin, 2006).
Conrad and Biber (2000) conducted a corpus study comparing the use of adver-
bial stance markers in conversational, academic and news registers. They employ the
term ‘stance’ to include: epistemic stance (both in reference to the source of infor-
mation and the level of commitment to a proposition), attitudinal stance (speaker’s
attitudes and judgements) and style stance, which relates to the manner in which
information is presented (akin to discourse markers). Their analysis shows that
adverbial stance markers have a variety of grammatical realizations and can occur
in different clause positions, making them “among the most difficult grammatical
features to analyse using computational techniques, because they are so pervasive
and flexible in their distribution, and because the same forms commonly serve other
grammatical functions”. They observed that stance adverbials were twice as com-
mon in conversation compared to written registers. The role of stance adverbials in
conversation is identified as a key resource for managing interpersonal dynamics.
Conrad and Biber (2000) found that ‘probably’, ‘actually’, ‘really’ and ‘sort of’ were
particularly common in conversation, and account for 70% of all epistemic markers
in conversation. Through the use of such markers individuals are able to modify the
content of their speech and encode important information about their commitment to
a given stance and strengthen or diminish how ‘knowing’ they come across. This is
important for face-management, and will likely have an significant impact on the
appropriate responses an interlocutor can issue in response to a speaker.
2.7.3 Pronouns and reference devices
Pronouns and self-reference have been explored in relation to authorial responsi-
bility in text (Hyland, 2002), medical discourse (Atkinson, 1999) and conversation
(Heritage and Raymond, 2005; Lerner and Kitzinger, 2007a,b).
Hyland (2002) asserts that self-reference, typically achieved through the use of
personal pronouns, is associated with commitment and knowledge claims. In addi-
tion, the first-person is effective at claiming authority when writers give information
about their own stances or beliefs. This act of locating oneself can be read as a form
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of self-positioning. However, it may extend beyond the self to situate anyone else
who was present. Using Goffman’s (1967) understanding of ‘face’ there is also the
potential for this other-locating to jeopardize the face of others.
Oh (2007) uses a conversation analytic approach to highlight that responsibility-
attribution and disagreement are often achieved through overt person reference
in Korean, and Halonen (2008) demonstrates that zero-constructions in Finnish
are strategically used for face-saving purposes, to distance speaker responsibility
from spoken content in sensitive contexts such as group therapy. In connection to
this Atkinson (1999) highlights that impersonal reportage in the passive helps in
contrast to devices denoting personal agency construct “zones of responsibility” and
credibility. Lerner and Kitzinger (2007a) shows that person reference relates to
Goffman’s notions of footing and face-work (Goffman, 1967a, 1981).
2.8 Language and medium
The literature drawn upon deals with the presentation of stance across a variety of
spoken and written registers. It is necessary to make clear here that the concern of
this thesis will be the presentation of stance in dialogue, i.e. real time exchanges that
take place either face-to-face or computer mediated. The different constraints and
affordances of various media affects the process of grounding (Clark and Brennan,
1991). Computer mediated real time dialogue has been acknowledged as “a hybrid
language variety displaying characteristics of both oral and written language” (Fer-
rara et al., 1991, p.10). As the focus of this work is the linguistic expression of stance
in a conversational context in which two or more co-participants are simultaneously
engaged, we will draw upon both data from face-to-face interactions and co-temporal
computer mediated dialogues. Consequently, the research on politeness in Computer
Mediated Communication (CMC) will be briefly addressed here.
2.8.1 Politeness in Computer Mediated Dialogue
Early treatment of CMC suggested that the lack of social cues would negatively
affect interpersonal relations (Culnan and Markus, 1987). Conversely, Walther
(1992) argued that as users became more adept at processing the social information
communicated via CMC over time this would become less of an issue. Walther
and D’Addario (2001) cite the creative and innovative use of non-verbal cues such
as emotions as evidence of emergent modes for communicating social information
in CMC contexts. Park (2008) states that non-verbal communication cues were
prevalent in text-based synchronous CMC channel, observing that online discourse
participant expressed interpersonal and affective stance through devices such as
2.9 Conclusion and Implications 59
contraction of linguistic forms, prosodic features and typographical conventions such
as the use of capital letters.
Brennan and Ohaeri (1999) conducted a study in which triads performed a
memory task either face to face or via synchronous chat tool. They found that
face-to-face groups hedged more than electronic groups, which they attribute to
formulation costs of including hedges in typed communication. However, there
was a positive correlation between word counts and hedges, suggesting that more
competent typists used more hedges, confirming that the omission is related to cost
of production rather than a depersonalisation affect of CMC. This, together with the
equal use of questions in the two conditions, led them to conclude that a participants
communicating via text still ‘cared about face-management needs, and when hedging
rates were low, this was because of the effort of typing.’ It is also worth noting that
this study was published 17 years ago, and the computer literacy rates will have
improved in this time due to the widespread adoption of personal computers mobile
devices and web messaging services.
So although hedging devices appear less frequently in CMC, which may give the
impression of impoliteness, it is not due to a lack of regard for face management,
but possibly just a by product of typing production costs. Furthermore, it is an
issue which may disappear over time as individuals become more adept at typing.
Alternatively, rather than just seeing a reversion to the levels of hedging witnessed in
face to face communication, it may be that domain/context specific alternatives are
innovated and introduced, in a similar vein to the evolution of emoticons.
Overall, the literature does not suggest that computer mediated communication
instils a lack of individuation and impersonalises the identity of typists. However,
the research of Park (2008) and Brennan and Ohaeri (1999), does suggest that the
role of hedges in CMC can provide a useful way into understanding the dynamics of
politeness in CMC.
2.9 Conclusion and Implications
In this chapter the devices through which speaker’s present their opinions and po-
sition their contributions as oppositional were explored. From more theoretical
accounts of the forms that disagreement and evaluative language can take, through to
the more empirically grounded and interactional accounts, the notion that stance is
an interactional matter, rather than the expression of a subjective attitudinal state was
presented. In section Section 2.6 and Section 2.7 what people actually say and the
particular sequential context for disagreements was addressed, ranging from subtle
markers such as reported speech through to more explicit ways of stating a disagree-
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ment (e.g. I disagree) or an opinion (e.g. I think X). Furthermore, the different
ways of constructing disagreement and the potential interactional consequences for
deliberation were considered, i.e. opening up or closing down the dialogue space.
Chapter 3
Taking a Stance: a Corpus Study of
Reported Speech
What can reported speech tell us about the differences between how people enact
disagreement and how they represent their disagreements in conversation? Which
elements are preserved in the representation of (dis)agreement and which are not?
To address these questions this chapter sets out to test whether there are systematic
differences in the manifestation of agreement and disagreement in direct speech
and reported speech in a large corpus of everyday conversations (Burnard, 1995).
In particular, the distribution of markers of (dis)agreement, updates, contrast and
emphasis are investigated. How speakers use these markers is compared across
sub-samples of dialogue: in direct speech, in reports of their own speech and the
speech of others.
3.1 Introduction
Qualitative studies show that people avoid exposed disagreement in conversation.
This is normally attributed to politeness strategies that mitigate the face-threat
involved in directly challenging or disagreeing with a conversational partner. Here
we explore how agreement and disagreement are presented in reported speech, i.e. a
situation where the risk of direct face-threat is removed. The difference between what
is said and what is reported as said thus provides a potentially useful analytic window
on the specific ways people use language to produce these different pragmatic effects.
Here we focus in particular on what this contrast can tell us about the way people
formulate and report on their agreements and disagreements with others.
The distribution of markers which can index agreement, disagreement, contrast
and stance positioning are compared in four samples of conversational data taken
from the British National Corpus (BNC). In particular, the following categories of
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speech are compared: a) direct speech with reported speech b) self-reported speech
(‘I said’) with other-reported speech (‘He said’, ‘She said’) and, in order to check
effects of conversational context, c) self-reported speech with direct speech by the
same speaker in their talk immediately preceding the reported speech.
This chapter proceeds by briefly setting out the Conversation Analytic (CA)
research on how disagreements are typically managed in direct conversation and
how reported speech can be used to present a position on a topic. Then the linguistic
features that can mark disagreement, agreement, contrast and stance positioning are
summarised and used to inform a quantitative analysis. This enables a comparison
of the ways people both enact and report on their agreements and disagreements.
Finally, the results and implications of the corpus study are presented.
3.1.1 Avoiding Disagreements
Making and responding to assessments and other assertions is a common feature of
conversation. Conversation analysts have shown that when people produce initial
assessments of situations or events, positive responses are made more quickly and
clearly than negative or unaligned responses (Pomerantz, 1984a; Sacks, 1987).
Negative or dispreferred responses are normally produced more slowly, are often
prefaced with some form of agreement (‘Oh yes... but’) and the negative assessment
itself is often delayed by several turns and produced with some sort of mitigating
account (Pomerantz, 1984a).
When responding to an initial assessment, an agreement may be signalled by
repeating back the original assessment, but whether this is an exact repeat or a
modified repeat can signal whether it is a strong agreement or weaker variation,
acting to modify or downgrade an assessment or perhaps even disagree. In the
following example, taken from Pomerantz (1984a), pauses and delays, such as
the ‘(hhhhh)’, may suggest the speaker is taking some time to formulate their
disagreement, or decide upon the most tactful way to deliver it:
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A: cause those things take working at,
(2.0)
B: (hhhhh) well, they do, but
A: They aren’t accidents,
B: No, they take working at, But on the
other hand, some people are born
with uhm (1.0)
B: well a sense of humor, I think it’s
something you are born with Bea.
A: Yes. Or it’s c- I have the- eh yes, I
think a lotta people are, but then I
think it can be developed too.
Example 1
In addition to the hesitation, speaker B also uses the discourse marker well,
often used to highlight that a disagreement is forthcoming. Furthermore, speaker
A performs an initial agreement by repeating back they take working at, before
delivering a contrasting point of view, namely that certain traits are innate. In
response speaker A also offers an appeasing agreement, before reverting back to
their previous, contrary stance, I think it can be developed too. This small extract
highlights many of the devices, such as hesitation, negation, and discourse markers,
that are employed when managing disagreement in dialogue.
The CA observations highlight the ways that people normally avoid exposing
disagreements directly (unless of course they intend to be abrupt or confrontational).
Consequently explicit markers of disagreement should tend to be rare in conversation
and much less common than explicit markers of agreement. How would we expect
these phenomena to play out in reported speech?
3.1.2 Reported speech
Direct challenges and disagreement in conversation are socially problematic. As
highlighted in the Chapter 2, exposed disagreement is generally avoided (Pomerantz,
1984a) because it is potentially face threatening (Brown and Levinson, 1987). If
people are reluctant to expose disagreements directly then reported speech provides
a potentially useful context in which prior disagreements could be presented more
explicitly; the original addressee is absent which reduces concerns about politeness
and the likelihood of a challenge to the speaker’s version of events.
As discussed in section 2.7.1, reported speech involves the selective representa-
tion of people’s own and others’ conversational conduct and their position on a given
topic.
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2a) So she said well you can’t do that.
I said I bloody can do that.
That is my caravan, not yours.
<pause> I said I can do it.
And I will do it if that man’s not gonna see me.a
2b) I actually had phrases like bra burning thrown
at me and I said that feminism to me is about
having the same opportunities as men [...] every-
body round the table said well yes I believe in
that too
I said well then you’re feministsb
aAt home, March 1992, BNC-KCN1
bAdapted from Informal meeting, BNC-HYY2
Table 3.1 Example 2
Reported speech can be used to express a point of view (that of another person’s
as in 2a) or your own as in 2b), to evidence claims or justify particular accounts
of events, to relay complaints and to claim epistemic priority or privileged rights,
knowledge or expertise about a topic under discussion (Clift, 2006a; Haakana, 2007;
Holt, 2000; Vincent and Perrin, 1999). For example, in the extract from the BNC
Dave produces an assessment and then quotes someone who echoes his opinion:
Dave: Yeah, but it’s got worse and worse
Keith: Oh right, yeah
Dave: and he said it’s got worse since he got the new
switchboard operator, which makes you think 1
Table 3.2 Example 3
Direct reports are often more forthright and feature less mitigation (Clift, 2007).
This unique context in which the usual constraints of politeness, i.e. the formulation
of utterances is taken with particular care to mitigate face threat, is diminished.
The difference between what is said and what is reported as said thus provides a
potentially useful analytic window on the specific ways people use language to
produce these different pragmatic effects. Here we focus in particular on what this
contrast can tell us about the way people formulate and report on their agreements
and disagreements with others, and what this can reveal about stance.
Reported speech could also be used as a way to represent people’s stance on
the specific matters being addressed in a conversation. Even if an utterance is not
formulated as being an agreement or disagreement it can be clear from the context
that it contrasts in some way with something somebody else said. This can be
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achieved using turn-initial markers such as ‘well’ that can signal a speaker is going
to produce something that is not well aligned with a previous turn or, as illustrated
in Example 1, by using negation. If reported speech is used for the expression of
opinions and disputes then markers of contrastive stance or position should be more
common than in direct speech. This is of particular interest because these are devices
that enable the current addressee to re-construct a version of the original prior turn
that reported speech represents a response to.
3.2 Hypotheses
Three general hypotheses are identified for reported speech:
1. Politeness: The general politeness hypothesis is that people avoid the face-
threat involved in direct disagreement with an addressee. Unless a current addressee
is aligned in some way with the person(s) whose speech is being reported then the
pressure for mitigation of negative responses is removed.2 The general politeness
hypothesis thus predicts that reported speech should tend to contain more exposed
disagreement than direct speech.
2. Self-Presentation: Even where people are not disagreeing directly with their
current addressee they might still wish to demonstrate that they understand that
disagreement is a sensitive matter e.g., to avoid the inference that they are rude or
combative. If people are sensitive to this then, all things being equal, they should
not produce any more explicit disagreements in reported speech than they do in
direct speech. Moreover, concerns about self-presentation should by definition affect
‘self’ more strongly than ‘other’ therefore we would expect fewer explicit markers of
disagreement in self-reported than other-reported speech.
3. Contrastive Stance: A third general hypothesis is that people’s primary con-
cern when reporting on a prior conversation is to highlight the substantive differences
between their own stance and that of others. The intuition here is that like ordinary
utterances reported speech should ideally be newsworthy in some way (Goodwin,
1979); either to the current addressee as a means of highlighting a significant stance
previously taken by the speaker, or to convey the newsworthiness of the reported
speech to the people actually in the prior conversation. This leads to the prediction
that reported speech should contain more explicit markers of stance or emphasis than
direct speech; for example, by using turn-initial discourse markers such as ‘well’ or
negations (Scott, 2002) as illustrated above in Example 1.
2Of course, it is possible that the current addressee might also take issue with the opinion or stance
identified in the reported speech but this would become an issue for their subsequent response to the
report not the format of the report itself.
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3.3 Linguistic Features
In order to make quantitative tests of these predictions we now consider some
potential indices of the different ways people can position direct and reported speech.
In particular, discourse markers of (dis)agreement, stance, emphasis and contrast
are considered. As explored in section 2.6.2, discourse markers are devices which
can enable speakers to explicitly show the relationship between two utterances, such
as highlighting that what is said is positioned in contrast to what has come before
(Fox Tree and Schrock, 1999, 2002; Fraser, 1996; Heritage, 1984; Smith, 1998).
3.3.1 Markers of Agreement and Disagreement
The simplest case for analysis is where people explicitly position their turns as
agreement or disagreement. This can be done with phrases such as ‘You’re wrong’,
‘I disagree’, ‘I don’t agree’ and ‘You’re right’ or ‘I agree’. Unfortunately, for
the reasons outlined above these exposed forms, especially those associated with
disagreement, are likely to be rare.
A second set of more indirect indicators are provided by cue words or discourse
markers that are associated with agreement and disagreement but don’t explicitly
formulate a turn as such, taken from Walker et al. (2012c) (see section 2.6.1 for a
more detailed discussion of how these markers were obtained). For our analysis then,
more implicit markers of disagreement are: ‘really’, ‘no’, ‘actually’, ‘but’, ‘so’, and
‘you mean’; and markers of agreement: markers of agreement: ‘yes’, ‘I know’, ‘I
believe’, ‘I think’, and ‘just’ (Walker et al., 2012c).
A potential limitation of these indirect markers for the purpose of this study is that
they are drawn from analysis of online discussion forums which are less dialogical
than face-to-face interaction and where people may also tend to actively seek out
disputes. It is also worth noting that, for example, the frequency of turn-initial ‘yes’
is not an unambiguous indicator of agreement; disagreement is often preceded by
techniques including agrees (e.g. ‘yes, but...’), delays and prefaces, such as, ‘well’
and ‘hmm’ (Kotthoff, 1993; Pomerantz, 1984a; Sacks and Jefferson, 1995). Clift
(2006a) observes that ‘well’ can act as a buffer. Nonetheless, we assume that the
relative distribution of these markers across different samples is indicative of the
overall patterns of agreement and disagreement within them.
3.3.2 Update Markers
In addition to marking the fact of agreement and disagreement there are more subtle
pragmatic markers that can signal an individual’s knowledge state or stance with
respect to the current conversational context. Here we use ‘well’ and ‘oh’, which we
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gloss as update markers both of which are associated with signalling some form of
contrast or sequential discontinuity in dialogue.
A turn-initial ‘well’ typically (but not exclusively) indicates that what follows
will be in some way unexpected, unwelcome, discontinuous or contrary to a prior
statement (Heritage and Clayman, 2010; Pomerantz, 1984b; Schegloff and Lerner,
2009; Schiffrin, 1988). As such it can signal that a forthcoming utterance is contrast-
ing, unexpected or perhaps unwanted in substance, and which will lead to an update
of the knowledge status.
A turn-initial oh, by contrast, typically (but not exclusively) acts as a reactive
change-of-state token that indexes a responsive shift to a prior utterance through an
update in the speaker’s knowledge or awareness (Heritage, 1984, 1998). Schiffrin
(1988) observes that oh often marks a shift in speaker orientation or stance, indicating
a speaker’s realisation that the hearer is not similarly aligned or oriented towards a
proposition and may signal a potentially argumentative stance. Heritage also notes
that ‘oh’ indexes a shift, identifying it as a ‘change-of- state’ token, highlighting an
update in the speaker’s knowledge or awareness (Heritage, 1984, 1998; Heritage and
Raymond, 2005), which is supported by (Fox Tree and Schrock, 1999) who observes
that it can signal a disjuncture, aiding hearers to integrate discourse.
3.3.3 Contrast, Emphasis and Expletives
Finally, in order to index the way in which the content of a turn is formulated or
positioned with respect to another turn, we track negations (‘not’ and ‘n’t’) and
mid-turn contrastive conjuncts (‘but’ and ‘though’) as markers of contrast. The role
of negation as a key phenomenon in relation to opinion and disagreement has been
noted in the literature (Benamara et al., 2012; Scott, 2002) and is of particular interest
here because of its use for the denial or rejection of statements; consequently, its role
in rejection and disagreement, together with its inherent connection to the expression
of alternatives or contrast, led to the inclusion of negation for our analysis. Adverbial
emphasisers, such as ‘really’, ‘surely’ and ‘clearly’, are included as indicators of
emphasis (Quirk and Crystal, 1985). The role of adverbial emphasisers as possible
indices of disagreement (Scott, 2002) and for the expression of stance (e.g. conveying
attitudes towards the content of a sentence), have been highlighted in the literature
(Biber and Finegan, 1989; Conrad and Biber, 2000). We also track frequencies
of a manually compiled list of common swearwords informed by previous studies
and frequency data that surfaced from a sub-sample of the BNC dataset (‘bastard’,
‘bitch’, ‘bloody’, ‘bollocks’, ‘fuck’, ‘piss off’, ‘shit’ and ‘wanker’) which can be




Building on the three general hypotheses presented above and the discussion of
different markers of agreement, disagreement and stance we can summarise eight
basic predictions:
1. Politeness: Markers of agreement should always be more common than mark-
ers of disagreement in all speech.
2. Politeness: Markers of disagreement should be more common in reported
speech than direct speech.
3. Politeness: Expletives should be more common in reported speech than direct
speech.
4. Self-Presentation: Markers of disagreement should not be more common in
self-reported speech than direct speech.
5. Self-Presentation: Markers of disagreement should be less common in self-
reported speech than other-reported speech.
6. Self-Presentation: Expletives should be less common in self-reported speech
than other-reported speech.
7. Contrastive Stance: Update markers should be more common in reported
speech than in direct speech.
8. Contrastive Stance: Contrast and Emphasis should be more common in re-
ported speech than in direct speech.
3.5 Method
The corpus analysis used the spoken dialogue component of the British National
Corpus (BNC), comprising approximately 10 million words. This sizeable collection
of naturally occurring conversations offers scope to explore patterns of reported
speech across a large sample. The transcripts include annotations for some key
paralinguistic features such as laughing, overlapping speech and significant pauses,
although the transcription conventions vary. Our analysis is based on the BNC’s
s-units which are sentence-like divisions of the transcribed utterances. We used
SCoRE, a web interface for dialogue corpora, to gather our data from the BNC
(Purver, 2001). It can be used to search for any regular expression, and for word or
phrase repetitions, including repeats across sentence/turn boundaries.
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For each set of markers their frequency in the BNC was gathered and analysed.
Reported speech can be introduced in a number of ways, for example, ‘I went’,
‘I says’, ‘he goes’, ‘she was like’. We focused on ‘pronoun + said + report’ as
this produced a good sized dataset. Using the ScoRE interface (Purver, 2001) it
was possible to extract all instances of ‘I said’ (5315 turns), ‘he said’ (3310 turns)
and ‘she said’ (2579 turns), which were then checked by hand to ensure they were
consistent samples of reported speech. A further 5315 turns were randomly selected
from the spoken dialogue section of the BNC to provide a comparable sample of
general direct speech.
In order to control for the possibility that reported speech tends to occur in
particular dialogue contexts or with particular audiences (e.g., story-telling to friends)
a second sub-sample of 500 turns of direct speech was selected from the same context
by identifying the nearest preceding turn to an identified instance of self-reported
speech (‘I said’) by the same speaker, that did not contain an instance of reported
speech. This is referred to below as the Local Context sample.
The samples were analysed for a number of turn-initial features: agreement and
disagreement markers, update markers ‘oh’ and ‘well’. Turn-initial in the reported
speech samples constituted what immediately followed I/(s)he said, while in the
direct speech sample it was simply the initial words of the turns. Non-turn-initial
features were also investigated: adverbial emphasisers (often indicators of stance or
opinion markers), ‘oh’ (change-of-state tokens), negations and swearwords.
3.6 Results
In this section the results of the corpus analysis are presented.
3.6.1 Exposed Disagreement
As Table 3.3 shows, both exposed agreement and disagreement are rare, although
exposed agreement is, as expected, more common than disagreement. Only 0.8% of
the turns sampled contain strong expressions of disagreement whereas 5.2% contain
strong expressions of agreement. Strikingly, over 97% of these instances of exposed
agreement/disagreement occur in direct speech. This observation is clearly counter
to the initial politeness hypothesis for reported speech and incompatible with the
self-presentation hypothesis.
Chi Square analysis of the frequency of strongly exposed agreement and dis-
agreement indicates that their distributions are different in reported and direct speech
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Phrase Reported Speech Direct Speech Total
You’re wrong 6 17 23
I disagree 0 15 15
I don’t agree 2 46 48
You’re right 5 224 229
I agree 5 318 323
Table 3.3 Instances of Exposed Agreement and Disagreement in the BNC. RS =
Reported Speech and DS = Direct Speech
(χ2(1) = 15.23, p<0.01).
3 There is approximately a 7:1 bias toward overt expression
of agreement over disagreement in direct speech compared with approximately 1:1 in
reported speech. This suggests that although explicit, exposed disagreement is much
less common in reported speech there is no particular bias in that context toward
overtly positioning a relayed turn as agreement or disagreement.
3.6.2 Agreement and Disagreement markers
The distribution of turn-initial markers of agreement and disagreement identified by






Really 3 5 4 1
No 173 128 190 12
Actually 3 5 2 1
But 85 63 51 13
So 108 30 17 19
You
mean
0 0 0 0
Total 372 231 264 46
Total
turns
5315 5889 5315 500
% total
turns
7.00 3.92 5.00 9.20
Table 3.4 Frequency of Disagreement Markers
As Table 3.4 suggests, the overall frequency of markers of disagreement is higher
in direct speech than all reported speech (χ2(1) = 48.3, p<0.01) and also higher in the








Yeah/Yes 647 139 181 26
I know 12 16 22 4
I believe 0 1 1 1
I think 31 22 27 3
I just 4 10 6 2
Total 694 188 237 36
Total turns 5315 5889 5315 500
% total
turns
13.06 3.19 4.46 7.20
Table 3.5 Frequency of Agreement Markers
Local Context sample (i.e. preceding direct speech turn by the same speaker) than in
the self-reported speech of the same speaker (χ2(1) = 16.22, p<0.01). Comparison
of self-reported speech with other-reported speech (he/she said) shows markers of
disagreement are less common in other-reported speech (χ2(1) = 7.22, p=0.01). These
patterns are opposite to the predicted pattern for the Politeness and Self-Presentation
hypotheses for reported speech.
The same pattern is observed for the markers of agreement. They are more
common in direct than reported speech (χ2(1) = 489, p<0.01) and more common
in the Local Context sample from the same speaker than in self-reported speech
(χ2(1) = 7.63, p=0.01). They are also more common in self-reported speech than
other-reported speech (χ2(1) = 12.2, p<0.01).
Overall the results show that explicit and implicit markers of agreement and
disagreement are more common in direct speech than reported speech and more
common in self-reported than other-reported speech.
3.6.3 Turn-Initial Update markers
The raw frequencies for the distribution of turn-initial update markers are pro-
vided in Table 3.6. The ‘reactive’ change of state token ‘oh’ is more common in
reported speech than all direct speech (χ2(1) = 16.7, p<0.01) but there is no differ-
ence in frequency between self-reported speech and the Local Context turns by the
same speaker (χ2(1) = 0.58, p=0.45). ‘Oh’ is however, slightly more frequent in
other-reported speech (he/she) than self-reported speech (χ2(1) = 4.72, p=0.03).
As Table 3.6 shows, differences in the use of the ‘prospective’ update marker
‘well’ are more marked. It is approximately twice as common in reported speech







Oh 170 292 218 17
Well 202 299 502 22
Total 372 591 720 39
Total turns 5315 5889 5315 500
% total
turns
7.00 10.04 13.55 7.8
Table 3.6 Frequency of Update Markers
the use of ‘well’ in self-reported speech where it is approximately twice as common
as in the Local Context speech turn by the same speaker (χ2(1) = 14.2, p<0.01) and
approximately twice as common in self-reported speech than direct speech (χ2(1) =
80.3, p<0.01).
Overall, in contrast to markers of (dis)agreement, signals of updates are more
common in reported speech. The use of the reactive ‘oh’ is more strongly associated
with other-reported speech whereas the use of the prospective ‘well’ is associated
with self-reported speech.
3.6.4 Contrast and Emphasis
The counts for markers of contrast and emphasis i.e. negations, contrastive con-
junctives (but, though), adverbial emphasisers (actually, certainly, clearly, definitely,
indeed, obviously, plainly, really, surely, for certain, for sure, of course) and common
swearwords are provided in Table 3.7. For all these markers occurrences at any






Negation 624 1300 1211 148
Swearwords 6 90 132 3
Contrastives 298 316 411 62
Adverbials 187 162 158 40
Total 1115 1868 1912 253
Total turns 5315 5889 5315 500
% total
turns
20.98 31.72 35.97 50.6
Table 3.7 Frequency of Negations and Adverbial emphasises
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It is immediately clear from Table 3.7 that swearwords are much more common
in reported speech than in direct speech (χ2(1) = 92.5, p<0.01); they are also more
common in self-reported speech than other-reported speech (χ2(1) = 76.8, p<0.01).
Swearwords are also four times more common in self-reported speech than in the
Local Context turns by the speaker (χ2(1) = 7.15, p<0.01).
Negations follow a similar pattern. They are approximately twice as common
in reported speech as direct speech (χ2(1) = 266, p<0.01) and approximately twice
as common in self-reported speech as other-reported speech (χ2(1) = 350, p<0.01).
However, negations are less frequent in self-reported speech than in the Local Context
turns by the same speaker.
Contrastive conjunctives are also more common in reported speech than direct
speech (χ2(1) = 4.82, p=0.03) and more than twice as common in self-reported speech
than in other-reported speech (χ2(1) = 25.79, p<0.01). However, like negations they
are less frequent in self-reported speech than in the Local Context turns by the same
speaker (χ2(1) = 13.3, p<0.01).
The pattern for adverbial emphasisers is different to the other markers of contrast.
Emphasis is both slightly more common in direct speech than reported speech (χ2(1)
= 5.31, p=0.02) and equally frequent in self-reported and other-reported speech (χ2(1)
= 0.48, p=0.48). It is also approximately twice as common in the Local Context
sample of the speaker (context sample) than in their self-reported speech. Overall,
emphasis is slightly more common in direct speech overall and particularly common
in turns introducing reported speech.
3.7 Discussion
Direct forms of disagreement occurred very rarely in the BNC. Thus it seems that
directly stating that you disagree with someone is not common practice. Although
the results show a clear preference for agreement over disagreement in direct speech,
they also show that, contrary to the predictions of the politeness hypothesis, reported
speech does not appear to be a context in which explicit disagreements are more
likely to be exposed. On the contrary, people are far less likely to include explicit
markers of agreement or disagreement in reported speech than in direct speech.
Moreover, where they do formulate a reported utterance with an explicit marker it is
equally likely to be agreement or disagreement.
Explicit makers of agreement and disagreement are rare of course and not an
essential part of actually enacting an agreement or disagreement. However, the results
show the same pattern for the less direct markers of agreement and disagreement
identified by Walker et al. (2012c). Again, markers of both disagreement and
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agreement are more common in direct speech than reported speech. Overall, it
appears that reported speech is not a context in which disagreements are normally
re-presented or rehearsed as disagreements.
These results also run counter to the hypothesis that the format of reported speech
turns is constrained by concerns with self-presentation. The results are contrary
to predictions 5,6 and 7. Although the self-presentation hypothesis predicts that
disagreement should not be more common in reported speech, it is incompatible with
the observation that it is more common in direct speech and more specifically more
common in self-reported speech than other-reported speech. A self-presentation
account is also difficult to reconcile with the observation that ostensibly taboo
swearwords are more common in direct than reported speech; self or other.
The hypothesis that provides the best fit to the preceding results is Contrastive
Stance. The results suggest that reported speech is not used for the re-presentation of
(dis)agreements, or at least not in the same way in which they are actually enacted in
direct speech. Firstly, the update markers ‘Oh’ and ‘Well’ appear to be quite strongly
associated with reported speech. This suggests people are deliberately highlighting
moments of change more than they actually mark them in direct speech. Although
not directly predicted the additional observation that people are more likely to ‘well’-
preface a self-report of their own remarks and ‘oh’-preface reports of another’s
remark suggests individuals position themselves as delivering updates and report on
others receiving them. This asymmetric highlighting of changes in epistemic stance
fits with a concern to re-present the newsworthy and contrastive elements of prior
conversations. Within these reports what is selected for inclusion also appears to
focus on the substance of a dispute, i.e. on expressions of contrast and features that
indicate shifts in stance. This is compatible with the relatively low frequency with
which ‘meta’ agreement and disagreement markers are used. It is also compatible
with the increased use of use of negations and contrastive conjunctives.
However, there are also some challenges to the Contrastive Stance hypothesis
in the data presented above. It doesn’t directly account for the observation that
swearwords will be used more frequently unless these are also construed primarily
as markers of contrast, perhaps acting as and emphasis device. This is plausible but
post-hoc. Also, its prediction that markers of emphasis should be more common in
reported speech is not borne out. The results show that the turn preceding reported
speech (the ‘Local Context’ turn) does tend to include emphasis so this might
reflect a marking of stance but again, this is a post-hoc explanation. It appears
that highlighting points of contrast and representing stance and shifts in assessed
parameters are key functions of reported speech. This aligns with Clift (2006a), in
that it suggests that there is an evidential interactive function being enacted through
the use of reported speech.
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While this study shows that reported speech is not used to re-present how dis-
agreements were enacted, it is possible that other forms of report may. The dataset
we worked with predominantly included direct reported speech or quotatives (‘he
said cats are bad’), but also some indirect reported speech (‘he said that cats are
bad’). Further work to investigate how the more descriptive indirect reports, and
the wider gamut of reported thoughts might be used to re-present disagreement may
provide further insights into the reporting of disagreement.
3.8 Implications
In this chapter a corpus study of reported and direct speech within the BNC was
examined for a variety of disagreement and stance markers. In line with literature,
it was found that exposed disagreement is rare in conversation. Even within the
context of reported speech, in which the potential face threat of an utterance is di-
minished, directly challenging a speaker, or overtly disagreeing with them is avoided.
Consequently understanding the effect of exposed agreement and disagreement may
be difficult to assess from corpus approaches. Although socially problematic, the
potential benefits of disagreement, particularly for substantive discussion are wide
reported. This leads to the question, what role could exposed disagreement play in
debate contexts? Does, or can, disagreement help to advance the dialogue and lead
to a more deliberative exchange, or must it always be socially problematic? What is
constructive engagement in discussion contexts and what is the role of disagreement
in this process?
The corpus of reported speech included higher frequencies of features which can
emphasises speaker position, such as contrast and negation. Thus rather than doing
disagreement in direct ways, perhaps making explicit the stance - i.e. the difference
between speaker positions - is a more important feature to examine when trying to
understand how disagreement is enacted in dialogue.
Chapter 4
Shifting Opinions: an Experimental
Approach to Disagreement
4.1 Introduction
Disagreement is understood to be socially problematic; it also rarely surfaces in
naturally occurring conversation. In this chapter an experiment was designed to
facilitate the direct manipulation of the occurrence of exposed (dis)agreement, also
referred to as impolite disagreement elsewhere in the literature, and to rack the
effects on the subsequent dialogue. This is the first experiment to directly manipulate
the occurrence of exposed agreement and disagreement in dialogue.
Previous studies on disagreement take a distributional or corpus based approach
at evidencing and analysing instances of disagreement in interaction (Abbott et al.,
2011; Holtgraves, 1997; Misra and Walker, 2013; Walker et al., 2012c). These
studies have provided valuable insights into the ways in which these complex social
interactions are handled in different contexts, and given rise to various theories on
how we process, respond to and mitigate the impact of disagreement. However,
the literature also highlights that exposed disagreement rarely surfaces in naturally
occurring conversation, as confirmed by the corpus study presented in chapter 3.
This chapter outlines an experimental approach for investigating disagreement,
which provides the opportunity to manipulate the occurrence of exposed (dis)agreement
in dialogue. By exposed, we refer particularly to direct and unequivocal presentations
of agreement and disagreement, such as ‘I agree’ and ‘You’re wrong’. However,
we also explore less direct markers, which can, but do not always function in a
(dis)agreement capacity. For example, turn-initial ‘yes’ and ‘no’, can and are often
used to signal agreement and disagreement, however, the function of these mark-
ers is context specific and dependent on the preceding content (for example a ‘no’
following a negative statement can function as agreement). In more general terms,
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disagreement, for the purposes of this study, refers to the presentation of a stance po-
sition that is incongruous, misaligned or somehow in opposition to or ‘at odds’ with
what has come before. Conversely, an agreement is characterised by an utterance
that serves to reinforce a prior contribution, denote alignment or concordance and
acceptance of a prior contribution.
4.1.1 Motivation for the study
Expressing a view in opposition to that of your interlocutor, i.e. one that contradicts,
challenges, refutes or denies their position, attitude or contribution, can be socially
problematic. Direct challenges to a speaker or disagreeing with their assertion in
dialogue can constitute, in Brown and Levinson’s terminology, what is known as a
Face Threatening Act, that is to say it can threaten the hearer’s public self-image.
Consequently, as demonstrated in chapter 3, disagreement, especially when done in
a direct manner, is rare in conversation. This means that it is difficult to assess what
affect it has upon a dialogue. An experimental approach has the advantage that it
allows us to directly manipulate the occurrence of exposed (dis)agreement and track
it’s effects on the subsequent dialogue.
As discussed in section 2.2.2 disagreement can signal social intimacy, lead to
novel contributions in problem solving talks, and be essential in developing the
deliberative quality of a dialogue. So although disagreement, particularly when
executed impolitely, tends to be problematic, for certain contexts, such as problem
solving and discussion tasks, it can be essential in advancing the deliberative quality
of a dialogue. Chiu (2008) also suggests that agreement can be potentially detrimental
to a dialogue, but the problematic aspects of agreement are not well reported in
the literature; this gives rise to a secondary question, ‘what affect does exposed
agreement have upon a dialogue?’ If it is problematic, how and in what ways does
this manifest?
If disagreement encourages novel contributions does agreement, conversely, stifle
them? If people are too readily agreeing, does this prevent more involved discussion
that could lead to shifts in stance or the development of new contributions? In order
to understand the effects of both exposed agreement and disagreement, an experi-
ment was designed that enabled the manipulation of such features under controlled
conditions. This is the first experiment to directly manipulate the occurrence of
exposed agreement and disagreement in dialogue.
The causal effects of exposed disagreement on the subsequent trajectory of a
dialogue has not previously been directly tested. One key reason for this is the
practical difficulty of manipulating linguistic features in a live dialogue. Here a
technique introduced by Healey et al. (2003) is used that takes advantage of the
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potential of text-chat for enabling selective manipulation of people’s turns without
their awareness.
4.1.2 Politeness and Accommodation Theory
One argument for the scarcity of disagreement in dialogue is anchored to the concept
of politeness. Politeness Theory builds upon Ervin Goffman’s concept of face.
Goffman (1967a) defines face as ‘the positive social value a person effectively claims
for himself’ through interaction and offers a model of co-operation that is enacted
when an individual’s face or social value is threatened during interaction. Goffman
stresses the co-operative nature of facework: ‘When a face has been threatened
[...] lack of effort on the part of one person induces compensative effort from
others’ (Goffman, 1967a). This mutual co-operation and shared consideration in
interaction has also been located as a central notion for Politeness Theorists (Brown
and Levinson, 1987; Watts, 2003).
Politeness Theory suggests that interlocutors minimise disagreement to save face,
employing strategic conflict avoidance techniques to mitigate the effect of any dis-
agreement that may surface (Leech, 1980). However, Accommodation Theory would
posit that if someone is agreeable their conversational partner would match them in
this convivial approach, whereas if they are adopting a discursive or even combative
linguistic style, then their conversational partner would be likely to adopt a similar
tact and synchronicity would become more exaggerated (Giles and Smith, 1979).
Accommodation Theory posits that interlocutors adopt strategies of convergence
to integrate and identify socially with another (Giles et al., 1991); this involves the
adoption of linguistic similarities and leads to perceived communicative effective-
ness (Giles and Smith, 1979) and cooperativeness (Feldman, 1968). Conversely,
speech divergence reflects distancing from the co-conversant and can surface when
confronted with perceived differences to the co-conversant.
Disagreement and Constructive Engagement
As demonstrated in section 2.6.1, although disagreement has often been regarded as
socially problematic, a number of potential benefits have also been countered. In
particular contexts such as task orientated dialogue, problem solving talk and work
place interactions, disagreement is identified as an essential process that can lead to
greater clarity (Colman et al., 2011), novel contributions Chiu (2008), and is both
acceptable and expected (Angouri, 2012; Angouri and Locher, 2012). However, it is
found that direct disagreement is still very rare in these contexts, with more polite
formulations being preferred (Angouri, 2012; Chiu, 2008).
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Conversely, researchers suggest that agreement, rather than disagreement, can
pose problems to the success of a dialogue (Chiu, 2008). Martin and White (2007)
argue that agreement can serve a contractive function, serving to close down the
possibility of further discussion. Issuing only agreements can lead to a lack of
mutual intelligibility and prevent further elaboration on the position an interlocutor
is presenting and exposition of the reasoning underpinning it. Intuitively this would
suggest that agreement can serve to close down a dialogue; does it therefore follow
that disagreement could, conversely, serve to open up the dialogic space? If dis-
agreement encourages novel contributions does agreement, conversely, stifle them?
If people are too readily agreeing, does this prevent more involved discussion that
could lead to shifts in stance or the development of new contributions?
Consequently, disagreement ought to be a catalyst or precursor to a potential
shift in position, as it signals a direct challenge to a held idea, which in turn may be
retained, re-negotiated or more fundamentally re-conceived. This, together with the
findings by Chiu (2008), suggests that disagreement can play an important role in
the deliberation and problem solving process. However, the exact effect of direct and
unmitigated disagreement has been little explored, owing to its highly marked nature
and therefore rare occurrence. Furthermore, a comparison of the exact interactional
effects of agreement and disagreement have hitherto not been fully explored. In this
chapter, and experimental approach which facilitates such a direct comparison is
presented.
4.1.3 Predictions
Given the literature we would expect that exposed disagreement would be espe-
cially problematic; it should instigate additional work being done in the interaction
and more instances of repair. Insertions of exposed disagreement should be more
disruptive than exposed agreement insertions, which should in turn facilitate more
agreement. Assuming speakers are being co-operative, all things being equal, then
disagreement should lead to more hedging and mitigation in order to manage the dis-
agreement and minimise face-threat. However, it may also lead to additional stance
shifts, or the consideration of more alternatives during the discussion dialogues.
4.2 Agreement and Disagreement Fragment Experi-
ment
In order to assess the impact of exposed (dis)agreement, an experiment was designed
in which instances of exposed (dis)agreement were artificially inserted into a dialogue.
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Turn-initial discourse markers such as ‘No’, ‘But’ ‘you’re wrong’ and, ‘I disagree’
can highlight instances of disagreement within a conversation. Similarly, ‘Yes’,
‘And’, ‘I agree’ and ‘you’re right’ can serve as indicators of agreement, or reinforce
congruence. These eight fragments were selected because they provide a range
of exposed, direct (dis)agreement and more subtle markers that can be used in
(dis)agreement. Using the DiET chat tool it was possible to alter a participant’s
turn before it was relayed to their conversational partner. This means that the
conversational partner would receive the updated turn with the intervention fragment
inserted at the beginning of the original turn, while the message sender would only
see their original turn.
Sender (A) chat log Receiver (B) chat log
A: What do you think? A:What do you think?
B: Tom should go B: Tom should go
A: Tom’s the pilot!!! A But Tom’s the pilot!!!
Table 4.1 Example of participants’ respective views of intervention turns
4.2.1 Hypotheses
1. Accommodation Theory: The general accommodation hypothesis is that dia-
logue partners match linguistic and discursive style. Thus the general accom-
modation hypothesis predicts that the insertion of agreement fragments will
elicit additional instances of agreement, while the insertion of disagreement
fragments will elicit additional instances of disagreement.
2. Politeness: The general politeness hypothesis is that face-threatening acts are
socially problematic and should result in compensatory action being taken
to redress and mitigate the situation. The general politeness hypothesis thus
predicts that inserting disagreement fragments into a dialogue should lead
to more work being done and more co-operation and consideration being
displayed; this may result in increased effort when formulating responses
(higher number of self-edits) and more clarification requests, expressions of
agreement and other routinised polite sequences.
3. Constructive Disagreements: The general constructive disagreement hypothe-
sis is that disagreement is essential for advancing the deliberative quality and
problem solving aspects of dialogue. The constructive disagreement hypothe-
sis thus predicts that people will respond constructively to disagreement. The
specific predictions for particular response measures are a much lower level
issue, but we would expect the insertion of disagreement fragments to lead to
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increased deliberation taking place which lead to a higher number of shifts in
stance and alternative solutions considered over the course of a dialogue.
4.2.2 Method
Pairs of participants were seated at separate computers in adjacent rooms and given
an instruction sheet to read detailing the balloon task. Participants are presented
with a fictional scenario in which an hot air balloon is losing altitude and about to
crash. The only way for any of three passengers to survive is for one of them to jump
to a certain death. The three passengers are: Dr. Nick Riviera, a cancer scientist,
Mrs. Susie Derkins, a pregnant primary school teacher, and Mr. Tom Derkins, the
balloon pilot and Susie’s husband. Participants are told to take as much time as they
need to read the summary of the situation and then discuss with their partners via a
chat tool set up on the computer at which they are seated, and attempt to come to a
conclusion over who should jump from the balloon. The advantages of this task are
that it is effective at generating debates between subjects and involves articulations
of agreement and disagreement as they attempt to come to a conclusion. There is
also plenty of scope for deliberation and shifts in stance.
4.2.3 Participants
Seventy-two participants were recruited, 46 female and 26 male, with the majority
being undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of London. Par-
ticipants were invited to attend with someone who they already knew. They were
recruited in pairs to ensure that inter-pair participants were acquainted. For a couple
of experiments if one participant didn’t show up a stand in was recruited last minute,
and in these exceptions, which are marked in the data, the pair were not previously
acquainted with each other. Each participant was paid at a rate of £7.50 per hour for
participating in the experiment, or if they were a Psychology student at Queen Mary
University of London then they could receive course credits in lieu of payment.
4.2.4 Materials
The participants communicate via a specially programmed chat tool, similar to
other instant messenger interfaces they may have used previously. The Dialogue
Experimental Tool kit (DiET) chat tool is a text-based chat interface facilitating real
time manipulations of the dialogue. It is possible to programme several different
types of interventions using the chat tool: turns may be altered prior to transmission,
turns may not be relayed, and additional turns may be added, (e.g. Healey et al.
(2003), insertion of spoof clarification requests).
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These manipulations occur as the dialogue progresses, thus making them min-
imally disruptive to the sequence of dialogue. The DiET chat tool is built in Java
and consists of a server console and user interface. Participants are faced with a
text box displaying the conversation history and a smaller text box into which they
can type. Participants can type simultaneously and their message is relayed to their
conversation partner by use of the ENTER key. The server time stamps and stores all
key presses. All turns are passed to the server before being transmitted to the other
participant, thus making it an intermediary between what the participants type and
what they receive. Turns can be automatically altered, removed or inserted by the
server before they are relayed.
4.2.5 Design
The experiment is conducted in pairs; there were 12 dyads for each condition. Pairs
of participants were presented with a discussion task and instructed to discuss for
30 minutes and attempt to come to an agreement. Each pair of participants was
assigned to a condition at random. There were three experimental conditions. Please
note, what we gloss here as the Agreement and Disagreement conditions, are named
as such because the inserted fragments in each condition can index disagreement,
however, it is acknowledged that the more indirect fragments do not consistently
perform this function.
• Control condition: Participants are welcomed and briefed before being sat
at their respective computers, which were situated in adjoining rooms. They
receive their task instructions on a piece of paper and can start when they
are ready. They are instructed to discuss the scenario and attempt to come
to an agreement on who should jump from the balloon for 30 minutes. No
interventions are performed by the server; participants receive the dialogue
turns exactly as they were typed.
• Agreement condition: Initial procedure is exactly the same as the control
condition. Participants receive the dialogue turns exactly as they were typed,
except for every fourth turn when one of the following fragments is inserted
position: ‘you’re right’, ‘I agree’, ‘yes’, ‘and’.
• Disagreement condition: Initial procedure is exactly the same as the control
condition. Participants receive the dialogue turns exactly as they were typed,
except for every fourth turn when one of the following fragments inserted at
turn-initial position: ‘you’re wrong’, ‘I disagree’, ‘no’, ‘but’.
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Frequency of interventions
A small scale pilot study was conducted to assess how frequently the insertions
could be made. It was important that enough interventions could be achieved over
the course of a dialogue so that their effect could be reliably tested, but without
causing participants to orientate themselves towards the intervention. Particularly
due to the marked nature of the inserted fragments inserting an explicitly formulated
disagreement such as ‘you’re wrong’ too frequently became problematic. In an
initial pilot experiment only the most explicit formulation case for each condition
was used (i.e. ‘I agree’ and ‘I disagree’). However, to avoid becoming obviously
repetitive and due to the marked nature of insertions, it was not possible to insert the
fragments regularly enough. This led to the decision to rotate four markers for each
condition, two explicit formulations (‘I agree’/‘I disagree’ and ‘you’re right’/‘you’re
wrong’) with two further less explicit markers of agreement or disagreement added
to provide a more varied, and therefore more naturalistic intervention (‘yes’ and
‘and’ in the agreement condition and ‘no’ and ‘but’ in the disagreement condition).
This combination of markers were piloted, with manipulations carried out every
fourth turn issued by each speaker with no perceptible disruption to the dialogue nor
orientation by the participants to the interventions. Triggering interventions every
fourth turn enabled enough data to be gathered to test the experimental condition,
whilst minimising the risk of making the intervention noticeable to participants. No
intervention was made if the turn consisted of only one word, or the turn started with
the same text as featured in the insertion fragments. This was to avoid the production
of particularly nonsensical turns such as ‘you’re wrong I agree’. The fragments
were cycled through in order but the exposed (dis)agreement fragments (‘you’re
wrong/right’, ‘I (dis)agree’) appeared half as often due to their marked nature.
4.3 Results
Data was gathered both directly from the chat tool which logged various features
such as typing time, number of self-edits, i.e. use of the backspace and delete key
and temporal data, as well as the transcripts themselves, which were analysed for
linguistic features and frequencies. All interventions were removed before frequency
counts were conducted to ensure that only markers and features actually contributed
by the participant were counted. Additionally the resulting transcripts were hand
coded for clarification requests and stance shifts, explained in more detail below.
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4.3.1 A note on terminology
Turn: For the purpose of the experiments presented in this thesis, a turn constitutes
the text relayed in a single message, meaning what is delineated by the ENTER key.
Stance position: For the purpose of the experiments presented in this thesis, the
stance position refers to a participant’s current, and publicly stated, opinion on which
characters should be saved/killed in the balloon task scenario.
Intervention Turn (IT): The IT refers to the turn issued by a speaker which has
had a Turn-initial intervention fragment inserted before the actual typed message.
Intervention Reply Turn (IRT): The IRT refers to the next turn issued by the
speaker who receives the Intervention Turn. This is not always the next sequential
turn after the IT, as the speaker whose turn contained the IT may issues another turn.
Clarification Requests: The transcripts were hand coded for Clarification Re-
quests (CR), a form of repair in which speakers signal a need for further information,
typically due to a lack of full comprehension of a previous utterance. This was
done by a single annotator, blind, and all labelling indicating which condition a file
belonged to was removed. CRs were hand labelled in the dataset, based on Purver
et al. (2003) schema (included in Appendix section A.1), example provided in Table
4.2.
Turn 1: P1 you’re wrong or maybe we are just
going by gender stereotypes.. the
feminist in me is screaming
IT
Turn 2: P1 haha
Turn 3: P2 what if thats the whole point IRT
Turn 4: P1 sorry what if....? CR
Turn 5: P1 susie jumped? CR
Table 4.2 Example of Reply Turn labelling
4.3.2 Coding for shifts in stance position
The transcripts were hand coded for shifts from one stance position to another
regarding who to throw off of the balloon, i.e when a participant changed their point
of view over who to sacrifice or save. There were seven potential stance states that
cover all the possible combinations of who to save and who to sacrifice. The range
of possible stances:
1. Undecided
2. Save Susie but undecided on who should die
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3. Save Nick but undecided on who should die
4. Save Tom but but undecided on who should die
5. Sacrifice Susie (and therefore save the other two)
6. Sacrifice Nick (and therefore save the other two)
7. Sacrifice Tom (and therefore save the other two)
The annotation was done by a single annotator, blind, and all labelling indicating
which condition a file belonged to was removed. A participant’s stance position
was carried over to the next turn, unless their current turn provided new information
that contradicted the previous stance position, in which case the stance position was
updated. By comparing the current stance position with the participant’s last stance
position it was possible to calculate whether or not a shift in stance position had
occurred, the total number of alternative stance positions considered and a count of
total stance position shifts.
A second annotator coded a sub-sample (approximately 10% of the total data)
of the experiment data, three experiment transcripts taken from each condition,
comprising 488 turns of dialogue. The annotators agreed on 87.70% of the codes,
and intercoder reliability was calculated using the using Krippendorff’s alpha (for
nominal data) (α= 0.70).
The annotation scheme was quite complicated and demanding, and required very
minute changes in participant stance position to be tracked, which were not always
clear from the text itself . As such, for future work a more simplistic coding scheme
is recommended to achieve better intercoder reliability.
4.3.3 Overview of dataset
Table 4.3 displays the descriptive data for the turn, word and character counts for
each condition.
Condition
Avg. Control Agreement Disagreement
Turns by Dyad 86.71 63.17 70.79
Words by Dyad 587.67 555.58 535.08
Char. by Dyad 2938 2797 2710
Words per turn 7.41 9.49 9.11
Table 4.3 Summary of average typed data per condition
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Both intervention conditions result in fewer overall turns than the Control condi-
tion, but this was particularly the case, and statistically significant, with the Agree-
ment condition (positive and agreement insertions, such as yes and I agree). Although
the Agreement condition features fewer turns than the Control condition, there are
more words per turn on average in the Agreement condition. A non-parametric
Kruskal Wallis test confirms a significant overall effect of Condition on the turns
typed in the dialogues (H(2) = 6.34, p<0.04).1 Subsequent planned pairwise com-
parisons with the Dunn’s test showed a significant increase in the number of turns
per dyad in the Control condition compared to the Agreement condition (p<0.05).
There is an overall effect of condition on the distribution of average words per
turn, as confirmed by a non-parametric, Kruskal Wallis test (H(2) = 6.55, p<0.04).
Subsequent planned pairwise comparisons with the Dunn’s test showed a significant
increase between Agreement and Control conditions (p<0.03).
4.3.4 Message construction




Table 4.4 Table depicting mean Typing Time and number of Self-edits (delete key
presses), per turn, per condition
Table 4.4 shows the average typing time in milliseconds and the number of
self-edits per turn. Self-edits are represented by the number of times the delete key
is pressed during turn construction. A non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test finds an
omnibus effect of condition on the number of self-edits during turn construction (H(2)
= 40.92, p<0.01), with planned pairwise comparison revealing significant difference
between the Agreement and Disagreement conditions (p<0.01). An overall effect of
condition on typing time is confirmed by a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test (H(2)
= 99.28, p<0.01), with planned pairwise comparison revealing significant difference
between the Agreement and Control conditions (p<0.01).
4.3.5 Message content
The following tables highlight differences in the content of the dialogues, such as
Clarification Requests and instances of exposed and potential disagreement.
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Table 4.5 No. of Clarification requests by Condition
Table 4.5 shows the number of Clarification Requests by condition. The Dis-
agreement condition has a significantly higher number of Clarification Requests
than Control condition and Agreement condition. A non-parametric Kruskal Wallis
test confirms an overall effect of Condition on the number of Clarification Requests
in the dialogues (H(2) = 12.03, p<0.01). Planned pairwise comparison showed a
significant increase between Control and Disagree conditions (p<0.01) and Agree
and Disagree (p<0.02).
Instances of exposed and potential (dis)agreement
Table 4.6 shows the frequencies of turn-initial exposed and potential (dis)agreement
markers. The markers included here are the same ones that feature in the fragments
that were artificially inserted during the experiment.
When considering all disagreement markers combined (‘no’, ‘but’,‘you’re wrong’,
‘I disagree’), a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows no reliable effect of con-
dition on the frequency of disagreement markers in general (H(2) = 1.39, p=0.50).
Similarly, a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows no reliable effect of condition
on the frequency of combined agreement markers (‘yes’, ‘and’,‘you’re right’, ‘I
agree’) (H(2) = 2.71, p=0.26).
However, when exposed and indirect markers are pooled separately, the results
are different. There is an omnibus effect of condition on the frequency of combined
exposed markers of agreement and disagreement (‘you’re wrong’, ‘I disagree’,
‘you’re right’, ‘I agree’) according to a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test (H(2) =
9.74, p<0.01).
When exposed agreement and disagreement markers are considered separately, a
non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows a significant omnibus effect of condition
on the frequency of turn-initial exposed markers of disagreement (‘you’re wrong’, ‘I
disagree’) (H(2) = 11.25, p<0.01). Subsequent planned pairwise comparisons with










I agree 2 5 10
You’re right 0 0 0
I disagree 0 0 3
You’re wrong 0 0 3




Yes 170 124 139
No 29 23 35
And 103 51 55
But 119 81 77
Table 4.6 Table providing frequency data of turn-initial content of messages relayed
during experiment dialogues.
TI Update Control Agreement Disagreement
Marker condition condition condition
Well 14 24 15
Oh 120 58 97




Percentage 7.08% 5.87% 7.44%
Table 4.7 Turn-Initial Update Markers
disagreement markers in the Disagreement condition compared to the Control condi-
tion (p=0.01) and the Agreement condition compared to the disagreement Condition
(p=0.01).
The frequencies of turn initial ‘and’ and ‘but’, markers which can act as continuer
and facilitate the structural continuation of contributions across turns are generally
lower in the Control Condition than the Agreement or Control conditions, however,
a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows no reliable effect of condition on the
frequencies of continuers (H(2) = 3.43, p=0.18).
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Turn-Initial Update Markers: Oh and Well
Table 4.7 shows that Agreement condition featured fewer update markers proportion-
ally than the Control condition, while the Disagreement condition featured slightly
more. The frequency of turn-initial ‘Oh’ in particular is higher in Control condition,
with Disagreement condition frequencies more closely resembling the Control than
Agreement condition. However, a Kruskal Wallis test does not deem the difference a
statistically significant effect of condition on the frequency of turn-initial Oh (H(2) =
2.94, p=0.23).
4.3.6 Intervention Reply Turns
In order to ascertain more clearly what effect the interventions had upon the dialogue,
the following table displays descriptive statistics for the reply turns. These were
counted as the next available turn by the participant who received the interven-
tion. This was not always the next sequential turn, as for our experiment turns are
demarcated by the use of the ENTER key.
Typing time
The average typing time of the intervention replies is significantly longer (mean
value 24.46 seconds) than the typing time of non-intervention replies (mean value
15.59seconds). A General Linear Mixed Models analysis showed there was no
interaction between condition and main effect, no main effect of condition (F(1.76) =
0.23, p=0.64), but a simple main effect of Intervention reply. There was no effect
generally across conversations according to condition, the observed difference was
specific to the intervention replies, not dependent on the nature of the intervention,
i.e. meaning a disagreement or agreement insertion.
Time elapsed between speaker turns
We also captured how much time elapsed between when the enter key was hit by
participant 1 relaying the intervention turn, and when the enter key was hit by
participant 2 relaying the Intervention Reply Turn. It should be noted that this was
not always the next consecutive turn, as participant one could send multiple turns
before participant 2 responded.
Table 4.8 shows that average time elapsed before a reply is issued is significantly
longer in the Intervention Reply Turns than in the control baseline - i.e. standard time











Table 4.8 Time elapsed between speaker turns
4.3.7 Stance shifts and Alternatives Considered
The experiment transcripts were also hand coded for stance shifts, i.e. when a
participant voices a departure from one held opinion to an alternative regarding who
should jump from the balloon.
Condition Total Median Mean St. Dev.
Control 175 7.5 8.33 3.96
Agree 248 11 10.33 4.88
Disagree 175 6 7.29 4.31
Table 4.9 Total number of stance position changes and averages per participant
The total number of stance position shifts and average per participant by condition
are shown in Table 4.9. The median number of stance position changes per participant
is significantly effected by condition (χ(2) = 6.91, p=0.03). A Median Test was
conducted as the variance is not approximately equal across samples, being much
larger for the agreement condition. This result suggests that the Disagreement
condition tends to reduce the number of alternatives people will consider and the
agreement condition tends to increase it.
There is no correlation between the length of the conversation (in turns) and the
number of state changes (Kendals Tau = -0.007, p = 0.94), so the significance is
not related to nor skewed by the fact that the Agreement condition contains longer
dialogues, i.e. it is not just about how much participants talk.
In table 4.10, we provide summary data for the number of possible alternatives
considered by a participant (out of a total of 7 stance states, i.e., "Kill Susie"). A
non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows the difference in the number of possi-
ble alternatives considered was not significant affected by condition (H(2) = 3.62,
p=0.16).
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Table 4.10 Number of mean possible alternative solutions considered per participant
by condition
4.4 Discussion
The general accommodation hypothesis predicted that the insertion of agreement
fragments would elicit additional instances of agreement, while the insertion of
disagreement fragments would elicit additional instances of disagreement. The
turn-initial frequency data shows an increase in exposed agreement and impolite
disagreement in the Disagreement condition when combined, and for increased
exposed disagreement when considered separately, the Agreement condition does
not contrast significantly with the Control in frequencies of exposed agreement or
disagreement. Thus the general trend is counter to our Accommodation hypothesis,
which anticipated that agreement would lead to more agreement while disagreement
would engender more disagreement.
Although there is a notable absence of instances of exposed disagreement in
the Agreement condition, with the comparative frequency in the Disagreement con-
firming a significant effect of condition, on closer inspection, what the so-called
turn-initial exposed disagreement were doing was more complex. Rather than
signalling an impolite disagreement, some of the instances counted were actually
examples of quotatives, with participants repeating back the intervention content
as a repair initiation. Therefore, a third of the instances of naturally occurring (i.e.
not artificially inserted intervention fragments) turn-initial exposed disagreement
markers in the Disagreement condition are actually instances of repair, rather than
disagreement. To assess whether these repair instances had skewed the statistical
tests, they were re-run with the falsely classified instances of exposed disagreement
removed. A Kruskal Wallis test still found that there was a significant omnibus effect
of condition on frequencies of exposed agreement and disagreement combined (H(2)
= 7.10, p=0.029), with a pairwise comparison confirming a significant increase in
the frequency of exposed (dis)agreement markers in the Disagreement condition
compared to the Control condition (p=0.027). When the exposed disagreement
marker frequencies considered separately there was also an omnibus effect of con-
dition (H(2) = 6.35, p<0.05), however, a pairwise comparison using Dunn’s test
could not confirm a significant increase in exposed disagreement in the Disagreement
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condition compared to the Agreement and Control conditions (Adjusted significance:
p<0.087).
As shown in the following excerpt from an experiment transcript, the exposed
disagreement is incongruent, jarring and provokes a repair sequence. The respondent
quotes back the source of trouble, indicated by the asterisks in the example below,
which were then falsely counted as naturally occurring turn-initial disagreement.
The artificial insertions are shown in square brackets:
Example 1
A: Pros of keeping the doctor alive
A: [you’re wrong] cures cancer
B: [no] you’re wrong?*
A: What about?
B: no, I don’t understand what you just said
B: You’re wrong cures cancer?*
A: The doctor, if still alive will be about to discover the sure for the
‘most common types of cancer’
This example demonstrates the disruptive nature of the inserted disagreement
fragment; it disrupts the dialogue and is deemed incongruous enough for participant
B to comment on, while participant A simply carries on with the conversation.
This occurred several times in the dataset, however, only ever with the exposed
disagreement fragments and never with the exposed agreement fragments. In line
with the literature we found that exposed disagreement is especially problematic and
on one occasion the insertion was so problematic that it was directly referenced and
quoted by a participant, with both participants being alerted to the intervention.
Example 2
A: imagine how many scientists in the world
B: you’re wrong theres a lot
A: i’m wrong?
B: what?
A: you said ’you’re wrong theres a lot’
A: [no] what am i wrong about?
The Disagreement condition featured a significantly higher number of clarifica-
tion requests. The Constructive Disagreement hypothesis anticipated that this would
signal additional work being done by participants trying to more fully understand one
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another’s point of view. However, it is possible that the clarification requests are more
clausal clarifications than an attempt to understand the content; this interpretation
is supported by Example 2, which notably features a high number of clarification
requests in a very short segment of dialogue.
Interestingly, there were more turn-initial agreement markers in both conditions
than in our baseline control condition and fewer turn-initial disagreement markers in
our disagreement condition transcripts. This would suggest that the disagreement
interventions led to less disagreement and more agreement, as indicated by the
markers identified by Walker et al. (2012c). However, it is worth noting that as in
the corpus study of the BNC, many of these markers did not appear at all in the
dialogues. As such, it seems likely that while they may be characteristic of forum
posts they may not feature commonly in real-time dialogue.
The Constructive Disagreement hypothesis also anticipated that the Disagreement
condition would lead to more consideration of possible solutions over the course
of a dialogue. The results show that although there is an effect of condition on the
number of shifts in stance state or solutions considered during the dialogue, the
directionality was contrary to our predictions. The insertion of agreement fragments
appeared to lead to more shifts in stance. As the intercoder reliability co-efficient
was between (α= 0.67 - α=80), this conclusion remains tentative, but one possible
explanation may be that agreement tokens were received as feedback and continuer
markers, thus creating a more supportive environment for developing and exchanging
possible ideas. The insertion of agreement tokens in the turn initial position could
also have transformed a disagreement turn into a politely formulated, agreement
prefaced disagreement turn. For example, "but Tom’s not very useful" could become
"I agree but Tom’s not very useful". This would potentially align with the CA and
Politeness Theory literature, as well as Chiu (2008), which specifies that while polite
disagreement may yield more novel contributions, impolite disagreement is always
problematic.
Overall, our results most strongly confirm the Politeness hypothesis. Insertions
of exposed disagreement had a disruptive effect upon the dialogues, producing
confusion and prompting additional clarification requests due to their unexpected
and incongruous nature. Conversely, exposed agreement, even though also inserted
randomly, did not disrupt the dialogue in the same way and was never explicitly
addressed by a participant. The Disagreement condition produced significantly
more instances of exposed agreement, which is most easily interpreted in terms of
politeness, face and redressive action; with additional exposed disagreement being
introduced into the dialogues, it seems that participants respond with cooperation and
attempt to redress the potential affronts to face posed by the inserted fragments. As
predicted there were more self-edits in the Disagreement condition, suggesting that
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participants were having to work harder to respond to the potentially face-threatening
insertions. Our results most strongly support the Politeness hypothesis and confirm
that exposed disagreement is problematic and disruptive in dialogue.
4.5 Implications
The experiment presented in this chapter highlights the problematic effect of ex-
posed disagreement, in particular, how it disrupts dialogues and instigates additional
work for participants to coordinate on the discussion process. The introduction of
unmitigated disagreement does not serve to advance the deliberative quality of the
discussion, rather, it appears to strongly deviate from the expected conversational
conduct. In response, to unmitigated disagreement participants issued shorter replies,
typed fewer words, which cold be displays or signals of disengagement. Furthermore,
they issued more agreement, which suggests that the discursive practice was further
compromised by the redressive action which was taken to assuage the face-threat
of the disagreements. Dialogues were closed down, shorter answers provided and
additional agreement tokens issued more readily in the face of explicit oppositional
positioning. Consequently, this suggests that exposed disagreement is not a useful
device for fostering constructive engagement; rather, more subtle ways of positioning
oppositional content, which are not so obviously face-threatening, although still
positioning a speakers contribution as an alternative, should be explored.
Chapter 5
Opening Up and Closing Down
Discussion: Experimenting with
Stance in Conversation
Chapter 4 demonstrated that exposed and unmitigated disagreement can be disruptive
and problematic in discussion dialogues. In this chapter the effect of more subtle
devices that speakers employ to position their contributions as oppositional are
examined.
5.1 Introduction
During a debate people have choices about how they present their contributions.
Amongst other things they can simply assert their position, they can modify it with a
propositional attitude verb such as ‘know’ or ‘think’ or they can turn an assertion into
a question rephrasing “I think X” as “Do you think X?”. These choices of attitude
and modality all help to establish what a person’s stance is and, in combination
with the choices made by their interlocutor, set the tone and direction of a debate.
One of the most important hypotheses about the impact of different stance markers
on dialogue relates to expressions of epistemic certainty; framing of a stance as
‘knowing’ or ‘unknowing’ appears to significantly alter the deliberative quality of a
discussion (Heritage, 2012a).
Although the interactional dimensions of stance have been discussed in some
detail (Du Bois, 2007; Englebretson, 2007; Kärkkäinen, 2003), this work is based
on case studies and corpus analyses. The causal effects of adopting different stance
markers on the subsequent trajectory of a dialogue has not, as far as we are aware,
been directly tested. One key reason for this is the practical difficulty of manipulating
stance markers in a live dialogue. In this chapter, we again use the technique
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introduced by Healey et al. (2003) that takes advantage of the potential of text-chat
for enabling selective manipulation of people’s turns, including the addition of stance
markers, without their awareness. We use this technique to assess how the epistemic
status of a stance, i.e. whether it is framed as either unknowing or knowing, impacts
on the quality of the joint action and deliberation in discussion dialogues.
5.1.1 Taking a Stance
Disagreement is generally minimised in conversation (Concannon et al., 2015b;
Pomerantz, 1984a), and when executed directly or impolitely tends to be problematic
(Chiu, 2008; Concannon et al., 2015a). However, in certain contexts, such as problem
solving and discussion tasks, it can be important for advancing the deliberative quality
of a dialogue and encouraging novel contributions (Chiu, 2008).
There is thus a delicate balance between mitigating the socially problematic
aspects of disagreement while still being able to identify and resolve differences
of opinion. This balance can be achieved in many different ways. Resources such
as ‘well’-prefacing (Pomerantz, 1984a), stance markers such as ‘I think’ (Kärkkäi-
nen, 2003) and reported speech (Clift, 2006a; Concannon et al., 2015a; Holt and
Clift, 2007) all provide less explicit ways of marking what follows as potentially
incongruous or in opposition to what went before.
An important underlying function of these different devices is to signal people’s
claimed rights to speak on a topic. Heritage (2012a) refers to this as ‘epistemic
status’: the relative positioning in which “persons recognize one another to be more
or less knowledgeable concerning some domain of knowledge”, which can alter from
moment to moment, and be “disassembled by persons who deploy epistemic stance
to appear more, or less knowledgeable than they really are” (Heritage, 2012a).
There are significant potential social and interactional implications of positioning
ourselves or others as either knowing or unknowing (Levinson, 2012). The man-
agement of rights and responsibilities is closely connected to participants’ concerns
with ‘face’ (Heritage and Raymond, 2005) or the “positive social value a person
effectively claims for himself” through interaction (Goffman, 1967a). For example,
in issuing requests for information or questions, the requester assumes an unknowing
epistemic status, and positions the recipient in a knowing one (Heritage, 2012a).
Such requests also create an obligation for the recipient to respond to the requester
(Levinson, 2012). Levinson (2012) observes that people prefer polar questions to
other forms that require more knowledge-rich responses and often disguise them as
assertions, thus demonstrating an unwillingness to locate oneself in an unknowing
position, nor to impose too greatly upon an interlocutor by demanding a response.
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5.1.2 Knowing vs unknowing stances
Following Heritage (2012b) (addressed in detail in section 2.5.3) our general hy-
pothesis is that framing a proposition as unknowing invites elaboration, sequence
expansion and further discussion of the topic at hand (Heritage, 2012b). Conversely,
a more knowing epistemic stance, creates a pressure for confirmation and sequence
closing. As such, we predict that inserting ‘knowing’ and ‘unknowing’ stance
markers will have different impacts on the course of a conversation even where,
counterfactually, nothing about the content of the modified assertions is changed.
Heritage (2012a) defines ‘epistemic status’ as the relative positioning in which
“persons recognize one another to be more or less knowledgeable concerning some
domain of knowledge”. Knowing all (K+) is typically conveyed through declaratives,
while interrogative grammatical format is the most explicit way that a speaker can
embody an ‘unknowing’ (K-) epistemic status. For example, the question ’what
time is your appointment’ positions the speaker in request of information, where
as ‘your appointment is at 3pm’ positions the speaker in a K+ position. However,
as highlighted by Drew (2012), how much speakers know relative to one another
is not only encoded in the grammatical format, but also in incongruities between
epistemic status and grammatical format, for example in posing a question to which
you already know the answer (e.g. ‘Aren’t you going to be late?’). Speakers’ relative
positioning can alter from moment to moment, and be “disassembled by persons
who deploy epistemic stance to appear more, or less knowledgeable than they really
are” (Heritage, 2012a).
In issuing a question the requester assumes an unknowing epistemic status and
positions the recipient in a knowing one (Heritage, 2012a), creating an obligation
for the recipient to respond (Levinson, 2012). Levinson (2012) observes that people
prefer polar questions to other forms that require more knowledge-rich responses
and often disguise them as assertions, thus demonstrating an unwillingness to locate
oneself in an unknowing position, nor to impose too greatly upon an interlocutor
by demanding a response. However, in a discussion context, in which individual
contributions on the topic under discussion are warranted and expected, the ways
in which requests are made could be influential to the deliberative quality of the
discussion.
Furthermore, between the most explicit formats of K+ and K- constructions
(i.e. declaratives and interrogatives), there are a range of other ways that speakers
can encode epistemic stance, such as modals, hedges and epistemic adverbs, which
can convey levels of speaker certainty, e.g. ‘It was definitely red’, and commit-
ment ‘I absolutely think...’ and evidential markings which convey the source of a
knowledge claim (i.e. direct evidentials based on sensorial/ visual evidence and
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indirect evidentials, such as inference and hearsay). Particularly within a discussion
context the management of imbalances in epistemic status is particularly pertinent as
participants’ contributions must necessarily negotiate alternative stance positions.
5.1.3 Collaborative and individual stance marking
In group work and decision-making which involves negotiation, the distinction be-
tween individual and collective stance taking becomes increasingly important. While
stance-taking has been framed as inherently interactional (Du Bois, 2007; Englebret-
son, 2007), and the the negotiation of stance can indeed be highly interactive, the
ways in which stance is marked can be individual or collective, i.e. a person can
present a stance as their own, or jointly shared with other conversational partners.
One obvious way in which this effect is achieved is through the use of personal
pronouns, with ‘I’ typically used to represent a personally claimed stance, and ‘we’
used to propose a joint stance. The use of ‘you’ can either be used to demarcate the
perceived opinion of an interactional interlocutor or serve as an interactional tool.
For example, Landgrebe (2012) addresses the function of the epistemic markers ‘I
think’ and ‘you know’, identifying the function of the latter interactional resource
as “to orient to a common understanding and invite for involvement and a shared
epistemic stance” (Landgrebe, 2012). Consequently, an additional hypothesis is that
framing propositions as ‘unknowing’ will also lead to greater collaboration and the
production of joint stances.
5.2 Marking Stance in the Balloon Task
The task chosen for the experiment reported below is the Balloon Task. Participants
are presented with a fictional scenario in which an hot air balloon is losing altitude
and about to crash. The only way for any of three passengers to survive is for one
of them to jump to a certain death. The three passengers are: Dr. Nick Riviera, a
cancer scientist, Mrs. Susie Derkins, a pregnant primary school teacher, and Mr.
Tom Derkins, the balloon pilot and Susie’s husband. To ensure a relatively natural
manipulation of epistemic stance was selected for this task an initial analysis was
conducted using control condition transcripts from previous balloon task transcripts
generated in the experiment presented in chapter 4. Twelve transcripts were analysed
for markers that conveyed ‘knowing’ or ‘unknowing’ states in relation to stance
marking. ‘I think’ was frequently used as a resource to mark a stance position. ‘I
think’ has been attributed a dual function, and can can also act as a hedge (Holmes,
1990), however in the discussion context it was used most frequently to convey a
knowing stance, particularly when at the beginning of a turn.
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(1) a. I think Tom should definitely stay in the balloon
b. I think Nick should definitely be the one to go
c. I think because there’s an element of risk with whether Nick will actually
end up coming up with a cure for cancer ... There’s no point taking two
risks by then letting go of Tom
d. i think we have a couple mins left
e. A: so tom has to jump?
B: i think so
In 1a, 1b and 1c the marker ‘I think’ serves to accentuate the propositional
content and emphasise the speaker’s commitment to their proposition and focuses on
a substantive aspect, namely, who should be sacrificed. In 1d and 1e, however, the
marker performs the opposite effect and suggests a lack of speaker commitment and
acts as a hedging marker. There were 44 instances of ‘I think’ in the transcripts, 34
instances (77.27%) served to emphasise the propositional content it was associated
with, eight instances (18.18%) acted in a ‘hedging’ or unknowing capacity, and the
two remaining instances made manifest the cognate processes (e.g.“whenever i think
that nick should go, i think ‘Are susie and tom really that important?’").
Of the 44 instances, 25 were turn-initial (56.82%), 19 of which served to em-
phasise the speaker’s ownership and commitment to the content that followed. Four
instances of turn-initial ‘I think’ (20%) were constructed in such a way that ‘I think’
functioned as a hedging marker and two instances were not possible to classify due
to insufficient context (i.e. ‘I think overall’). Closer inspection of the use cases
showed that all instances of turn-initial ‘I think’, in which the proceeding content
featured a character from the scenario, conveyed a ‘knowing’ stance. As such, using
‘I think’ as a turn-initial insertion for turns which contain a mention of one of the
scenario’s characters, should increase the likelihood of a consistent effect of framing
the utterance as ‘knowing’, rather than performing a hedging effect.
When used non-turn-initial we see more variation in use - so whether as a hedge
or booster. For example in the following example:
A: im sure plenty of doctors think that they’re on the brink
B: Yeah
A: he is very smart, so he probably isn’t over exaggerating
A: he might be but i think its unlikely that he is exaggerating
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While looking for markers which served to downgrade the epistemic strength
of assertion, ‘do you think’ was one such ‘unknowing’ device that was used in the
transcripts.
A: do you think the married couple would gang up on the doctor and
throw him out
B: maybe. he is their friend though
‘Do you think’ makes a minimised contrast pair with ‘I think’ and can be inserted at a
turn-initial position without changing the content of the turn. Consequently, ‘I think’
and ‘do you think’ were selected as our turn-initial inserts to frame the proceeding
content as more or less ‘knowing’.
5.3 Hypothesis
The analysis of previous dialogues enables us to operationalise our general hypothe-
sis about the level of knowingness with which opinions are presented. In particular,
inserting ‘I think’ should, all things being equal, position assertions as more ‘know-
ing’, i.e. frame them as a stance with increased speaker commitment. If this is correct
it should tend to cause a closing down of the discussion of the topic at hand. As
such we anticipate there will be less deliberation about the possible solutions to the
task. Conversely, we expect that presenting opinions as ‘unknowing’ should improve
the deliberative quality of the dialogue, with more ideas and positions exchanged
and elaborated on. We anticipate that presenting contributions as unknowing will
create an environment in which participants are more likely to make manifest their
uncertainty, as it will be acceptable to appear unknowing, and certainty, as solutions
will be discussed more, and potentially co-constructed, so that once a stance is
established it can be committed to with greater conviction.
5.4 Predictions
1. Fewer possible solutions will be considered when contributions are framed
as knowing and responses will be less considered; this should affect turn
formulation, with shorter typing times and less editing of turns. Framing
contributions as knowing will close down the dialogue, as indicated by shorter
and fewer turns.
2. Framing contributions as unknowing will open up dialogues, leading to longer
turns and more possible solutions considered.
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3. More possible solutions will be considered and more care will be taken in
the construction of turns, as evidenced by slower typing times and more edits
when contributions are introduced with an unknowing preface (‘do you think
X’).
4. Framing contributions as unknowing will lead to higher frequencies of certainty
and uncertainty markers.
5.5 Method
Pairs of participants were seated at separate computers on either side of an open
plan office and given an instruction sheet to read detailing the balloon task. The
task presented is identical to the one used in Chapter 4. Participants are told to take
as much time as they need to read the summary of the situation and then discuss
with their partners via a chat tool set up on the computer at which they are seated,
and attempt to come to a conclusion over who should jump from the balloon. The
advantages of this task are that it is effective at generating debates between subjects
and there is good scope for deliberation.
5.5.1 Participants
Sixty participants were recruited, 41 females and 19 males, with the majority being
undergraduate and postgraduate students at the University of London. Participants
were invited to attend with someone who they already knew. They were recruited in
pairs to ensure that inter-pair participants were acquainted and increase the likeli-
hood that both participants would attend. For a couple of experiments participants
partnered up with someone else from their course, but with whom they were not
previously acquainted, but these exceptions are marked in the data. All subjects were
native speakers of English. Each participant received 7.50 GBP remuneration for
participating in the experiment, or if they were a Psychology student at Queen Mary
University of London, they could receive course credits in lieu of payment.
5.5.2 Design
The experiment is conducted in pairs, with 10 dyads per condition. Pairs of partici-
pants were presented with a discussion task and instructed to discuss for 30 minutes
and attempt to come to an agreement. The three experiment conditions were:
1. Control Condition: No interventions
2. Knowing Condition: Turn-Initial ‘I think’ Insertion
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3. Unknowing Condition: Turn-Initial ‘Do you think’ Insertion
Each pair of participants was assigned to one of these conditions at random. In the
Control condition there were no interventions performed by the server; participants
received the dialogue turns exactly as they were typed. However, in the Knowing and
Unknowing conditions manipulations were carried out. Interventions were issued
every four turns, if and only if the turn included a reference to one of the characters in
the scenario (e.g. Doctor, Susie, etc.). Interventions are not visible to the individual
whose turn has been manipulated, only the recipient, so that there is no awareness
that turns are being intercepted before being relayed.
To increase the consistently of our ‘I think’ intervention functioning in a more
knowing capacity we created a rules based system that ensured that a consistent
effect was produced by the insertion- as far as possible. To Control for unnecessary
variance we introduced some protocols to ensure that an intervention would only be
triggered if the utterance featured a subject/object. Statements about the characters
within the scenario, and which did not functioned as a question, were targeted.
Frequency of interventions
A pilot study was conducted to assess how frequently an intervention would need
to be inserted. It was important that we could achieve enough interventions, but
without creating clearly nonsensical statements. Making insertions every four turns
led to enough interventions over the course of a dialogue so that however, in some
cases this led to poorly formulated turns being produced. It was decided that the
intervention would take place every four turns, if and only if the sentence contained
reference to a character (i.e. variations of dr/Nick/scientist, balloon pilot/Tom or
Susie/Sue, he/she/they etc.). This was achieved using a keyword search on turns
before they were relayed to the participant, which occurred in real time to ensure
there was no perceivable delay. The conversation Controller was written in such a
way to ensure that an insertion was only produced if the utterance that followed was
not a question, a polar answer (i.e. sentences starting with a turn-initial yes or no),
comprised of a single word, nor started with a continuer, i.e. ‘and’.
5.5.3 Procedure
Upon arrival, I personally met all participants and provided an overview of the
study, allowing for any questions to be asked. After completing consent forms and
discussing any queries that they had I took each participant to a separate computer.
The experiment took place in an open plan office; participants were sat at computers
in the same room but at other sides of the office. As it was an open plan office
5.5 Method 103
there were often other colleagues walking in and out or working quietly in the room.
Participants were made aware that this may happen before the experiment started, so
that they were not distracted. Participants were informed at the start of the experiment
that they were free to leave at any time if they felt uncomfortable, however, there
were no instances of this happening. Before starting the task participants are given
the information sheet (see chapter A), which outlines the scenario. Once they had
finished reading the instruction sheet they were free to start typing. After 30 minutes
I asked them to stop typing and they were provided with a brief questionnaire (see
chapter A) to complete, before a full debrief was conducted and remuneration handed
over.
5.5.4 Analysis
The DiET chat tool records all interventions and key presses, including edits made
before participants press ‘send’, made by each participant. Counting frequencies of
certainty adverbials (e.g. ‘surely’, ‘clearly’, etc.), uncertainty markers (‘possibly’,
‘potentially’, etc.) and personal pronouns (‘we/us’ as indexing collective stance,
‘I/me/my’ for individual stance, and ‘you/yours’ for other stance) were also collected.
Uncertainty Markers includes uncertainty adverbials as well as modals (‘may’,
‘might’ and ‘could’) and hedges (‘quite’, ‘sort of’, etc.), but certainty and uncertainty
adverbials are also presented individually for comparison1 . Obvious typographical
errors were corrected to increase the accuracy of the frequency counts (e.g. possibiliyt
–> possibility). The inserted fragments were also removed from the transcripts before
frequency counts were conducted, to ensure that the figures reflected only what the
participants actively contributed.
5.5.5 Coding for shifts in stance position
As in the previous experiment it was necessary to assess how the experimental
conditions affected the levels of deliberation in the dialogues.
In order to assess the deliberative quality of each dialogue, two factors were
considered: the number of possible solutions considered and the total number of
stance positions inhabited during the dialogue. A shift from one stance position
to another is referred to as a stance shift. The number of alternative solutions
1The full list of words and phrases used for each category are as follows:- Certainty adverbials:
absolutely, actually, certainly, clearly, plainly, definitely, evidently, indeed, obviously, really, surely,
undoubtedly, unquestionably, for certain, for sure,of course; Uncertainty adverbials: admittedly,
allegedly, apparently, arguably, conceivably, inexplicably, likely, maybe, perhaps, possibly, potentially,
presumably, probably, reportedly, seemingly, supposedly; Uncertainty modals: may, might, can could
Hoye (1997) and Hedges (including approximators): quite, sort of, kind of , might, a bit, a little bit,
just, at least, approximately, about, around, something like, almost, pretty, sometimes.
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considered refers to the total number of possible solutions entertained (out of a total
four possible solutions). This serves as a measure for the quality of the deliberation,
and demonstrates how much of the state space of the problem solving domain they
explored. The dialogue transcripts are hand coded to record this information and
indicate points in the dialogue when the two participants share the same or opposing
stances.
The transcripts were hand coded for shifts from one stance position to another
regarding who to throw off of the balloon, i.e when a participant conveyed through
the text a consideration of a solution regarding who to sacrifice. The stance positions
were hand labelled for each conversation so that it is possible to detect the decision
patterns for each participant, how it relates to their conversational partner, and to gain
a numeric indicator of how many times the participant shifted their stance position.
The transcripts were hand coded for the solutions being considered, with a possible
solution being the character to be sacrificed (for example, Undecided, Kill Tom, Kill
Susie, Kill Nick) and the number of shifts from one solution to another during the
conversation (e.g. Kill Susie –> Undecided –> Kill Tom = three shifts in stance
position).
The coding scheme used for labelling the stance positions was a simplified
version of the protocol used in the previous experiment. The decision to alter the
coding method was taken to reduce the level of annotator interpretation necessary
for coding, simplifying the number of factors considered to make the coding process
less ambiguous and robust. Due to the nature of the task, participants often would
take a structured approach and consider each of the inhabitants of the balloon
in turn; consequently this led to additional shifts in stance being recorded that
did not necessarily reflect a committed viewpoint, as deliberations from someone
being definitely saved, to possibly not could be marked as a shift, but required
additional annotator interpretation. In this experiment the coding only marked a shift
in the decision of who to sacrifice, rather than who to save and who to sacrifice.
Consequently, the number of possible stance states was reduced from seven to four.
The three removed stance positions were:
1. Save Susie but undecided on who should die;
2. Save Nick but undecided on who should die
3. Save Tom but but undecided on who should die
The four remaining potential stance positions were:
1. Undecided
2. Sacrifice Susie (and therefore save the other two)
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3. Sacrifice Nick (and therefore save the other two)
4. Sacrifice Tom (and therefore save the other two)
The point in the dialogue where each of these stance position shifts occur was
also recorded for each participant. The annotations are based purely on the content
of the dialogue and when it is made manifest in an utterance that a participant has
shifted opinion, even though the participant may have formed an opinion before
they share it with their partner via text. Furthermore, turns were counted in which
participant A and B had matching or opposing stance states. Time spent in an
undecided state, even if both participant A and B both were undecided is not counted
as a matching stance as it is unclear what their current stance is. A matching stance
would only be A: Tom B: Tom; A: Nick B: Nick or A: Susie B: Susie.
Intercoder reliability
The annotation for stance position and shifts in stance position was done by a single
annotator, blind, and all labelling indicating which condition a file belonged to was
removed. A participant’s stance position was carried over to the next turn, unless
their current turn provided new information that contradicted the previous stance
position, in which case the stance position was updated.
A second annotator coded a sub-sample (approximately 10% of the total data)
of the experiment data, a random selection of three experiment transcripts across
all conditions, comprising 563 turns of dialogue. Inter-annotator agreement was
calculated using Krippendorff’s alpha (for nominal data) and the intercoders met
intercoder reliability (α= 0.85).
See Section A.4 for details of the guidance provided to the second annotator.
5.6 Results
In the following sections the results of the experimental analysis is presented.
5.6.1 Message construction
Word counts
Table 5.1 details the number of total words, total turns and average words per turn
per participant for each condition.
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Condition Total Words Total Turns Mean Words Per
Turn
Control Mean 618.30 81.05 8.71
Std. Dev. 182.12 35.91 4.43
Unknowing Mean 641.95 74.35 9.45
Std. Dev. 160.28 34.57 3.62
Knowing Mean 649.05 94.65 6.65
Std. Dev. 196.08 37.50 1.87
Total Mean 636.43 83.35 8.27
Std. Dev. 177.51 36.41 3.62
Table 5.1 Word counts per condition, per participant
Figure 5.1 shows a boxplot of the mean word counts per condition.
Fig. 5.1 Boxplot of Average Total Words per Dyad per Condition
Figure 5.2 is a boxplot detailing the mean number of turns in a dialogue for each
condition.
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Fig. 5.2 Boxplot of Average Total Number of Turns per Dyad per Condition
Figure 5.3 is a boxplot detailing the mean number of words in a given turn for each
condition in a dialogue for each condition.
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Fig. 5.3 Boxplot of Total Average Words per Turn per Condition
A nonparametric Kruskal Wallis independent samples test shows that there is a
significant omnibus effect of condition on the number of words typed per turn (H(2)
= 7.475 , p= 0.02). A post hoc pairwise comparison using Dunn’s test shows that
there is a significant difference in the number of words produced in a turn between
the Knowing and Unknowing condition, with Knowing dialogues containing fewer
words per turn and Unknowing dialogues containing more words per turn (p= 0.02).
There is no significant difference between the number of words typed per turn in the
Control and Unknowing conditions (p= 0.74), nor Knowing and Control conditions
(p= 0.35). A nonparametric Kruskal Wallis independent samples test shows that the
total number of words typed was not significantly affected by the condition (H(2) =
0.283, p= 0.87) and there is no significant effect of condition on the number of turns
per dialogue (H(2) = 3.556 , p= 0.17).
Typing time
Table 5.2 provides details of the typing time in milliseconds and the speed of typing
for each condition.
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Condition Avg. Type Time Avg. Speed
Control Mean 16005.50 3.09
Std. Deviation 8118.06 0.88
Unknowing Mean 17279.88 3.72
Std. Deviation 10793.22 1.17
Knowing Mean 12988.29 3.26
Std. Deviation 5300.58 0.81
Total Mean 15424.56 3.36
Std. Deviation 8 430.84 0.99
Table 5.2 Typing Time and Speed per condition, per participant
Figure 5.4 shows the boxplot for the mean duration spent constructing a message
across conditions.
Fig. 5.4 Boxplot of Average Typing Time for Message Construction per Condition
Figure 5.5 displays the boxplot for the mean typing speed of participants across
conditions.
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Fig. 5.5 Boxplot of Average Typing Speed per Condition
Typing time averaged by participant was analysed using a Generalised Linear
Mixed Models analysis (GLMM) with a Gamma distribution because the timing data
was positively skewed. Participants was included as a random factor and condition as
a fixed factor. This shows a clear main effect of condition (F(2,59)=13.18, p<0.00).
The estimated marginal means are: Control: 12,139, Unknowing: 13,404 and
Knowing: 8,813. Pairwise Contrasts show that the Knowing condition has shorter
typing times than Control (t = -3.606, p<0.00) and shorter than the Unknowing
condition (t = -4.87, p<0.00) but Unknowing and Control are not reliably different
(t = 1.16, p=0.25).
Self edits
Table 5.3 provides details of the various self-edits participants made during turn
construction, such as deletion and insertion of characters before pressing send to
relay the message to their partner.
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Condition Self-edits (Inserts) Self-edits (Deletion)
Control Mean 0.25 53.32
Std. Deviation 3.79 125.10
Unknowing Mean 0.31 73.38
Std. Deviation 0.68 169.25
Knowing Mean 0.03 20.41
Std. Deviation 0.10 49.01
Total Mean 0.20 49.01
Std. Deviation 0.47 118.79
Table 5.3 Self edits per condition, per participant
Figure 5.6 displays the relative distributions of self-edits (inserts) during message
construction as a boxplot.
Fig. 5.6 Boxplot of Average Self-edits (inserts) per condition
The mean number of self-edit insertions per turn is substantially lower in the
Knowing condition than the Control and Unknowing conditions. A Kruskal Wallis
test shows that there is a significant omnibus effect of condition on the number
of Self-edits (Inserts) per participant (H(2) = 7.761, p=0.02). A post hoc pairwise
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comparison using the Dunn’s method shows that there are significantly fewer Self-
edits (Inserts) in the Knowing condition than the Unknowing condition (p=0.04), but
no significant difference between Knowing and Control (p=0.06), nor Unknowing
and Control condition (p=1.0). The mean number of self-edit deletions per turn
is higher in the Unknowing condition than the Control and Knowing conditions
(see fig. 5.7). However, a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows that there is no
significant effect of condition on the number of Self-edits (Deletions) (H(2) = 4.560,
p=0.10).
Figure 5.7 displays the relative distributions of self-edits (deletes) during message
construction as a boxplot.
Fig. 5.7 Boxplot of Average Self-edits (deletion) per condition
5.6.2 Epistemic Strength
Table 5.4 provides mean frequencies of epistemic markers, adverbials of certainty,
adverbials of uncertainty and combined uncertainty markers (adverbials, hedges,








Control Mean 0.28 0.54 4.69
Std. Dev. 0.25 0.32 1.12
Knowing Mean 0.33 0.55 4.60
Std. Dev. 0.34 0.21 1.19
Unknowing Mean 0.67 0.65 4.69
Std. Dev. 0.35 0.39 0.88
Total Mean 0.43 0.58 4.66
Std. Dev. 0.35 0.31 1.04
Table 5.4 Epistemic markers
A non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows that there is an omnibus effect
of condition on the frequency of certainty adverbials (H(2) = 7.501 p=0.02). A
post-hoc pairwise comparison Dunn’s test shows that there are significantly more
certainty adverbials in the Unknowing condition compared to the Control condition
(p=0.04), but no significant difference in frequencies between the Control and
Knowing (p=1.00), nor Knowing and Unknowing conditions (p=0.08). A non-
parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows that there is no omnibus effect of condition on
the mean frequencies of uncertainty adverbials (H(2) = 0.742 p=0.69) or combined
uncertainty markers (H(2) = 0.148 p=0.93).
Figure 5.8 displays a boxplot showing the frequencies of certainty adverbs across
conditions.
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Fig. 5.8 Boxplot of Certainty Adverbials
Figure 5.9 displays a boxplot showing the frequencies of uncertainty adverbials
across conditions.
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Fig. 5.9 Boxplot of Uncertainty Adverbials
Figure 5.10 displays a boxplot showing the frequencies of combined uncertainty
markers across conditions.
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Fig. 5.10 Boxplot of Combined Uncertainty Markers
5.6.3 Markers of Contrast and Negation
Table 5.5 provides details of the mean frequencies of contrast and Negation Markers
normalised per hundred words, for each condition.
Condition Contrast Markers Negation
Control Mean 1.54 1.04
Std. Deviation 0.69 0.32
Unknowing Mean 1.69 1.52
Std. Deviation 0.63 0.41
Knowing Mean 1.51 1.38
Std. Deviation 0.55 0.80
Total Mean 1.64 1.31
Std. Deviation 0.64 0.57
Table 5.5 Contrast and Negation
Figure 5.11 displays a boxplot showing the frequencies of negations across
conditions.
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Fig. 5.11 Boxplot of Negation Frequencies
Figure 5.12 displays a boxplot showing the frequencies of contrast markers across
conditions.
There is no significant difference in the frequency of contrast markers across
conditions, as confirmed by a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test (H(2) = 1.210,
p=0.55). There is however, a significant difference in the frequency of negation
across conditions. A non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test confirms an omnibus effect
of condition on negation frequency (H(2) = 6.088, p<0.05), with a post hoc pairwise
comparison with Dunn’s test showing that there is significantly more negation in
Unknowing than Control (p=0.04), but no significant difference between Unknowing
and Knowing (p=0.535) nor Control and Knowing (p=0.79).
5.6.4 Deliberation Quality
Table 5.6 details the mean number of changes from a given stance position to another
per participant over the course of the dialogue for each condition, as well as the total
number of possible alternatives considered.
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Control 4.85 3.10 14.50% 56.70%
Std. Dev. 1.843 0.968 11.10 27.77
Unknowing 6.80 3.30 13.36% 67.89%
Std. Dev. 2.628 0.657 12.63 17.64
Knowing 4.55 2.75 19.37% 56.53%
Std. Dev. 1.605 0.550 17.54 30.33
Total Mean 5.40 3.05 15.75% 60.37%
Std. Dev. 2.271 0.769 14.04 25.95
Table 5.6 Mean Stance shifts During Dialogue and Possible Solutions Considered
per participant by condition
There are a third more stance shifts in the Unknowing condition than the Control
and Knowing conditions. A Kruskal Wallis non-parametric test shows that there is a
significant omnibus effect of condition on the number of stance shifts traversed by a
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participant (H(2) = 9.559 p<0.01). A planned pairwise post hoc comparison using
the Dunn’s test shows that there are significantly more stance shifts in the Unknowing
condition than the Knowing condition (p=0.01) but no confirmed significant effect
between Unknowing and Control (p=0.06). Figure 5.13 displays a boxplot showing
the mean number of shifts in stance position by participant across conditions.
Fig. 5.13 Boxplot of Total Number of Stance Shifts per Participant
There is an omnibus effect of condition on number of possible solutions consid-
ered (H(2) = 6.146 p<0.05). There are more possible solutions considered in the
Unknowing condition than the Knowing condition (p=0.04). However, there is no
significant difference between Knowing and Control (p=0.33) and nor Control and
Unknowing conditions (p=.1.00).
Figure 5.14 displays a boxplot showing the mean number of possible solutions
considered per participant across conditions.
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Fig. 5.14 Boxplot of Number of Solutions Considered
There is no significant difference in when the first opinion (H(2) = 1.429 p=0.49)
nor last opinion (H(2) = 1.712 p=0.43) is reached across conditions.
Amount of Conversation Spent in Concord versus Discord
Table 5.7 provides details of the mean percentage of turns in which participant A and
B had matching and opposing stance states across conditions.
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Total Mean 40.15% 59.85%
Std. Dev. 0.20
Table 5.7 Mean percent of dialogue in which participant A and B had matching and
opposing stance positions
The distributions show approximately 16% difference in the ratio of opposing and
matching stance positions between Knowing and Unknowing conditions, with more
turns covered with opposing stances in the Knowing condition and more matching
stances in the Unknowing Condition. However, a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis
test find no significant effect of condition on the distribution of oppositional and
matching stance states amongst participants (H(2) = 3.850 p=0.15).
5.6.5 Pronoun Usage
Table 5.8 provides mean frequencies of self-referencing, other-referencing and
collective pronoun frequencies, per 100 word,per dyad, for each condition.
Condition Me/My/I You/Yours We/Ours Total
Pro-
nouns
Control Mean 1.30 0.47 0.64 36.10
Std. Dev. 0.51 0.26 0.43 9.92
Unknowing Mean 1.44 0.49 0.74 50.10
Std. Dev. 0.51 0.25 0.33 19.82
Knowing Mean 1.16 0.61 0.91 44.40
Std. Dev. 0.38 0.32 0.46 14.41
Total Mean 1.30 0.52 0.76 43.53
Std. Dev. 0.47 0.27 0.41 15.85
Table 5.8 Individual, Other and Collective Personal Pronouns Normalised per 100
words and Mean frequencies of Total Pronouns per dyad
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A non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows no effect of condition on the fre-
quency of self-referencing personal pronouns per 100 (H(2) = 1.987, p=0.37), nor
other-referencing personal pronouns (H(2) = 1.443, p=0.49). There is also no signifi-
cant effect of condition on the frequency of collective personal pronouns per 100 as
confirmed by a non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test (H(2) = 1.215, p=0.55).
5.6.6 Post-hoc Analysis
Some additional post-hoc analysis was conducted on the experiment data. As a
follow on from the previous experiment, to assess what impact our stance marking
insertions had upon the levels of agreement and disagreement within the dialogues,
the frequencies of turn-initial Agreement, Disagreement and Update markers, were
examined.
Turn-Initial Agreement, Disagreement and Update Markers
Table 5.9 details the mean frequencies of turn-initial Agreement, Disagreement and
Update Markers per 100 turns, per condition:
Condition TI Agreement TI Disagreement TI Update
Control Mean 25.15 22.70 2.10
Std. Deviation 18.51 30.84 1.73
Unknowing Mean 22.25 10.18 2.0
Std. Deviation 14.45 3.79 1.08
Knowing Mean 20.84 12.20 4.70
Std. Deviation 19.07 5.08 1.68
Total Mean 27.90 16.37 3.47
Std. Deviation 31.62 11.17 5.61
Table 5.9 Turn-Initial Markers
Figure 5.15 displays a boxplot for turn-initial agreement marker frequencies.
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Fig. 5.15 Boxplot of Turn-initial Agreement Marker Frequencies
Figure 5.16 displays a boxplot for turn-initial disagreement marker frequencies.
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Fig. 5.16 Boxplot of Turn-initial Disagreement Marker Frequencies
Figure 5.17 displays a boxplot for turn-initial update marker frequencies.
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Fig. 5.17 Boxplot of Turn-initial Update Marker Frequencies
A non-parametric Kruskal Wallis test shows no statistically significant effect of
condition on the frequency of turn-initial Agreement Markers, (H(2) = 0.794, p=
0.67), turn-initial Disagreement Markers, (H(2) = 0.560, p= 0.76), nor turn-initial
update markers (H(2) = 0.148, p= 0.93).
5.7 Discussion
5.7.1 Stance Shifts and Alternatives considered
In line with our prediction, the results show that framing statements as unknowing led
to more deliberation in the dialogues. Not only were there a higher numbers of shifts
in stance, indicating a thorough deliberation going back and forth over the possible
solutions, there was also a fuller exploration of the total possible solutions (i.e.
participants in the Unknowing condition were more likely to consider all of the four
possible outcomes, and consider each person to be ejected rather than just sticking to
a one or two). This supports our hypothesis that ‘I think’ positioned assertions as
more ‘knowing’, and caused a closing down of the discussion and reduced the quality
and coverage of the deliberation. Conversely, as predicted, presenting opinions as
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‘unknowing’ improved the deliberative quality of the dialogue, with more ideas and
positions exchanged and elaborated on.
5.7.2 Message Construction: typing speed, time and self edits
The results show that the introduction of the knowing stance marker ‘I think’ leads
to fewer words per turn, i.e. shorter, or more terse responses. This greater efficiency
in the construction of dialogue turns, suggests that the introduction of the knowing
stance marker leads to more direct exchange of opinions. This directness is also
supported by the fewer edits during turn construction in this condition. Less care
is taken in the Knowing condition to alter the message prior to relaying it to a
conversational partner, perhaps leading to less delicately constructed or polite turns,
but more direct and less guarded opinion exchange. The results show that prefacing
statements with a knowing preface (i.e. ‘I think’) forecloses the conversation.
5.7.3 Speaker Commitment
Counter to our predictions there was no significant effect of condition on the fre-
quency of expressions of uncertainty. However, significantly more certainty adver-
bials are employed by participants in the Unknowing condition compared to the
Control condition. This suggests that framing contributions as unknowing creates an
environment in which participants are more likely to make manifest their commit-
ment to a stance by upgrading the epistemic strength of a statement through certainty
adverbials; as solutions are discussed more and potentially co-constructed, once a
stance is established it can be committed to with greater conviction by participants
in the Unknowing Condition. So, although the Knowing Condition features less
guarded and more direct messages as indicated in the manner in which they are
constructed, it is in the Unknowing Condition that speakers commit more firmly to
the substantive essence of their utterance.
Interpreting these results together suggests that the introduction of ‘Do you think’
opens up the dialogue, inviting further elaboration of the topic at hand, while intro-
ducing ‘I think’ closes down the dialogue and limits the deliberative quality of the
discussion. ‘Do you think’ positions the speaker in a position of unknowing epis-
temic status, and also directly invokes the hearer to collaborate in the co-construction
of a joint stance. In the Unknowing Condition, stance positions are more explicitly
emphasised through certainty adverbials and negation, i.e. when something is impor-
tant, speakers take care to make clear the focus of their stance and emphasise the
strength of commitment to a given proposition. In part this may be due to the fact that
‘do you think’ directly invites input and therefore greater care is taken to make clear
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exactly what the opinion to which they are attaching themselves is. The interactive
negotiation of the stance is more exaggerated. Conversely, the introduction of ‘I
think’ to the dialogue has the opposite effect: the presentation of a knowing stance,
leads to less consideration and more conviction among participants, demonstrated
through fewer edits when constructing responses and more terse and direct turns.
Opinions are expressed plainly and without additional specification.
5.7.4 Pronoun Usage
Counter to our hypothesis, manipulations to the degree of knowingness did not
affect the use of personal pronouns. This may indicate that framing contributions as
unknowing doesn’t necessarily lead to more joint construction of stance, although the
fact that individuals spent more time considering a shared stance poses a challenge
to this. Or it may be that personal pronouns do not provide a robust enough indicator
of joint versus individual stance construction in this context.
5.8 Conclusion
In this Chapter the causal effects of epistemic status, as expressed through particular
stance markers, on the deliberative quality of a dialogue were investigated using an
experimental approach. Framing a statement as knowing has a significant impact on
the deliberative quality of a dialogue and decreases the likelihood that participants
will consider multiple possible solutions, shifting their opinion fewer times before
reaching a concluding stance. Furthermore, participants in the Unknowing Condition,
spent a larger proportion of dialogues considering one another’s stance. This suggests
that, within a discussion dialogue, the framing of a statement in a unknowing way can
lead to a more flexible deliberation process and a greater willingness to engage with
alternative viewpoints. Furthermore, being more considerate of one another’s views
was not necessarily to the detriment of expressing a position with conviction; one
explanation for the higher frequencies of certainty adverbials could be that adding
‘do you think’ led to greater displays of speaker commitment to a stance one a stance
position was settled upon. However, although the unknowing condition differed from
the control, it did not differ from the knowing condition to a level deemed significant
(p= 0.08), which makes this proposal less concrete and further investigation would
be needed to confirm if this is the case.
Framing a statement as knowing affects the ways in which individuals produce
messages; specifically, framing as messages as knowing led to fewer insert-edits.
This suggests that there is less care taken in the construction of messages, and less
conscientious effort put into producing polite, or considered turns.
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The length of message was affected by condition but it is not possible to determine
whether framing as contributions as knowing led to shorter responses or framing
as contributions as unknowing led to longer responses, as neither knowing nor
unknowing differed from the control). However, it does appear that the two markers
are having acting upon different ends of a spectrum in terms of opening up or closing
down the dialogue.
Shorter messages are typically more direct and the fewer insert-edits may reflect
decreased guardedness. one way to interpret this is that by prefacing statements with
‘I think’, the context is set for the exchange of opinions; by introducing a stance
with a knowing marker, the appropriateness of a response that is equally direct is
established. Conversely, introducing a contribution with ‘Do you think’ simply puts
it on the table for further discussion, directly inviting for input, and therefore a
lengthier response.
Overall it seems that marking stances with a knowing preface leads to more
direct and unguarded exchanges, but does not improve the deliberative quality of
the dialogues. Conversely, prefacing statements with the unknowing preface ‘do
you think’ encourages a more collaborative deliberation, in which more possible
solutions are considered in turn before a final decision is reached.
Chapter 6
Discussion and Conclusion
In this thesis we have presented an experimental approach for examining the causal
effects of exposed (dis)agreement and stance constructions with differing levels of
knowingness in dialogue. In particular it has addressed how such constructions
can serve to open up or close down discussion dialogues. This has focused on a
comparison of exposed agreement and disagreement with an interlocutor and the
framing of an opinion as knowing or unknowing. In both experiments a motivating
factor was a desire to better understand how the construction and framing of discur-
sive content could support constructive engagement and lead to more considered
discussion dialogues, with additional viewpoints considered.
6.1 Introduction
The results of this thesis suggest that the ways in which people negotiate the various
positions proposed during an interaction is managed through a range of subtle linguis-
tic devices, and that the consequences of how a speaker presents their position can
have non-trivial effects. In line with the literature, we demonstrate that constructions
which explicitly challenge or dismiss another speaker’s position (e.g. you’re wrong),
rarely occur, and when artificially inserted they disrupt dialogues and frustrate the
potential for deliberation. These findings concur with Angouri (2012); Chiu (2008),
which highlight that impoliteness is a key influential factor that can affect how
speaker challenges are interpreted and responded to. Thus, despite the intuition that
adversity is a necessary precursor to considered and thoughtful dialogue, the ways
in which speakers convey opposition is essential to the constructive outcomes of an
interaction.
However, although explicitly announcing a disagreement is rare, positioning
content as oppositional is still possible and is achieved through in a variety of ways.
Furthermore, it is not simply about explicitly marking what is said as oppositional,
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but rather that it is newsworthy, substantive or fundamental to the integration and
progression of the ongoing dialogue. While directly disagreeing with an interlocutor
can lead to disengagement which closes down the dialogue space, more subtle devices
which mark what is being said as a substantive, or with potential consequences for
the ongoing interaction can play an important role in deliberative dialogues. This
interpretation supports the wider work on discourse markers and pragmatic particles,
which have been shown to aid hearer’s ability to recall aspects of a dialogue (Fox Tree
and Schrock, 1999, 2002; Liu and Tree, 2012) – and mark that attention ought to be
paid to what is being said.
The other factor at play, is the management of interpersonal relations. Qualitative
studies have revealed specific phenomena associated with disagreement, such as
delays and the prefacing of disagreement with agreement (for example, "Oh yes,
she is a lovely girl, but she can be problematic") (Pomerantz, 1987); this attends to
something other than marking content as substantive, namely the face of participants
in an interaction. Heritage’s work on epistemic status highlights how this continually
shifting engine of balance and imbalance drives contributions in a dialogue. The
experimental work on knowingness presented in this thesis highlights the significance
of how a speaker’s commitment to a positions can directly influence the chance that
alternative solutions are considered. The implications of this suggest that how
people put forth a position, and the perceived attachment they have to it, alters
co-conversants ability to comment on, and collaborative co-construct a position. If
issued with less overt commitment there is additional space for negotiation of the
specific terms of agreement or consensus. How propositions are put forth, therefore,
can be a significant in the creation of a dialogical context in which deliberation can
occur.
6.2 Summary of Contribution
Chapter 3 presented a study of a large corpus of everyday conversations, in which the
distribution of speaker’s markers of (dis)agreement, updates, contrast and emphasis
was compared across samples of direct speech and reports of their own speech and
the speech of others. The analysis showed that exposed disagreement occurs very
rarely, but that there are a variety of other ways in which speaker’s signal that their
position is contrasting to what has come before. One of the most interesting among
these is the way people mark their rights to speak about something. The use of
such resources as reported speech and prefacing incongruent content with discourse
markers (e.g. ‘well’) can be important when constructing and presenting a stance
position and in the management epistemic status and face concerns.
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In line with existing research, the corpus analysis of ordinary conversation
highlighted that exposed and direct disagreement occurs very rarely. However,
exposed agreement also occurred relatively infrequently. The context of reported
speech was investigated as a site in which the potential face-threat of disagreeing with
an interlocutor was removed or reduced. While exposed disagreement was not more
common in reported speech, it was distinct from direct speech (non-reports), in a
number of ways, which support the interpretation of reported speech as an interactive
evidential proposed by Clift (2006a,b), and its role as a stance marker. The content
framed as reports highlighted the substance of the difference, the oppositional
stance, as evident by higher frequencies of contrastive markers and negation. This
highlighted the various ways in which speakers mark oppositional content and
employ evidential devices to convey their position to their co-conversants.
What the corpus study could not shed light on was what happens when people do
directly disagree with a co-conversant in an unmitigated manner. While Chiu (2008)
found that polite disagreement was beneficial to advancing dialogues and led to
novel contributions, what of impolite or more direct ways of exposing disagreement?
An experiment was presented that used a method that allowed fine-grained manip-
ulations of text based dialogues in real-time. Exposed agreement and disagreement
fragments were inserted into a discussion dialogue. As exposed disagreement occurs
so rarely in natural conversation this afforded us a unique opportunity to ascertain
the interactional effect of exposed disagreement on a dialogue. Furthermore, Chiu
(2008) suggests that agreement can be problematic for discursive contexts. The
effect of agreement on the expansion or contraction of dialogic space has garnered
much less attention, and in constructing our experiment in chapter 4, it was possible
for us to directly compare the effect of agreement and disagreement on the course of
a dialogue.
The findings showed that the insertion of explicit disagreement violates the con-
ventions of polite dialogue, leading participants to put more effort into the production
of their replies. Insertions of exposed disagreement disrupt dialogues, bringing the
topic of disagreement directly into the conversation, provoking clarification requests
and resulting in a greater number of self-edits when formulating turns. The insertion
of disagreement also led to more instances of exposed agreement, suggesting that
dialogue partners co-operate to redress the face-threat of disagreement. Conversely,
exposed agreement insertions were not as incongruous and had less disruptive impact
on the ensuing dialogues. However, introducing agreement into the dialogue did lead
to greater deliberation, with more alternative scenarios considered by participants
during the task. One interpretation of this would be to conclude that being polite, and
thus creating a supportive discussion environment is more important that exposing
contrary viewpoints.
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Contrary to the findings on polite disagreement by Chiu (2008), direct disagree-
ment did not improve the quality of deliberation. Rather, in line with Pomerantz
(1984a), chapter 4 demonstrated the socially problematic effect of disagreeing in
a direct and unmitigated manner with an interlocutor. The insertions of explicit
disagreement clearly violated norms and conventions of polite dialogue, leading
to extra composition and editing of reply turns in response. Furthermore, while
in part, it was hypothesised that disagreement could be productive and serve to
move the dialogue on, direct disagreement did not have this effect: the dialogue
space was closed down by the introduction of exposed disagreement; thus it was not
interpreted as, nor did it foster, constructive engagement. By comparison, however,
the introduction of agreement fragments into a dialogue did lead to more possible
viewpoints being consulted.
Chapter 5 facilitated the examination of a more subtle facet of discursive dia-
logue, namely the framing of a stance as knowing or unknowing. This enabled the
manipulation of oppositional content in a less face-threatening manner, but with
differing degrees of ‘knowingness’. Rather than intervening in the presentation of
direct agreement or disagreement, in this experiment we were able to manipulate the
way in which propositional content was presented to interlocutors. Building on the
work of Heritage (2012a,b), we were able to systematically test the precise effects of
altering the knowingness of speaker contributions, and demonstrate a causal relation
to the deliberative quality of a dialogue.
The results show that how knowingly a position is presented can have significant
effects on the quality of the ensuing deliberation. In particular, when assertions were
framed as unknowing and directly invited participants to co-construct stance posi-
tions, more diverse opinions were consulted by both parties in the dialogue. Marking
speaker stance as knowing led to more direct and unguarded exchanges, but did not
improve the deliberative quality of the dialogues. Conversely, framing statements
as less knowing increased the likelihood that participants engage with and consider
more alternative viewpoints before reaching a concluding stance, thus increasing
the deliberative quality of a dialogue. By investigating the impact of altering the
epistemic framing of a stance as ‘knowing’ or ‘unknowing’, this thesis demonstrates
the interactional effect of more subtle devices for presenting oppositional content in
dialogue.
In combination, these studies have advanced the understanding of the causal
effects of disagreement and degrees of knowingness in discursive contexts, namely
that while exposed disagreement is problematic and does not foster constructive
engagement, reducing the degree of knowingness with which assertions are put forth
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can contribute to a discussion context in which the reconsideration of multiple stance
positions are encountered.
6.3 Potential Applications of the Study
By investigating the impact of altering the epistemic framing of a stance as ‘knowing’
or ‘unknowing’, this thesis assesses the interactional effect of more subtle devices for
presenting oppositional content in dialogue. Potential applications of this research
include training guidelines for facilitators of deliberation or individuals developing
tools which aim to promote more considered debate. There is also a wider implication
for computational approaches to argumentation, in that it highlights the importance
of interpersonal dynamics and identifies stance construction as a key resource for
formulating polite arguments; consequently, stance markers may be particularly
useful for detecting informal argument in socially generated data.
6.4 Limitations and Further Work
The experimental work presented in this thesis focuses on dyadic interaction. How
epistemic status and the management of face is negotiated in multi-party interaction
would need further consideration. Additionally, the specific ways in which the
findings of the thesis, such as how constructive engagement in the deliberative
process can be improved by presenting contributions as less knowing could actually
be integrated into online tools would need additional research.
Recent developments to the DiET Toolkit have made it possible to log the
character by character insertions and deletions made while constructing a turn
to relay to a interlocutor. Since both of our experiments show that an effect of
intervention on the message construction, formulation and editing before sending
a turn, it a series of experiments using this additional functionality could provide
useful insights into the cognitive processes involved in managing the reception and
response to socially problematic content in contexts in which the management of
diverse viewpoints is critical.
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PARTICIPANT INSTRUCTION SHEET : BALLOON TASK
Please choose a nickname and then read ALL of this text before starting.
The task is to collaborate with your partner to resolve a dilemma. To do this you will be 
using:
(1) A character-by-character chat tool (the experimenter will explain how this works)
You use this window to communicate. 
The situation
Three people are in a hot air balloon. The balloon is losing height and about to crash 
into the mountains. Having thrown everything imaginable out of the balloon, including 
food, sandbags and parachutes, their  only hope is for one of them to jump to their 
certain death to give the balloon the extra height to clear the mountains and save the 
other two.  But who is it to be?
The three people are:
Dr.  Nick Rivers  – a  cancer  research  scientist  who  believes  he  is  on  the  brink  of 
discovering a cure for most common types of cancer. He is a good friend of Tom and 
Susie Derkins.
Mrs. Susie Derkins – a primary school teacher. She is over the moon because she is 7 
months pregnant with her second child. 
Mr. Tom Derkins – the balloon pilot. He is the husband of Susie, who he loves very 
much. He is also the only one with any balloon flying experience.
Your Task
You must discuss the pros and cons of keeping each of the three people in the balloon 
with your partner, and come to an agreement about who should be thrown out…
Balloon Task Questionnaire  
Please complete this form after you have finished the Balloon Task. 
Title of Study:  
Investigation into the effects of a network-based chat tool on human dialogue & problem-solving  
 
Name used in chat tool ……………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
Who did you agree should be thrown off the balloon? …………………………………………………….…… 
Do you think this was the correct decision? ………………………………………………………………yes/no 
If no, who did you think it should be?...…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
How easy to come to an agreement did you find it? (please circle) 
Very easy  
Neither easy 
nor difficult 
 Very difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
How easy did you think the discussion was to follow? (please circle) 
Very easy  
Neither easy 
nor difficult 
 Very difficult 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 




 The same  
Much less 
smoothly 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 










Thank you for taking part in this study! 
 
Does the initiator edit, amend, or reprise part of their
contribution before another participant responds to it?
YES           NO
Is the edit, amendment, or reprise introduced to
change the meaning of the contribution?
Is this contribution introduced to edit, amend, or
reprise a previous contribution by the initiator?
NO          YES
Was this edit, amendment, or reprise requested or
intentionally prompted by another participant?
Repair is
P3, OI, SR
YES           NO
Request/Prompt
is  P2 NTRI
Repair is
P3, SI, SR
Is this contribution introduced to propose repetition or
revision of another participant’s contribution?
P2 OI, OR
YES           NO
P2, NTRI,
(Incomplete)
YES           NO
P1, SI, SR,
(Articulation)
Does the revision occur before completion (or
a possible completion) of the contribution?






Does the initiator also provide
a proposed revision?
Repeat until no new instances are detected
End
Does the other participant acknowledge
or accept the proposal to repeat or revise
their contribution?
YES           NO
P2 NTRI
Is this contribution introduced to accept or confirm another participant’s
interpretation of one of the initiator’s previous contributions?
End
YES           NO
YES           NO
Is this revision completed
by another participant?
YES           NO
P1, SI, SR
(Formulation )
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A.2 Hedging and Boosting uses of ‘I think’ in the con-
trol conditions of experiment 1
Turn Label
I think because there’s an element of risk with whether Nick will actually
end up coming up with a cure for cancer
emphasis
I think Tom should definitely stay in the balloon emphasis
I think Nick should definitely be the one to go emphasis
i think we should stop now emphasis
I think the doctor would be willing to sacrifice himself, as he’s a good
friend of theirs
emphasis
i think overall unknown
I think the doctor would jump to his certain death emphasis
i think its going to be pretty difficult to try and steer the balloon emphasis
i think we have a couple mins left hedge
i think we have made the right decision hedge
i think unknown
i think when they land the best 2 people for survival skills will be the 2
men
emphasis
i think the dr should jump emphasis
i think its just us emphasis/ambiguous*
I think thats actually gonna be the best idea emphasis
i think nick emphasis
i think so hedge
i think what we said first emphasis
i think tom emphasis
i think making [h]er stay alive will be worse punishemnt emphasis
i think dr nick would be good to keep because cancer is a huge problem
in the world and no1 has found a cure for it yet and it would be good if
he found it
emphasis
i think we did this in school hedge
i think that too emphasis
i think i’d go insane if i had to make that decision emphasis
I think Tom wouldn’t live with himself if Susie went. He loves her very
much.
emphasis
Table A.1 Coding of pragmatic effect of turn-initial ‘I think’ as hedge, emphasis or
other
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*Sequentially this is issued in response to the other participant asking if they
think the researchers are reading what they are typing, and it read more as a dismissal
of this; however, it is not possible to confirm this.
Turn Label
but i think we should think about the most valuable lives, not the quantity emphasis
he might be but i think its unlikely that he is exaggerating emphasis
whenever i think that nick should go, i think "Are susie and tom really
that important?"
other
im still leaning towards nick staying o but i think we should finalise the
decision
emphasis
as a dad i think he would want to see his wife and children live emphasis
and even if Tom explained the basics to them, I think he’d be in a pretty
panicky mood
emphasis
however in this otherwise justified decision I think thats alright emphasis
yh basically i think the first person that needs to stay on the hot air
balloon is mr tom
emphasis
I’m gonna fill in the sheet now, I think our time is up hedge
the way I think of it is logistical who is going to be helped other
okay i think thats the decision we would stick with emphasis
ok honestly i think tom emphasis
however i think if the cancer research scientist knew how to pilot the
balloon, him and susie should stay on
emphasis
so i think nick shud go emphasis
and i think the others could do that hedge
but then again i think they’d prefer him then either one of them emphasis
tbh i think no one should jump. they took the hot air balloon ride
together
emphasis
but i think we should confirm emphasis
No - pretty good I think. I saw a balloon crash land and everyone was
ok, bit shaken.
hedge
Table A.2 Coding of pragmatic effect of ‘I think’ (non-turn-initial) as hedge, emphasis
or other
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A.3 Intercoder Reliability for Experiment 1
A second annotator was provided with the sub-sample of data and a set of written
instructions. After reading the instructions and discussing for 10-15 minutes, I sat
with the annotator and we talked through an example transcript to ensure that they
felt comfortable with the task at hand and understood the instructions.
A.3.1 Instructions for second coder
Hello and thank you for agreeing to annotate these three dialogue transcripts.
We are trying to capture the decision making process that the participants go
through during the dialogue.
Therefore, your task is to label the current ‘stance position’ of each dialogue
participant at the end of each turn (or row) in the dialogue transcript.
There is a column which corresponds to each participant’s stance position, la-
belled with their name. Inside each column you can label the participant’s stated
position on whether the corresponding character should be killed (K), saved (S) or if
they are undecided (u) about their fate.
If they strongly state that the wish to have a character die then the others are
marked as saved. If they show some doubt then the stance position annotation
changes to undecided. The stance position stays the same and carries over to the
next row unless the text contradicts the stance position.
If more than one individual is up being considered for sacrifice then they would
both be marked with a U for undecided. If they know that they want to save one
person but are not agreed on who to kill then you would have S for saved in that
character’s column and U in the other two characters’ columns.
Presume that each participant starts as undecided about the fate of the character,
unless their first contribution clarifies otherwise. Continue through the spreadsheet
updating each row based on what you have read in the text entry for that row.
Stance positions to chose from:
• Save Susie but undecided on who should die
• Save Nick but undecided on who should die
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• Undecided
In the column marked Stance position shift, insert a ‘1’ if on that line one of the
participants’ ‘stance positions’ has been updated, and ‘0’ if it has not changed.
A.3.2 Example of annotation
Fig. A.1 Example annotation
Figure A.1 shows an excerpt from the example annotated transcript provided to the
annotator.
A.4 Intercoder Reliability for Experiment 2
A second annotator was provided with the sub-sample of data and a set of written
instructions. After reading the instructions and discussing for 10-15 minutes, I sat
with the annotator and we talked through an example transcript to ensure that they
felt comfortable with the task at hand and understood the instructions.
A.4.1 Instructions for second coder
In the column marked Stance position enter an annotation for each row based on
the corresponding message data. Based only on what is written in the text, for each
A.4 Intercoder Reliability for Experiment 2 153
line of dialogue select the appropriate annotation which conveys who the particiapnt
has stated should be killed. This need not necessarily convince you that they have
truly changed their opinion on the matter as this becomes complicated to decipher,
but judged on the message that they have typed, if it implies an alternative person
is being selected (even if only temporarily) to be sacrificed, note this down as your
annotation. The annotation should only record who the participant states should be
killed, and if this is not yet clear, or they have shown that they are undecided again
then you mark their stance status as undecided.





In the column marked Stance position shift, insert a ‘1’ if on that line one of the
participants’ ‘stance positions’ has been updated, and ‘0’ if it has not changed.
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A.4.2 Example of annotation
Fig. A.2 Example annotation





A Research Ethics Questionnaire was submitted and approved for the studies con-
tained within this thesis. The letter confirming this is included here, together with
the Participant Instructions and Consent form that were presented to all participants
who took part in the experiments.
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CS 410 
Department of Computer Science 
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Mile End 
London       29th September 2014 !
To Whom It May Concern: !
Re: QMREC1379a – Investigation into the Effects of a Chat Tool on Human 
Dialogue and Discussion Style.  
  
I can confirm that Ms Shauna Concannon has completed a Research Ethics 
Questionnaire with regard to the above research. !
The result of which was the conclusion that her proposed work does not present 
any ethical concerns; is extremely low risk; and thus does not require the 




Ms Hazel Covill 
Research Ethics Committee Administrator !
Patron: Her Majesty the Queen  
Incorporated by Royal Charter as Queen Mary 
and Westfield College, University of London
 
18. CONSENT FORM (guideline 18)  
Please complete this form after you have read the Information Sheet and listened to an explanation about the 
research. 
Title of Study:  
Investigation into the Effects of a Network-based Chat Tool on Human Dialogue and Problem-
Solving  
 
Queen Mary Research Ethics Committee Ref: ________________ 
 
• Thank you for considering taking part in this research. The person organizing the research must explain the 
project to you before you agree to take part.  
• If you have any questions arising from the Information Sheet or explanation already given to you, please ask 
the researcher before you decide whether to join in. You will be given a copy of this Consent Form to keep 
and refer to at any time.  
Please cross out as necessary 
Have you been asked to consent for yourself or on behalf of someone else?..................................................self/other 
Have you read the Information Sheet (Appendix A)?.............................................................................................yes/no 
Have you had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study?................................................................yes/no 
Who have you spoken to?................................................................................................................................................ 
Do you understand that you are free to withdraw from the study at any time without having to give a reason for 
withdrawing and will receive payment in full for participating?...............................................................................yes/no 
Do you understand that everything you type using the chat tool will be recorded (There is no audio            
recording)...............................................................................................................................................................yes/no 
Do you understand that you are free to decide after the task is completed whether you are happy for the recorded 
conversation to be studied and stored?.................................................................................................................yes/no 
Do you have some experience of using text-based chat tools such as MSN Messenger or ICQ?........................yes/no 
Have you declared your involvement in other research studies currently under way or undertaken in the last 12 
months?.................................................................................................................................................................yes/no 
Do you consent to the processing of your personal information for the purposes of this research study with the 
understanding that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the 
provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998?.........................................................................................................yes/no 
Do you agree to be contacted in the future by QMUL researchers who would like to invite you to participate in follow 
up studies to this project or in future studies of a similar nature?.........................................................................yes/no 
Do you understand that at any point after the experiment you are entitled to a “debriefing” to discuss any concerns 
that might have arisen due to having taken part in this study...............................................................................yes/no 
Participant’s Statement:  
I ___________________________________________ agree that the research project named above has been 
explained to me to my satisfaction and I agree to take part in the study. I have read both the notes written above 
and the Information Sheet about the project, and understand what the research study involves.  
Signed: Date:  
Investigator’s Statement:  
I ___________________________________________ confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands 
and any foreseeable risks (where applicable) of the proposed research to the volunteer.  
Signed: Date: 
 
17. INFORMATION SHEET (guideline 17) 
REC Protocol Number.…........... 
 
YOU WILL BE GIVEN A COPY OF THIS INFORMATION SHEET  
Investigation into the Effects of a Network-based Chat Tool on Human Dialogue 
and Problem-Solving  
We would like to invite you to participate in this original research project. You should only participate if 
you want to; choosing not to take part will not disadvantage you in any way. Your decision will not affect 
anything concerning your studies at Queen Mary. Before you decide whether you want to take part, it is 
important for you to understand why the research is being done and what your participation will involve. 
Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if 
there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. If you do decide to take part, 
please let us know beforehand if you have been involved in any other study during the last year.  
We are investigating the usability of a network-based chat program and maze game in order to study 
their effect on the way people interact with each other, and would like to ask you to participate in a study 
using these two programs. You will have two tasks.  One will involve communicating via the chat 
program, and the other will be to solve a series of maze puzzles.  In total, both tasks should take less 
than two hours. Afterwards we welcome any feedback about your experience using the programs. 
The conversation will be recorded and kept for study. The records will be anonymous: when you begin 
the task you will be asked to choose a nickname for the chat, and your real name will not be stored in the 
records. 
It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this 
information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form.  If you decide to take part you are still 
free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason.  In particular, after the tasks are complete you 
will be able to decide whether you are happy for the recorded conversation to be studied and stored. 
In the event of you suffering any adverse effects as a consequence of your participation in this study, you 
will be compensated through Queen Mary University of London’s ‘No Fault Compensation Scheme’. 
 
